Pay-performance Sensitivity and Firm Size: Insights From the Mutual Fund Industry

I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent\u27s pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that reduce the advisor\u27s marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor\u27s declining marginal product. Specifically, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate contract and to specify a greater amount of compensation decline in their contracts. Consistent with optimal contracting, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with declining-rate contracts and funds with single-rate contracts

Convenience in the mutual fund industry

Abstract I examine the role of convenience in the mutual fund industry. I find that investors pay more for relatively convenient funds, and that the flows to convenient funds are less responsive to performance. These findings suggest that investors do not evaluate mutual funds independently, but rather that investors select a primary fund, likely based on beliefs about managerial ability, and then select funds which are relatively convenient to this primary fund. Highlights ► I find that investors pay a significant premium to invest in convenient mutual funds. ► I find that the flows to convenient funds are indifferent to fund performance. ► These results demonstrate the importance of convenience to mutual fund investors. ► They suggest that investors choose a primary fund and then funds that are convenient

Locating Decision Rights: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry

Mutual fund advisors make portfolio decisions for their funds on a daily basis. We examine the location of these portfolio decision rights on two dimensions. First, we consider the geographic location of the decision rights. Second, we consider whether the decision rights remain with an advisor or are allocated to an independent sub-advisor. We argue that the allocation of portfolio decision rights involves a tradeoff between the opportunity cost of not matching decision rights with specific knowledge, and the agency costs associated with moving the decision rights to the specific knowledge. The patterns in the location of decision rights are consistent with the tradeoff being a meaningful determinant of the allocation of decision rights in the mutual fund industry. We also find that funds that are predicted to be sub-advised and are sub-advised outperform those that are predicted to be sub-advised but are not

Going Overboard? On Busy Directors and Firm Value

Abstract The literature disagrees on the link between so-called busy boards (where many independent directors hold multiple board seats) and firm performance. Some argue that busyness certifies a director’s ability and that such directors are value enhancing. Others argue that “over-boarded” directors are ineffective and detract from firm value. We find evidence that (1) the disparate results in prior work stem from differences in both sample composition and empirical design, (2) on balance the results suggest a negative association between board busyness and firm performance, and (3) the inclusion of firm fixed effects dramatically affects the conclusions drawn from, and the explanatory power of, multivariate analyses. We also explore alternative empirical definitions of what constitutes a busy director and find that commonly used proxies for busyness perform well relative to more complex alternatives. Highlights ► The disparate busy director findings result from different samples and methodology. ► Including firm fixed effects results in a constant negative relation. ► The common busy director definition is as informative as more intense alternatives

Clawback Provisions in Real Estate Investment Trusts

Using a sample of 195 unique real estate investment trusts (REITs), we examine factors related to the adoption of clawback provisions within managerial compensation contracts. In general, we find strong and consistent empirical evidence that clawback provision are directly related to firm size, complexity, leverage, growth options, monitoring incentives, and CEO performance incentives. We also find that clawbacks are associated with enhanced market and accounting performance, with stronger performance relations observed for adoption decisions tied directly to regulatory mandates. In sum, we conclude compensation clawback provisions represent a value-relevant, strategic governance mechanism for REITs

Advisor Choice in Asia-Pacific Property Markets

This paper examines advisor choice decisions by publicly traded REITs and listed property companies in Asia-Pacific real estate markets. Using a sample of 168 firms, we find robust evidence that firms strategically evaluate and compare the increased agency costs associated with external advisement against the potential benefits associated with collocating decision rights with location specific soft information. Our empirical results reveal real estate companies tend to hire external advisors when they invest in countries: 1) that are more economically and politically unstable, 2) whose legal system is based on civil law, 3) where the level of corruption is perceived to be high, and 4) when disclosure is relatively poor. Additionally, we find the probability of retaining an external advisor is directly related to the expected agency costs. Lastly, we find evidence of return premiums in excess of 13 % for firms whose organizational structure matches their investment profile. As such, we conclude that the decision to hire an external advisor represents a value relevant trade-off between the costs and benefits of this organizational arrangement

Capital Structure and Political Risk in Asia-Pacific Real Estate Markets

This study investigates the determinants of capital structure decisions by real estate firms, with a specific focus on the impact of political risk on leverage. Using a sample of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts, we find those firms with properties located in countries characterized by relatively high degrees of political risk, such as political instability, and/or greater uncertainty in the ability to repatriate and monetize profits from international investment activities, employ less debt than their counterparts operating in more politically stable environments. This core finding remains robust to alternative sample selection criteria including the division of the sample into high versus low market-to-book value firms, and also holds within the subset of organizations that are active in raising additional capital in the secondary markets

Investor Behavior in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence from Gross Flows

Using a large sample of monthly gross flows from 1997 to 2003, we uncover several previously undocumented regularities in investor behavior. First, investor purchases and sales produce fund-level gross flows that are highly persistent. Persistence in fund flows dominates performance as a predictor of future fund flows. More importantly, failing to account for flow persistence leads to incorrect inferences with respect to the relation between performance and flows. Second, we document that investors react differently to performance depending on the type of fund, and that investor trading activity produces meaningful differences in the persistence of fund flows across mutual fund types. Third, at least some investors appear to evaluate and respond to mutual fund performance over much shorter time spans than previously assessed. Additionally, we document differences in the speed and magnitude of investors’ purchase and sales responses to performance

Investors Do Respond to Poor Mutual Fund Performance: Evidence from Inflows and Outflows

Abstract We examine the relation between mutual fund performance and gross flows for a large sample of actively managed U.S. mutual funds. Unlike previous studies that have only examined periods of generally increasing net flows, our sample includes periods of both increasing and decreasing net flows. We find that outflows are related to performance, with investors withdrawing money from poor performers. We also find that outflows and inflows respond asymmetrically to performance, outflows increase more aggressively following poor performance, and inflows increase more aggressively following good performance. Additionally, we find a symmetric performance net flow relation

The Impact of Geographic and Cultural Dispersion on Information Opacity

This paper investigates the influences of intrafirm geographic and cultural dispersion, the distance between the location of a firm’s investments and its headquarters, on the firm’s information environment. Specifically, using a sample of publicly traded real estate companies across the Asia-Pacific region, we examine how intrafirm geographic and cultural distance impacts a firm’s capital acquisition costs. As a consequence of both the heavily regulated operating environment faced by these firms, as well as the capital intensive nature of this industry, funding costs should be of pronounced importance to firms within this sector. Consistent with this paradigm, we find that firms with geographically disperse investments exhibit enhanced informational opacity. Specifically, firms with more geographically disperse investments exhibit higher capital acquisition costs than their more geographically concentrated counterparts. Similarly, firms with more culturally disparate investments also exhibit enhanced informational opacity, as evidenced by increased capital costs. Additionally, we present evidence that the impact of both physical and cultural distance is increasing following the global financial crisis. Taken together, our results provide strong evidence that both intrafirm geographic and cultural dispersion materially impact both an organization’s information environment and funding costs