Negation and negative properties: reply to Richard Vallée

I argue in §1 that there is a clear distinction between predicate negation and sentential negation and that sentential negation is a special case of predicate negation operating on the predicate ‘is true’. In §2 I reply to Richard’s objections to negative properties on the basis of the conception of properties as identity conditions presented in Chapter 12 of Logical Forms

LOGICAL FORMS AND LOGICAL FORM: RESPONSE TO JOHN CORCORAN

In his paper John Corcoran examines in detail many issues relating to logical form, and raises some questions about my formulations. In my response I emphasize two main distinctions that may clear up some of the issues. One is the distinction between logical forms, in the sense of logical properties of an abstract character, and logical form, in the sense in which we speak of the logical form (or logical structure) of a sentence, or of a proposition. Another is the distinction, emphasized by Boole, between primary propositions (about things), and secondary propositions (about propositions)—which I illustrate through the distinction between predicate negation and sentential negation. Resumo: Em seu artigo John Corcoran examina em detalhe muitas questões sobre forma lógica e levanta alguns problemas relativos à minhas formulações. Na réplica enfatizo duas distinções principais, que podem esclarecer algumas questões. A primeira é a distinção entre formas lógicas, no sentido de propriedades lógicas de caráter abstrato, e forma lógica, no sentido em que falamos da forma lógica (ou estrutura lógica) de uma sentença ou de uma proposição. A segunda é a distinção, enfatizada por Boole, entre proposições primárias (sobre coisas) e proposições secundárias (sobre proposições), exemplificada com a distinção entre negação predicativa e negação sentencial.Palavras chave: Formas lógicas. Forma lógica. Propriedade lógica. Predicação. Negação

Viaje a América, por el Vizconde de Chateaubriand

Biblioteca de UltramarCopia digital. Madrid : Ministerio de Cultura. Subdirección General de Coordinación Bibliotecaria, 201

PLATONISM IN MATHEMATICS

In this paper I examine arguments by Benacerraf and by Chihara against Gödel’s platonistic philosophy of mathematics

Did the slingshots hit the mark?: reply to Marco Ruffino

In §§1-2 I argue that Marco misidentifies my main objections to the Church and Gödel slingshot arguments and that his defense of these arguments does not overcome those objections. In §3 I discuss his criticisms of my theory of descriptions in relation to Church’s argument

SYMBOLISM AND LOGICAL FORM: RESPONSE TO JAVIER LEGRIS

Javier Legris examines my views on symbolism and logical form in relation to two important distinctions emphasized by Jean van Heijenoort—the distinction between logic as calculus and logic as universal language, and the distinction between absolutism and relativism in logic. I generally agree with his considerations and focus my response on some relevant aspects of classical logic. Resumo: Javier Legris examina minhas considerações sobre simbolismo e forma lógica em relação à duas distinções enfatizadas por Jean van Heijenoort: a distinção entre lógica como cálculo e lógica como linguagem universal, e a distinção entre absolutismo e relativismo na lógica. Estou basicamente de acordo com suas observações e em minha réplica enfoco alguns aspectos relevantes da lógica clássica. Palavras chave: Simbolismo. Forma lógica. Calculo lógico. Linguagem

PROOF AND PRACTICE: RESPONSE TO NORMA GOETHE

Norma Goethe addresses my criticisms of the notion of formal proof as a representation of the practice of proving, and in the process revisits large portions of my discussion of proof. I agree with many of her comments, and direct my response to two specific issues. The first concerns the essential features of proof, and the second the distinction between actual proofs and idealized proofs.Resumo: Norma Goethe tece seus comentários entorno de minhas críticas à noção de prova formal como representação da prática de provar e retoma diversos aspectos da discussão de prova em meu livro. Concordo com muitas de suas considerações e dirijo minha réplica a duas questões específicas. A primeira é sobre as características essenciais das provas, e a segunda sobre a distinção entre provas atuais e provas idealizadas.Palavras chave: Prova. Prática matemática. Conhecimento. Justificação

Counterfactuals: reply to Claudio Pizzi

After some preliminary remarks in §1, I argue in §2 that Claudio’s considerations about my treatment of Quine’s Bizet-Verdi counterfactuals do not constitute a difficulty for the structural analysis of such counterfactuals. I discuss some of his other examples and argue that counterfactuals are ambiguous both structurally and contextually. I conclude with an examination of the principle of transitivity for counterfactuals

LANGUAGE, LOGIC, AND ONTOLOGY: RESPONSE TO OSCAR ESQUISABEL

Oscar Esquisabel gives an overview of Chapter 13, tracing connections with several philosophers and traditions in philosophy, especially with the hermeneutic tradition. In my response I address his concluding questions about hermeneutics, and about the relation between senses, meanings, and concepts.Resumo:Oscar Esquisabel apresenta uma visão geral do capítulo 13, traçando conexões com vários filósofos e tradições filosóficas, especialmente com a tradição hermenêutica. Dirijo minha réplica à suas questões finais sobre hermenêutica e sobre a relação entre sentidos, significados e conceitos.Palavras chave: Linguagem. Sentido. Significado. Conceito. Objetividade. Hermenêutica

How is it determined that the true is not the same as the false?

The question that I discuss in this paper is whether Frege has a criterion of identity for the objects the True and the False that he introduces as denotation of sentences. My answer is that he does not, either in general or within the system of Basic Laws