36 research outputs found
The Gap Between Lifetime Fertility Intentions and Completed Fertility in Europe and the United States: A Cohort Approach
We study the aggregate gap between intended and actual fertility in 19 European
countries and the US based on a cohort approach. This complements prior research
that had mainly used a period approach. We compare the mean intended number
of children among young women aged 20 to 24 (born in the early 1970s), meas
ured during the 1990s in the Fertility and Family Surveys, with data on completed
fertility in the same cohorts around age 40. In a similar manner, we compare the
share who state that they do not want a child with actual cohort childlessness. Our
exploration is informed by the cognitive-social model of fertility intentions devel-
oped by Bachrach and Morgan (Popul Dev Rev 39(3):459-485, 2013). In all coun-
tries, women eventually had, on average, fewer children than the earlier expectations
in their birth cohort, and more often than intended, they remained childless. The
results reveal distinct regional patterns, which are most apparent for childlessness.
The gap between intended and actual childlessness is widest in the Southern Euro-
pean and the German-speaking countries and smallest in the Central and Eastern
European countries. Additionally, we analyze the aggregate intentions-fertility gap
among women with different levels of education. The gap is largest among highly
educated women in most countries studied and the educational gradient varies by
region, most distinctively for childlessness. Differences between countries suggest
that contextual factors-norms about parenthood, work-family policies, unemployment-shape women's fertility goals, total family size, and the gap between them
Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour: a comparative study of European countries
European demographers rarely study religion as a determinant of contemporary demographic behaviour. One reason could be the secularisation observed in European countries, implying that the effect of religiosity has been diminishing. This paper aims to show that religion can have an important impact on ideals, intentions and behaviour related to fertility. First we discuss recent trends in religiosity. We base our ensuing hypotheses on three deliberations why religion may have a bearing on fertility: importance of religious teaching, effect of social capital and function of religion to decrease uncertainty. Using FFS data we examine the influence of several measures of religiosity on the ideal number of children and intentions to have a second and third child, as well as on the expected and actual number of children. We find that all measures of religiosity are in general related to a higher ideal number of children, higher odds to intend another child and higher expected and actual number of children. Participation in religious services turns out to be slightly more salient than affiliation and self-assessed religiosity. We also discover that the effect of religion on ideals is more pronounced than its effect on intentions. Ideals stay further away from behaviour than intentions do and hence the influence of religion is intermediated by other social systems.
Childcare and housework during the first lockdown in Austria: Traditional division or new roles?
Objective: This study analyses how much time mothers and fathers spent on childcare and housework during and after the first COVID-19 lockdown in Austria (starting in mid-March 2020) and how they distributed that time between themselves. Background: Parents needed to reallocate care work between themselves as, on the one hand, kindergartens and schools closed for two months and, on the other hand, employment-related changes arose, e.g., working from home. The results are discussed in light of major theories that address the division of care work: the time availability approach and gender role theory. Method: This study employs data from the Austrian Corona Panel Project 2020/21, a web-based survey using quota sampling, which started in the second week of the first lockdown (n=372 for respondents in couples with children below age 15). Altogether, seven waves contain information about time spent on childcare and housework; three were conducted during or right after the first lockdown (April and May 2020) and four between June 2020 and February 2021. Linear and logistic regression models were used. Results: Within the whole study period, parents' total workload (care work and employment) was highest during the first lockdown. The workload was greatest - an average of 15 hours on weekdays - among mothers with children below age six. While mothers shouldered more care work in most families, partners shared tasks equally in around one third of them. Care time depended on employment hours, especially for fathers. Yet, it was higher for mothers with the same level of employment as fathers. Conclusion: The COVID-19-related employment changes led to a rise in arrangements that rarely existed before in Austria, e.g., fathers working part-time. Consequently, some fathers took on new roles, especially when they worked from home (mostly among the higher educated), were non-employed (mostly among the lower educated) or worked part-time. The paper concludes by discussing whether those experiences may permanently result in more egalitarian gender roles.Fragestellung: Diese Studie untersucht, wie viel Zeit MĂŒtter und VĂ€ter wĂ€hrend und nach dem ersten COVID-19 Lockdown in Ăsterreich (welcher Mitte MĂ€rz 2020 begann) fĂŒr Kinderbetreuung und Hausarbeit aufwendeten und wie sie diese Zeit untereinander aufteilten. Hintergrund: Eltern mussten Kinderbetreuungs- und Hausarbeitszeit (Care-Arbeit) neu verteilen, da einerseits KindergĂ€rten und Schulen zwei Monate lang geschlossen blieben, und es andererseits erwerbsbezogene VerĂ€nderungen gab, z.B. Homeoffice. Die Ergebnisse werden vor dem Hintergrund zentraler Theorien zur Aufteilung von Care-Arbeit diskutiert: dem "time availability approach" und Geschlechterrollentheorie. Methode: Die Studie verwendet die Daten des Austrian Corona Panel Projects 2020/21, eine webbasierte Umfrage auf Grundlage einer Quotenstichprobe, welche in der zweiten Woche des ersten Lockdowns begann (n=372 Befragte in Paaren mit Kindern unter 15 Jahre). Insgesamt beinhalten sieben Wellen Informationen zu der mit Kinderbetreuung und Hausarbeit verwendeten Zeit; drei davon wurden im oder unmittelbar nach dem ersten Lockdown durchgefĂŒhrt (April und Mai 2020) und vier zwischen Juni 2020 und Februar 2021. Die Datenauswertung erfolgte mittels linearer und logistischer Regressionsmodelle. Ergebnisse: Innerhalb der gesamten Untersuchungsperiode war die Arbeitsbelastung (Care- und Erwerbsarbeit) der Eltern am höchsten wĂ€hrend des ersten Lockdowns. Die Arbeitsbelastung war am gröĂten - im Durchschnitt 15 Stunden pro Wochentag - unter MĂŒttern mit Kindern unter sechs Jahren. WĂ€hrend in der Mehrheit der Familien MĂŒtter mehr Care-Arbeit verrichteten, war die Aufteilung in rund einem Drittel ausgeglichen. Care-Arbeit war abhĂ€ngig von den Erwerbsarbeitsstunden, vor allem fĂŒr VĂ€ter. Gleichzeitig war sie beim selben ErwerbsausmaĂ höher fĂŒr MĂŒtter. Schlussfolgerung: Die COVID-19-bedingten Ănderungen in der ErwerbstĂ€tigkeit fĂŒhrten zu einem Anstieg in Arrangements, die davor in Ăsterreich kaum existiert hatten, z.B. Teilzeitarbeit von VĂ€tern. Daher nahmen manche VĂ€ter neue Rollen ein, vor allem, wenn sie im Homeoffice arbeiteten (vor allem höher gebildete), nicht erwerbstĂ€tig waren (vor allem niedriger gebildete) oder in Teilzeit waren. Es wird diskutiert, ob diese Erfahrungen lĂ€ngerfristig zu egalitĂ€reren Geschlechterrollen fĂŒhren werden
Growing diversity in couples' work patterns during the COVID-19 pandemic in Austria
Objective: This paper studies changes in couples' work patterns during the COVID-19 pandemic with a focus on socio-economic status and children's age. Background: We contribute to previous research by examining flows between different work patterns using panel data and by providing evidence for a conservative welfare state. Method: Analyses are based on the Austrian Labour Force Surveys 2019-20 and include different-sex couples with children below age 15 (n=930 to 3,053). We applied (multinomial) logistic regression models. Results: The findings reveal a polarization into both more egalitarian (e.g., partners work equal hours) and more traditional (e.g., sole male earner) models during the first lockdown, while the moderate male full-time/female part-time model strongly declined. Among the two more egalitarian models, the "about equal hours" model was mostly fuelled by families with lower socio-economic status, conversely the "role reversal" model (woman more hours) grew predominantly among couples where the female partner was highly educated or had a high earnings share. Retraditionalisation was mainly restricted to women with weaker positions on the labour market: The male sole worker model progressed among families with younger children and when the female earnings share was low. Conclusion: Overall, more couples transited to egalitarian than traditional work patterns. This shift was largely confined to the first lockdown and chiefly driven by men's rise in short-time work. Appendix: https://ubp.uni-bamberg.de/jfr/index.php/jfr/article/view/1008/775Fragestellung: Die Studie untersucht VerĂ€nderungen in den Erwerbsmustern von Paaren wĂ€hrend der COVID-19 Pandemie in Ăsterreich. Dabei fokussiert sie auf Unterschiede nach dem sozioökonomischen Status und dem Alter der Kinder. Hintergrund: Wir leisten einen Beitrag zur bisherigen Forschung, indem wir anhand von Paneldaten die VerĂ€nderungen der Erwerbsmuster untersuchen und Evidenz fĂŒr einen konservativen Wohlfahrtsstaat bereitstellen. Methode: Die Analysen basieren auf den österreichischen ArbeitskrĂ€fteerhebungen (Mikrozensus) 2019-20 und umfassen verschiedengeschlechtliche Paare mit Kindern unter 15 Jahren (n=930 bis 3.053). Die Daten werden mittels (multinomialer) logistischer Regressionsmodelle ausgewertet. Ergebnisse: Die Ergebnisse deuten eine Polarisierung an, da sowohl egalitĂ€re Modelle (z.B. Partner*innen arbeiten etwa gleiche Stunden) als auch traditionelle Modelle (z.B. mĂ€nnlicher ErnĂ€hrer) wĂ€hrend des ersten Lockdowns zunahmen, wĂ€hrend das moderate Mann Vollzeit/Frau Teilzeit Modell stark abnahm. Unter den beiden egalitĂ€reren Modellen kam das Modell "etwa gleiche Stunden" hauptsĂ€chlich in Familien mit niedrigerem sozioökonomischem Status vor, wĂ€hrend das Modell "Rollenumkehr" (Frau arbeitet mehr Stunden) ĂŒberwiegend bei Paaren zu beobachten war, bei denen die Partnerin eine höhere Bildung und/oder einen hohen Einkommensanteil hatte. Die Retraditionalisierung beschrĂ€nkte sich hauptsĂ€chlich auf Frauen mit schwĂ€cheren Positionen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Zu VerĂ€nderungen hin zum mĂ€nnlichen ErnĂ€hrermodell kam es vor allem in Familien mit jĂŒngeren Kindern und/oder geringem weiblichen Einkommensanteil. Schlussfolgerung: Insgesamt wechselten mehr Paare zu egalitĂ€ren als zu traditionellen Erwerbsmustern. Dieser Wandel beschrĂ€nkte sich gröĂtenteils auf den ersten Lockdown und wurde hauptsĂ€chlich durch den Anstieg der Kurzarbeit bei MĂ€nnern vorangetrieben
Growing inequality during the Great Recession: Labour market institutions and the education gap in unemployment across Europe and in the United States
We study how the education gap in unemployment has evolved by gender and age groups across 28 European countries and the United States from 2000 to 2014, using the European Union's Labour Force Surveys and the US Current Population Surveys. During and after the Great Recession, the absolute education gap in unemployment expanded in almost all countries, which was mainly driven by a marked increase in the unemployment risk among low educated men. A two-step multilevel analysis confirmed the negative relationship between the education gap and both (lagged) GDP growth and GDP level. Further, institutional labour market features moderated the impact of the business cycle. A higher share of temporary employment boosted employment for less educated persons, thus flattening the education gradient in unemployment, while a larger public sector somewhat protected more highly educated individuals against unemployment. The gap for young workers was large in settings with strict regular contract regulations
The Part-Time Revolution: Changes in the Parenthood Effect on Womenâs Employment in Austria across the Birth Cohorts from 1940 to 1979
Comparing employment rates of mothers and childless women over the life course across the birth cohorts from 1940 to 1979 in Austria, we address the question of whether the parenthood effect on employment has declined. By following synthetic cohorts of mothers and childless women up to retirement age, we can study both the short-term and long-term consequences of having a child. We consider employment participation as well as working time and also perform analyses by educational level. Our study is based on the Austrian microcensus, conducted between 1986 and 2016, and uses descriptive methods, logistic regression models, and decomposition analysis. The results show that the increase in the proportion of part-time work has led to a declining work volume of mothers with young children, despite employment rates of mothers having increased across cohorts. Return to the workplace is progressively concentrated when the child is 3â5âyears old, but the parenthood effect has become weaker only from the time children enter school. Part-time employment is primarily adopted (at least with younger children) by highly educated mothers and often remains a long-term arrangement
Felt deficits in time with children: Individual and contextual factors across 27 European countries
A sizeable portion of parents say they lack time with childrenâan important social problem given that time strains link to parental well-being. Extending perspectives on the demands and rewards of parenting beyond the individual level, we provide a contextual-level window onto mothers' and fathers' time strains. Based on data from the European Quality of Life Survey 2016/17 (n = 5,898), we analyze whether parents feel they spend enough time caring for their children using multilevel models. We first observe that country context matters in that perceptions of time only moderately or weakly relate to hours with children across countries, especially for fathers, suggesting varying social expectations across Europe. Second, in multivariate analyses examining micro- and macro-level factors, we show that at the individual level, feeling too little time with children is more frequent among fathers and those who work more hours, even when controlling for estimated weekly hours spent caring for children. At the country level, parents' time strain is higher in countries where employees have less time and place flexibility, typically in Central and Eastern as well as Southern Europe. Gender norms matter as well. Extending contextual perspectives, we argue that how gender-work-family regimes color felt time strain is a promising future research direction
Doing science, forgoing childbearing? Evidence from a sample of female scientists in Austria
Academic women in Austria and Germany have extraordinarily high final levels of childlessness of 45-60%, as documented by prior research. This study investigates how female scientists' fertility behaviour relates to their childbearing ideals and intentions in Austria. It analyses whether high childlessness and low numbers of children are intended or not. By looking additionally at employment conditions and partnership status, this study points to possible obstacles hindering couples to realise their childbearing desires. Furthermore, it shows how female scientists combine their academic career and childcare. The analysis is based on a sample of female scientists who had applied for a grant at the Austrian Academy of Sciences (n=196). It comprises women aged 25-45 who work in different scientific fields in Austria. Female scientists aged 40-45 have 0.9 children on average and 44% remain childless. However, these levels are far from the number of offspring that young scientists under the age of 35 intend to have. They perceive on average two as their ideal and intended number; only around 10% want to stay childless. Several obstacles which impede childbearing were identified, e.g. the strong work commitment of the female scientists, the need to be geographically mobile and the high prevalence of living apart together relationships. As for the combination of work and family, female scientists return back to work quickly after they have a child. Most do not regard the family as the main caregiver but perceive a division of tasks between the family and the public as preferable
Keine Zeit fĂŒr Kinder? VerĂ€nderungen in der Kinderbetreuungszeit von Eltern in Deutschland und Ăsterreich
Based on time-use data for Germany (1991/92â2001/02) and Austria (1992â2008/09) this contribution depicts trends in the amount of time parents of children under age six spend on child care. Using a decomposition technique, the article analyzes whether these trends are due to real changes in the time parents set aside for being with their children (behavioral changes) or to changes in the composition of the population. The findings show that the time devoted to child care has remained constant in Germany but has increased in Austria (as in many other western countries). While both components have only weak effects in Germany, behavioral changes are the main force behind the trend in Austria. In particular, three group, fathers employed full-time who have non-employed partners, housewives, and parents with medium education spend more time with their children in Austria. In both countries, the rising number of mothers working part-time has a positive effect on care time; the decreasing number of housewives, a negative one.Dieser Beitrag verwendet Daten der Zeitbudgetstudien aus Deutschland (1991/92 und 2001/02) und Ăsterreich (1992 und 2008/09), um Trends in der Kinderbetreuungszeit von Eltern mit Kindern unter sechs Jahren darzustellen. Mittels Dekompositionsanalysen wird bestimmt, welche Prozesse fĂŒr diese Trends verantwortlich sind, nĂ€mlich entweder reale Ănderungen in der Zeit, die Eltern sich fĂŒr ihre Kinder nehmen (VerhaltensĂ€nderungen), oder strukturelle Verschiebungen in der Bevçlkerungskomposition. Die Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Kinderbetreuungszeit in Deutschland weitgehend konstant geblieben ist und sich in Ăsterreich â wie in vielen anderen westlichen LĂ€ndern â deutlich erhöht hat. In Ăsterreich lassen sich die Trends in der Kinderbetreuungszeit in erster Linie durch VerhaltensĂ€nderungen und weniger durch eine geĂ€nderte Bevölkerungszusammensetzung erklĂ€ren, wĂ€hrend beide Komponenten in Deutschland nur schwache Effekte zeigen. In Ăsterreich verbringen insbesondere vollzeitbeschĂ€ftigte VĂ€ter mit nicht erwerbstĂ€tigen Partnerinnen, Hausfrauen und Eltern mit mittlerer Bildung mehr Zeit mit ihren Kindern. FĂŒr beide LĂ€nder gilt, dass sich der gestiegene Anteil von MĂŒttern in Teilzeitarbeit positiv auf die Kinderbetreuungszeit auswirkt, die rĂŒcklĂ€ufige Zahl der Hausfrauen negativ
Cohabitation and marriage in Austria
BACKGROUND
Although cohabitation has spread rapidly in Austria during the past decades, it is more a prelude than an alternative to marriage. The individualization thesis serves as a conceptual framework for explaining the rise of cohabiting unions.
OBJECTIVE
Our aim is to understand what motivates people to cohabit and marry from an individualization perspective. The present study was designed to investigate in which ways key notions of the individualization thesis such as commitment, romantic love and risk are reflected in discourses on cohabitation and marriage.
METHODS
Research is based on data from eight focus group discussions (71 participants) conducted in Vienna, Austria, in 2012. This data was analyzed with the help of qualitative methods.
RESULTS
The focus group participants regarded cohabitation and marriage as different life course strategies. They felt that young adulthood is a period characterized by uncertain external circumstances, in which people build up commitment in cohabitation without feeling limited in terms of opportunities. As dissolving a cohabiting union entails lower costs, the risk posed by this type of union was considered low. The respondents associated marriage with security and long-term commitment and saw it as an ideal for a later stage in life. They argued that romantic love and individual satisfaction should prevail throughout the entire marriage. Core terms of the individualization thesis - commitment, romantic love, and risk - were perceived differently between cohabitation and marriage. We conclude that the individualization thesis best fits young adulthood and is less relevant for later life stages