Can A Single Exposure To The Resource-Event-Agent Framework Enhance Data Modeling Performance?

Due to the widespread use of technology, it is becoming increasingly critical that accounting students have the ability to document accounting information systems (AIS).  This skill is important for understanding the information system, mapping business processes, and understanding systems’ controls.  The present study reports on an experiment designed to investigate the effects of a single exposure to the Resource-Event-Agent (REA) framework on students’ data modeling performance.  The results of the experiment indicate that accounting students who receive a single, scripted exposure to the REA framework perform better on data modeling tasks than students with no exposure to the REA framework.  This has important implications for accounting educators as they develop classroom instruction and administrators as they contemplate an appropriate emphasis on data modeling in the accounting curriculum

Why Financial Executives Do Bad Things:The Effects of the Slippery Slope and Tone at the Top on Misreporting Behavior

This paper employs theory of normal organizational wrongdoing and investigates the joint effects of management tone and the slippery slope on financial reporting misbehavior. In Study 1, we investigate assumptions about the effects of sliding down the slippery slope and tone at the top on financial executives' decisions to misreport earnings. Results of Study 1 indicate that executives are willing to engage in misreporting behavior when there is a positive tone set by the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) (kind attitude toward employees and non-aggressive attitude about earnings), regardless of the presence or absence of a slippery slope. A negative tone set by the CFO does not facilitate the transition from minor indiscretions to financial misreporting. In Study 2, we find that auditors evaluating executives' decisions under the same conditions as those in Study 1 do not react to the slippery slope condition, but auditors assess higher risks of fraud when the CFO sets a negative tone. Overall, our results indicate that many assumptions about the slippery slope and tone at the top should be questioned. We provide evidence that pro-organizational behaviors and incrementalism yield new insights into the causes of ethical failures, financial misreporting behavior, and failures of corporate governance mechanisms

Accounting Information Systems

xii, 464 p. : Ill.; 28 cm

Using Database Technology In The AIS Classroom: Effects On Learning And Student Satisfaction

The purpose of this study is twofold.  First, we examine the effects of using database technology in the classroom on students' acquisition of database knowledge and performance on relation normalization tasks.  Second, we solicit sstudnets' views on this methodology to determine their satisfaction.  Our results suggest that designing an active learning exercise tha allows students to interact with a database management system during class improves knowledge acquisition, the ability to apply knowledge, and satisfaction with the course and the instructor

Chief Audit Executives’ Evaluations of Whistle-Blowing Allegations

This study examines the effects of the source of whistle-blowing allegations and potential for allegations to trigger concerns about reputation threats on Chief Audit Executives’ handling of whistle-blowing allegations. The participants for this study, 79 Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) and deputy CAEs, evaluated whistle-blowing reports related to financial reporting malfeasance that were received from either an anonymous or a non-anonymous source. The whistle-blowing reports alleged that the wrongdoing resulted from either the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal controls (suggesting higher responsibility of the CAE and internal audit) or the circumvention of internal controls (suggesting lower responsibility of the CAE or internal audit). Findings indicate that CAEs believe anonymous whistle-blowing reports to be significantly less credible than non-anonymous reports. Although CAEs assessed lower credibility ratings for the reports alleging wrongdoing by the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal controls, they allocated more resources to investigating these allegations

Internal audit reporting lines, fraud risk decomposition, and assessments of fraud risk

The main purpose of this research is to examine the effects of internal audit reporting lines on fraud risk assessments made by internal auditors when the level of fraud risk varies. Significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of reporting lines in maintaining the autonomy of internal auditors, but the perceived benefits of requiring internal audit to report directly to the audit committee have not been validated or systematically investigated. Results of an experiment involving 172 experienced internal auditors and additional survey findings indicate that internal auditors perceive more personal threats when they report high levels of risk directly to the audit committee, relative to management. Perceived threats lead internal auditors to reduce assessed levels of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee relative to when reporting to management. This finding runs counter to the anticipated benefits of requirements that the internal audit function report directly to the audit committee, and it reveals potential conflicts of interest and independence threats created by the audit committee itself. We also investigate the effects of fraud risk decomposition on risk assessments made by internal auditors. We find that fraud risk assessment decomposition does not have the same effects on internal auditors as it has on external auditors, and the effects of decomposition do not align with the expected benefits of decomposition.

The effects of disclosure type and audit committee expertise on Chief Audit Executives' tolerance for financial misstatements

This study involves an experiment where 73 Chief Audit Executives and deputy Chief Audit Executives determine the amount of adjustment required to correct a misstatement. We manipulate the financial reporting location of the misstatement (recognized vs. disclosed) and the level of audit committee expertise (high vs. low). The results indicate that financial reporting location has significant effects on internal auditors' decisions to correct misstatements. Specifically, internal auditors are more willing to waive disclosed misstatements relative to recognized misstatements. Contrary to expectations, the results do not indicate that increased audit committee expertise and associated increases in audit committee members' perceived powers cause internal auditors to be less willing to waive misstatements.

Designing Fraud Risk Assessment Decision Aids to Promote the Acquisition of Expertise

This conference proceeding was published in Proceedings of the Information Systems Section of the American Accounting Association Midyear Meeting