Philip Leonard Cottrell (1944–2013)

Published online: 11 February 201

Mimesis, scapegoating and financial crises: a critical evaluation of René Girard’s intellectual legacy

René Girard’s pathbreaking work, especially on mimetic (imitative) thought and behavior, can be used to reinforce Marxist explanations of financial crisis. Yet Girard’s concept of the scapegoat mechanism is less applicable to the modern world, and failure to recognize this can lead to confusion. A prime example is the contribution of the neo-Marxist scholar Henri Guénin-Paracini and his co-authors, who hold that the same mechanism Girard identified as existing in ancient times reconciles workers to contemporary capitalism’s financial crisis tendencies. A close analysis of their argument reveals that this mechanism explains nothing about post-crisis social reproduction. Nevertheless, Girardian cognizance of scapegoating and the persecutory impulse is useful in ensuring that resistance to financialization is depersonalized. Girard’s theory of mimesis, however, can contribute to a systemic account of factors leading to financial crises. In particular, his mimetic theory has the potential to bridge Keynesian and Marxist explanations of why such crises occur

Asian Monetary Integration: A Japanese Perspective

This paper discusses Japan's strategy for Asian monetary integration. It argues that Japan faces three major policy challenges when promoting intraregional exchange rate stability. First, there must be some convergence of exchange rate regimes in East Asia, and the most realistic option is for the region's emerging economies to adopt similar managed floating regimes - rather than a peg to an external currency. This requires major emerging economies - particularly the People's Republic of China (PRC) - to move to a more flexible regime vis-à-vis the US dollar. Second, given the limited degree of the yen's internationalization and the lack of the renminbi's (or the prospect of its rapid) full convertibility, it is in the interest of East Asia to create a regional monetary anchor through a combination of some form of national inflation targeting and a currency basket system. Emerging economies in the region need to find a suitable currency basket for their exchange rate target, such as a special drawing rights-plus (SDR+) currency basket - i.e., a basket of the SDR and emerging East Asian currencies. Third, if the creation of a stable regional monetary zone is desirable, the region must have a country or countries assuming a leadership role in this endeavor. There is no question that Japan and the PRC are such potential leaders, and the two countries need to collaborate closely with each other. To assume a leadership role, together with the PRC, in creating a stable monetary zone in Asia, Japan needs to make significant efforts at the national and regional levels and further strengthen financial cooperation. Practical steps that Japan could take include (i) restoring sustained economic growth through Abenomics; (ii) transforming Tokyo into a globally competitive international financial center; (iii) further strengthening regional economic and financial surveillance (Economic Review and Policy Dialogue and ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office) and regional financial safety nets (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization) and creation of an Asian currency unit index; and (iv) launching serious policy discussions focusing on exchange rate issues to achieve intraregional exchange rate stability

The British Army, information management and the First World War revolution in military affairs

Information Management (IM) – the systematic ordering, processing and channelling of information within organisations – forms a critical component of modern military command and control systems. As a subject of scholarly enquiry, however, the history of military IM has been relatively poorly served. Employing new and under-utilised archival sources, this article takes the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of the First World War as its case study and assesses the extent to which its IM system contributed to the emergence of the modern battlefield in 1918. It argues that the demands of fighting a modern war resulted in a general, but not universal, improvement in the BEF’s IM techniques, which in turn laid the groundwork, albeit in embryonic form, for the IM systems of modern armies. KEY WORDS: British Army, Information Management, First World War, Revolution in Military Affairs, Adaptatio