Review: The musical representation: meaning, ontology, and emotion

Review of the book: Charles O. Nussbaum: The Musical Representation: Meaning, Ontology, and Emotion

Excerpts from Morning, Noon, and Night

Presents the poems Syzygy, Offering, and Giving, excerpts from Morning Noon and Night, by Charles O. Hartman

Discovery From Non-Parties (Third-Party Discovery) in International Arbitration

International arbitration rules and many arbitration laws usually provide procedures that permit tribunals to order parties to disclose documents and other materials to the other parties.1 More complex are the rules that determine opportunities to obtain discovery from persons that are not party to the arbitration (third-party discovery). This article will review third-party discovery under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the provisions of the US Code s.1782 that authorise US courts to act in aid of actions before foreign tribunals. Section 1782 has unique interest at this time because it figured prominently in the EU antitrust investigation of Intel that was initiated on request from Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). Early in that investigation, AMD filed a s.1782 request in the US District Court to obtain evidence from US sources for submission to the DG-Competition of the European Commission (EC). This request ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices Inc2 which appeared to significantly expand the scope of s.1782. Ironically, after AMD won on key legal issues in the Supreme Court, the District Court on remand exercised its discretion and denied the request for judicial assistance. This paper first describes the FAA non-party discovery rules and the split among the federal appellate courts concerning the authority of arbitrators to order prehearing discovery from non-parties. Next, it provides an analysis of the meaning of the terms “interested party” and “tribunal”—terms that were controversially interpreted by the Supreme Court in Intel and are essential to the application of s.1782. Finally, it discusses the “discretionary” factors used by the federal courts in deciding whether to grant a s.1782 request even when the statutory criteria are met. The opportunity to exercise this discretion seems to rebut the argument that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of s.1782 gives participants before foreign tribunals more discovery rights in the United States than are available to the parties in arbitrations covered by the FAA

Charles O. McFadden

https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/willowhillheritage-obituaries/4597/thumbnail.jp

Maximum Carbon Intensity Limitations and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

Emission of greenhouse gases is a global problem. Any nation seeking to restrict such emissions by its manufacturers should avoid putting them at a disadvantage in world and domestic markets where they are likely to compete with producers that do not bear the cost of emission controls. One approach being considered in the United States would be adoption of technical regulations limiting the carbon intensity of basic products, such as cement, aluminum, steel, etc., offered for sale in the US market (carbon intensity would be defined as the C02 equivalent emissions per ton of product). Domestic and imported products that exceed the regulation limit could not be sold in US commerce, except pursuant to exceptions that would be available on a national treatment basis. Technical regulations would be based on the quantity of carbon equivalent gases emitted in the production of a unit of product, such as a ton of steel. The regulations would set a numerical limit on carbon intensity; would set discrete limits for different products and types of manufacture; would require auditable facility measurement but could allow compliance on an average company-wide basis; and would be tightened over time to encourage new technologies. However, there would be no requirement for the adoption of specific technologies. The article will analyze the validity of such regulations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).\u27 The preamble to the TBT Agreement recognizes that no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary ..fo.r the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, [or] of the environment ..a.t the levels it considers appropriate In addition, TBT Agreement Article 2.2 includes protection of human health or safety ..o.r the environment as legitimate objectives of technical regulations. The article will examine whether a maximum carbon emission limit would be a [t/echnical regulation\u27 as defined by the TBT Agreement Annex i.i, taking into account the WTO Appellate Body statement that characteristics subject to regulation are not limited to qualities intrinsic to the product itself Consideration will also be given to the TBTAgreement requirement that technical regulations should not be applied so as to create unnecessary obstacles to trade. Finally, there will be an evaluation of the application of Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 to measures that qualify as technical regulations

Charles O. Finley Obit

Outrageous. Brilliant. Ignorant. Arrogant. Tasteless. Farsighted. Reactionary. Hilarious. Maddening. Mindless. Creative. Innovative. Destructive. He was all of these. And on Monday when I heard the announcement of his death, I was reminded of how much I enjoyed and how much I was disgusted by Charles Oscar Finley owner of the Kansas City-Oakland Athletics of the American League