Explaining partition: Reconsidering the role of the security dilemma in the Cyprus crisis of 1974

In this thesis the proposed link between a security dilemma at the domestic-level of analysis and partition following ethnic conflict is examined in the context of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The original framework of the argument being examined was offered by Chaim Kaufmann and is analyzed here by comparing and contrasting the history of Cyprus with the components of the framework. The thesis suggests that the framework does not adequately explain the partition in the case of Cyprus, as the history of that conflict does not reflect the components observable in the proposed linkage between the security dilemma and partition, nor does the situation fully reflect the traditional notion of a security dilemma

Ethnic partition as a solution to ethnic war - an empirical critique of the theoretical literature

Some theorists of ethnic conflict argue that the physical separation of warring ethnic groups may be the only possible solution to civil war. Without territorial partition and (if needed) forced population movements, they argue, ethnic war cannot end and genocide is likely. Other scholars have counter-argued that partition only replaces internal war with international war, creates undemocratic successor states, and generates tremendous human suffering. So far this debate has been informed by few important case studies. The author uses a new set of data on civil wars to identify the main determinants of ethnic partitions and to estimate their impact on the probability of war's recurrence, on low-grade ethnic violence, and on the political institutions of successor states. The author's analysis is the first large-sample quantitative analysis of the subject, testing the propositions of partition theory and weighing heavily on the side of its critics. He shows that almost all of the assertions of partition theorists fail to pass rigorous empirical tests. He finds that, on average, partition does not significantly reduce the probability of new violence. A better strategy might be to combine ethnic groups, but most important is to establish credible and equitable systems of governance. It is also important not to load the strategy with subjective premises about the necessity of ethnically pure states and about the futility of inter-ethnic cooperation.International Affairs,Peace&Peacekeeping,Post Conflict Reconstruction,Post Conflict Reconstruction,Children and Youth,Peace&Peacekeeping,International Affairs,Post Conflict Reconstruction,Post Conflict Reconstruction,Children and Youth

Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil War: Statehood, Demography, and the Role of Post-War Balance of Power for Peace

Partition has been proposed as a way to (i) end ethnic civil wars and to (ii) build a lasting peace after ethnic civil wars end. This dissertation builds on partition theory and the ethnic security dilemma in three ways, demonstrating empirical support for a novel theory of why violence recurs following the end of ethnic civil wars and how partition can be used to prevent such violence. The dissertation begins by introducing the puzzle of ethnic group concentration: the social sciences have demonstrated that concentrated ethnic groups produce both peace and violence. The first case study discredits the notion that ethnic group concentration produced during ethnic civil wars will produce an end to ethnic civil wars. I conducted detailed field research, producing a longitudinal study of ethnic migration and violence in the Georgia-Abkhaz civil war (1992-1993), which acts as a crucial case. I conclude that partitioning groups does not end ethnic war. This is the first accurate empirical test of the ethnic security dilemma. Next, the dissertation looks at partition's ability to build peace by concentrating ethnic groups in new homeland states, and I argue that post-partition violence is caused by weak states and the triadic political space endogenously created by partitions that do not separate ethnic groups completely. I call this the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma, building on previous ethnic security dilemma research. I test this empirically by introducing an index measuring the degree to which partitions separate ethnic groups, and I compare all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004, demonstrating that partitions which completely separate ethnic groups provide a better chance for peace. Third, I selected two cases (Moldova and Georgia) to examine the causal processes of post-war recurring violence. Georgia, which experienced post-partition violence, and Moldova, which did not, act as a structured case comparison. I conclude that mixed ethnic demography interacts with state-building to cause or avert renewed violence

Security: Collective good or commodity?

This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final published article is available from the link below. Copyright @ 2008 Sage.The state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in Europe and North America has been central to the development of security as a collective good. Not only has it institutionalized the state as the prime national and international security provider, it has helped to reduce the threat from other actors by either prohibiting or limiting their use of violence. The recent growth of the private security industry appears to undermine this view. Not only are private security firms proliferating at the national level; private military companies are also taking over an increasing range of military functions in both national defence and international interventions. This article seeks to provide an examination of the theoretical and practical implications of the shift from states to markets in the provision of security. Specifically, it discusses how the conceptualization of security as a commodity rather than a collective good affects the meaning and implementation of security in Western democracies.ESR

Promoting Democracy in Ethnically Divided Societies: The Benefits of Combining Partition and Power-Sharing

Recent conflict resolutions have attempted to explain the best route ofresolving ethnic conflicts within divided societies. This research attempts to engage in the recent debate surrounding conflict resolution which highlights the effects of partition and power-sharing programs upon democratic consolidation. By using a focused-structured comparison of three cases, partition is found to be insufficient in attaining democracy. A combination of partition and power-sharing leads to more democratic consolidation within divided societies. Further, a society which is affluent and gender equal, neighbors other liberal democracies, and fully develops power-sharing institutions will enjoy significant advantages in securing stable and lasting democratic outcomes