Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine

Following the United States\u27 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq,\u27 the US government argued that the successor government in Iraq was not responsible for Iraq\u27s Saddam-era debt under the purported doctrine of odious-regime debt. This purported doctrine apparently excused--by operation of law--all successor regimes from repaying debts that were incurred by oppressive predecessor regimes. Here, Cheng presents three-part response regarding the purported rule that oppressive debts of a predecessor government do not bind its successor

Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration

This Article\u27s thesis is that, although arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration are not formally bound by precedent in the same manner as common-law judges, there is an informal, but powerful, system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to account for prior published awards and to stabilize international investment law. This informal system, however, imperfectly supports the relevant policy goals. It is additionally being tested by an increasing diversity of arbitrators, who are themselves facing pressures from investors and host States to meet conflicting demands. This Article proposes that the structure of investment treaty arbitration can absorb such stresses if: (a) the system of precedent is clarified and publicized to enable the global community to appraise awards and the arbitrators who render them; (b) investors and States exercise care in their selection of arbitrators; and (c) the community of international arbitrators exercises sufficient informal self-regulation and self-selection. This thesis is developed in three Parts. Part I discusses the concept and policies of precedent as it has developed in courts. Part II examines the extent to which these policies apply to investment treaty arbitration, and whether investment treaty arbitration has a system of precedent that promotes the relevant policy goals. Part III makes recommendations to further refine the system of precedent in response to emerging global trends, such as the economic growth of the People\u27s Republic of China and an increasing diversity of arbitrators from both developed and developing States

Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration

This Article\u27s thesis is that, although arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration are not formally bound by precedent in the same manner as common-law judges, there is an informal, but powerful, system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to account for prior published awards and to stabilize international investment law. This informal system, however, imperfectly supports the relevant policy goals. It is additionally being tested by an increasing diversity of arbitrators, who are themselves facing pressures from investors and host States to meet conflicting demands. This Article proposes that the structure of investment treaty arbitration can absorb such stresses if: (a) the system of precedent is clarified and publicized to enable the global community to appraise awards and the arbitrators who render them; (b) investors and States exercise care in their selection of arbitrators; and (c) the community of international arbitrators exercises sufficient informal self-regulation and self-selection. This thesis is developed in three Parts. Part I discusses the concept and policies of precedent as it has developed in courts. Part II examines the extent to which these policies apply to investment treaty arbitration, and whether investment treaty arbitration has a system of precedent that promotes the relevant policy goals. Part III makes recommendations to further refine the system of precedent in response to emerging global trends, such as the economic growth of the People\u27s Republic of China and an increasing diversity of arbitrators from both developed and developing States

Oscillations of complex networks

A complex network processing information or physical flows is usually characterized by a number of macroscopic quantities such as the diameter and the betweenness centrality. An issue of significant theoretical and practical interest is how such a network responds to sudden changes caused by attacks or disturbances. By introducing a model to address this issue, we find that, for a finite-capacity network, perturbations can cause the network to \emph{oscillate} persistently in the sense that the characterizing quantities vary periodically or randomly with time. We provide a theoretical estimate of the critical capacity-parameter value for the onset of the network oscillation. The finding is expected to have broad implications as it suggests that complex networks may be structurally highly dynamic.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures. submitte

THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN AID ON THE CREATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH Wenli Cheng, Dingsheng Zhang and Heng-Fu Zou*

This paper develops a model to study the effects of foreign aid on the creation and distribution of wealth in the recipient country. It considers three types of foreign aid: permanent grants to all individuals, temporary grants to uneducated workers, and foreign aid in the form of low interest rate loans to individuals who invest in education. The model shows that the economy may have two long-run equilibria, a rich equilibrium and a poor one. All types of foreign aid can increase the proportion of individuals investing in education, which means more people converging to the rich equilibrium and higher average wealth in the economy. In addition, if permanent or temporary grants are sufficient large, it is possible that the whole economy may converge to the rich equilibrium.foreign aid, overlapping-generations model, investment in education

On the connectedness of planar self-affine sets

In this paper, we consider the connectedness of planar self-affine set $T(A,\mathcal{D})$ arising from an integral expanding matrix $A$ with characteristic polynomial $f(x)=x^2+bx+c$ and a digit set $\mathcal{D}=\{0,1,\dots, m\}v$. The necessary and sufficient conditions only depending on $b,c,m$ are given for the $T(A,\mathcal{D})$ to be connected. Moreover, we also consider the case that ${\mathcal D}$ is non-consecutively collinear.Comment: 18 pages; 18 figure