Peranan ASEAN dalam kesalinghubungan pengangkutan rel di Asia: evolusi, faktor dan prospek

Pengkritik biasanya menggambarkan ‘ASEAN Way’ sebagai proses yang lembap dalam mempromosi integrasi serantau. Kritikan tersebut telah membawa kepada persoalan berhubung dengan peranan ASEAN dalam prospek kesalinghubungan fizikal serantau. Setakat ini memang terdapat kekurangan kajian ekonomi politik berkenaan dengan peranan ASEAN dalam perkembangan kesalinghubungan rel serantau di Asia. Oleh itu, kajian ini bertujuan memenuhi lompang penyelidikan tersebut. Artikel ini bermula dengan penyingkapan sejarah asal-usul perkembangan jaringan keretapi merentasi Asia sejak zaman imperialisme bagi mengkaji evolusi dan pelbagai faktor yang mempengaruhi perkembangan kesalinghubungan pengangkutan rel di rantau tersebut. Berdasarkan data sekunder berkenaan perkembangan rangkaian keretapi di Asia, analisis menunjukkan bahawa faktor ekonomi merupakan pendorong utama bagi setiap fasa perkembangan jaringan rel di rantau tersebut. Faktor tersebut bertambah penting berikutan dengan peningkatan penglibatan Asia dalam rangkaian pengeluaran global serta peningkatan perdagangan intra-ASEAN dan perdagangan dengan rantau lain sejak 1990-an. Hasil kajian mendapati bahawa kesalinghubungan pengangkutan rel di Asia berkembang mengikut konteks ekonomi politik rantau tersebut tanpa mengikut acuan institusi Kesatuan Eropah. Pelaksanaan polisi adalah terikat dengan perundangan Kesatuan Eropah. Pendekatan ASEAN yang berasaskan persefahaman dan autonomi nasional memberi fleksibiliti kepada negara-negara anggota ASEAN dalam pelaksanaan kesalinghubungan. Namun demikian, potensi ekonomi yang tinggi telah meningkatkan kehendak politik dan komitmen pemimpin-pemimpin ASEAN bagi memastikan kelancaran pelaksanaan jaringan rel Trans-Asian walaupun terdapat beberapa halangan dan masalah daripada segi politik dan geografi/teknikal. Justeru, prospek perkembangan jaringan TAR adalah cerah dengan gabungan peranan ASEAN, initiatif China dan Jepun melalui Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, Belt and Road Initiative dan Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, di samping bantuan teknikal dan kewangan daripada organisasi antarabangsa lain

Analyzing Malaysia's changing alignment choices, 1971-89

This article analyzes Malaysia’s changing policies toward China and other big powers during the period 1971-1989, as a case to illustrate how and why smaller states adjust their alignment choices in the wake of reduced strategic commitment of their big power patrons the way they do. It argues that it was due to the changing distribution of regional power in the face of the British East of Suez policy and the American retreat from mainland Southeast Asia in the late 1960s – in conjunction with domestic political considerations in the post-1969 period – that had compelled Malaysia’s ruling elite to replace the country’s long-standing pro-West policy with a new posture of “non-alignment” and “regional neutralization”. In the view of the elite, in order to get the big powers to recognize and guarantee the region as an area of neutrality, the Southeast Asian states should acknowledge and accommodate each of the major powers’ “legitimate interests”, while observing a policy of “equidistance” with all the powers. This new alignment posture necessitated the Tun Razak government to adjust its China policy, paving way for the Malaysia-China rapprochement of the early 1970s

Smaller states' alignment choices: A comparative study of Malaysia and Singapore's hedging behavior in the face of a rising China

This is a comparative study about smaller states' alignment choices in the face of a rising and proximate power. Specifically, it adopts the approach of structured, focused comparison of cases, examining how and why Malaysia and Singapore have responded to a rising China the way they have. The study indicates that Malaysia and Singapore's China policies share four basic features: economically, a pragmatic approach to maximize commercial benefits; diplomatically, an engagement policy to integrate China into the ASEAN-based regional institutions; politically, a dominance-denial position to prevent Beijing from evolving into an unchecked hegemon; and militarily, an indirect-balancing stance to prepare for a possible scenario of failed engagement. Despite these similarities, however, the two countries' policies are critically different in one important aspect. That is, while Malaysia has demonstrated a greater readiness to accommodate and utilize the growing Chinese power as a force to pursue its own interests, Singapore – due to its own domestic and geopolitical calculations – has rejected such a limited-bandwagoning approach. These findings highlight that smaller states often do not have to choose between balancing and bandwagoning; rather, under the conditions of high-uncertainties and high-stakes, smaller states tend to exhibit different degrees of "hedging" behavior, which, in essence, is a two-pronged approach of maximizing economic and diplomatic returns when things are fine, while simultaneously preparing for strategic contingency in order to mitigate the long-range risks surrounding the rise of a big power. That the two similarly-situated states have demonstrated dissimilar degrees of hedging behavior further suggests that, while the structural pressures amid the shifting distribution of power do compel both countries to opt for hedging, it is the dissimilar domestic factors that have driven them to hedge differently. These findings lead us to argue that, the substance of smaller states' reactions vis-à-vis a rising power is not determined by their concerns over the growing power gap per se; rather, it is a function of domestic legitimation through which the ruling elites seek to capitalize on the dynamics of the rising power for the ultimate goal of justifying their own political authority at home

Hedging via Institutions: ASEAN-led Multilateralism in the Age of the Indo-Pacific

This article unpacks the dynamics of group hedging in international relations by examining the Southeast Asian states’ collective efforts to use ASEAN-led multilateral institutions as a platform to hedge against a range of risks surrounding intensifying big-power rivalry and increasing global uncertainties. It argues that ASEAN’s collective hedging is a converged but not necessarily coordinated act. Despite the states’ diverging attributes and outlooks, they converge on shared vulnerabilities, collective memories, and disadvantaged positions. Southeast Asian states thus view ASEAN-based multilateralism as an indispensable, albeit insufficient, means to engage big powers and manage other challenges. Through the functions of institutional binding, buffering, and building, ASEAN’s group hedging serves to mitigate and offset risks while shaping Asian order amid deepening uncertainties in the age of the Indo-Pacific

Malaysia’s China policy in the post-Mahathir era : a neoclassical realist explanation

Malaysia’s China policy in the post-Cold War era – as an instance of a smaller state’s strategy toward a proximate and rising great power – has been characterized by three patterns. First, there was a shift from hostility and guarded rapprochement during the Cold War to cordiality and maturing partnership in the post-Cold War era. Second, despite the overall positive development, Malaysia’s China policy has remained, in essence, a hedging approach that is driven by both a pragmatic desire to maximize benefits from a closer relationship with the neighboring giant and a contingent calculation to guard against any long-term strategic risks in the uncertain regional environment. Third, such a two-pronged approach, which took shape since the 1990s under Mahathir Mohamad, has endured beyond the Mahathir era. Indeed, under his successors Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Najib Tun Razak, Malaysia has continued to pursue a policy of dualism vis-à-vis China. What explains the enduring continuity of the hedging approach in Malaysia’s China policy? This paper adopts a neoclassical realist perspective, arguing that the continuity is attributed to both structural and domestic factors. Domestically, the changing bases of political legitimation in the multi-ethnic country, which highlight the increasing salience of economic performance and political inclusiveness as key sources of moral authority to the UMNO-led coalition government, have necessitated the succeeding leaders to continue pursuing a pragmatic policy aimed at ensuring a stable and productive relationship with China, not least to gain from the steadily growing bilateral trade and the giant’s growing outward investment. Structurally, Malaysia’s position as a smaller state has compelled it to be constantly vigilant about the uncertainty of state intentions and inter-great power relations, which in turn demands it adopts contingent measures to hedge against longer-term risks. It is such structural and domestic determinants that have fundamentally shaped the country’s policy towards China in general and the South China Sea issue in particular, which characteristically bears the mark of a delicate dualism, i.e. an explicit preference for engaging China through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, but one that is backed by a low-key practice of maintaining and strengthening its traditional military links with its Western security partners. * An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 8th International Malaysian Studies Conference (MSC8), Bangi, 9 July 2012. I would like to thank Zakaria Haji Ahmad, Tang Siew Mun, Nor Azizan Idris, Chin Kok Fay, Ravichandran Moorthy, Heng Pek Koon, Lee Poh Ping, iii Stephen Leong, and Joseph Liow for their comments and suggestions to improve the paper. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the UKM Centre for Research and Innovation Management (CRIM)’s grant GGPM-2012-038, and the ISIS-UKM Project on Malaysia-China Relations. I also thank my research assistants Wong Chee Ming and Aini Raudhah Roslam for their help in data collection. All shortcomings are my own

An emerging 3rd pillar in Asian architecture? AIIB and other China-led initiatives

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Associate Professor, Strategic Studies and International Relations at the National University of Malaysia, explains that "the emerging institutional pole is China-centered [and] anchored on remuneration-calculated and identity-based 'common security'." The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization with which the author is affiliated

MALAYSIA’S U.S. policy under Najib: Ambivalence no more?

This paper adopts a neoclassical realist perspective to explain Malaysia’s evolving policy towards the United States under Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak. It argues that to the extent that there is a “shift” in Malaysia’s U.S. policy under the current leadership, the substance and symbolism in Najib’s U.S. policy has been driven and limited by the needs of the ruling elite to strike a balance between a variety of structural imperatives and domestic considerations. Structurally, in the face of a fast rising China (with whom Malaysia has come to develop an increasingly productive relation in both economic and diplomatic domains, but with whom it has unresolved territorial issues), the leader of the smaller state is increasingly confronted with the geostrategic need to keep a more balanced relationship with all the major players. This is especially so with the United States, which, under the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia policy, has demonstrated a renewed and enhanced commitment to engage countries in the Asia-Pacific, including Malaysia. This structural push, however, has been counteracted by the smaller state’s desire of not wanting to be entrapped in any big power rivalry, and by its concern about the uncertainties of great power commitments. Domestically, there is a strong economic need to further enhance two-way trade and increase the flow of American capital and technology into Malaysia, deemed vital to Najib’s Economic Transformation Program. Perhaps more importantly, there is also a political calculation by the governing elite to capitalize on the increasingly warm and close bilateral ties as a leverage to reduce – if not neutralize – Washington’s support for the Anwar Ibrahim-led opposition and civil society movements, which have presented a growing challenge to the ruling BN coalition. This calculation, however, has been counteracted by UMNO’s domestic concern of not wanting to appear too closely aligned with America, in order not to alienate the country’s Muslim majority voters who have been critical of U.S. policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These structural and domestic determinants together explain Malaysia’s evolving policy toward the superpower under the current leadership

“Hedging” di Laut China Selatan: analisis tindakan negara-negara Asia Tenggara

Pengurusan pertikaian di Laut China Selatan mesti mengambil kira perilaku “hedging” negara serantau. Hedging adalah pendirian tidak menyebelahi mana-mana pihak yang terlibat dalam perlumbaan kuasa, yang digandingi pelbagai tindakan yang bertentangan untuk offset risiko yang mungkin muncul, dan diiringi usaha berterusan bagi menyediakan ruang contingency atau jalan keluar jika wujud sesuatu kebuntuan. Kecenderungan hedging seperti ini bukan hanya dipamerkan oleh negara penuntut, bahkan oleh negara bukan penuntut. Sebenarnya, tindakan assertif China yang kian meningkat, dan strategi Indo-Pasifik oleh A.S. yang kelihatan terumbang-ambing, menyebabkan negara-negara Asia Tenggara mengelakkan “balancing” (menjalin pakatan dengan A.S. bagi mengimbangi China); dan tiada satu pun negara kecil di rantau ini yang memilih “bandwagoning” (menerima hubungan secara berhierarki dengan China demi keuntungan, walaupun ini menjejaskan autonomi serta lain-lain kepentingan nasionalnya). Sebaliknya, mereka bertegas melaksanakan hedging. Apakah faktor yang mempengaruhi tindakan ini? Kertas ini menghujah bahawa kecenderungan dan tindakan hedging negara kecil adalah dipengaruhi oleh faktor struktural dan domestik. Faktor struktural menyebabkan negara lebih lemah berusaha mengelak daripada melonggokkan sepenuh harapannya kepada satu pihak tertentu sahaja. Ini disebabkan oleh keadaan tidak menentu yang berterusan mengenai niat China, komitmen A.S., dan masa depan hubungan China-A.S. Faktor domestik, terutamanya legitimasi politik elit pemerintah, mendorong sesebuah negara melaksanakan hedging demi untuk menangani risiko, menerusi pendekatan dasar yang dipelbagaikan. Perbincangan mengenai Laut China Selatan harus menerima realiti ini dan bukan meminggirkannya