Daytime REM sleep affects emotional experience but not decision choices in moral dilemmas

Moral decision-making depends on the interaction between automatic emotional responses and rational cognitive control. A natural emotional regulator state seems to be sleep, in particular rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. We tested the impact of daytime sleep, either with or without REM, on moral decision. Sixty participants were presented with 12 sacrificial (6 Footbridge-and 6 Trolley-type) and 8 everyday-type moral dilemmas at 9 AM and at 5 PM. In sacrificial dilemmas, participants had to decide whether or not to kill one person to save more people (utilitarian choice), and to judge how morally acceptable the proposed choice was. In everyday-type dilemmas, participants had to decide whether to endorse moral violations involving dishonest behavior. At 12 PM, 40 participants took a 120-min nap (17 with REM and 23 with NREM only) while 20 participants remained awake. Mixed-model analysis revealed that participants judged the utilitarian choice as less morally acceptable in the afternoon, irrespective of sleep. We also observed a negative association between theta activity during REM and increased self-rated unpleasantness during moral decisions. Nevertheless, moral decision did not change across the day and between groups. These results suggest that although both time and REM sleep may affect the evaluation of a moral situation, these factors did not ultimately impact the individual moral choices

Gaze cuing of attention in snake phobic women: the influence of facial expression

Only a few studies investigated whether animal phobics exhibit attentional biases in contexts where no phobic stimuli are present. Among these, recent studies provided evidence for a bias toward facial expressions of fear and disgust in animal phobics. Such findings may be due to the fact that these expressions could signal the presence of a phobic object in the surroundings. To test this hypothesis and further investigate attentional biases for emotional faces in animal phobics, we conducted an experiment using a gaze-cuing paradigm in which participants\u2019 attention was driven by the task-irrelevant gaze of a centrally presented face. We employed dynamic negative facial expressions of disgust, fear and anger and found an enhanced gaze-cuing effect in snake phobics as compared to controls, irrespective of facial expression. These results provide evidence of a general hypervigilance in animal phobics in the absence of phobic stimuli, and indicate that research on specific phobias should not be limited to symptom provocation paradigms

Neural processing of moral content reflects moral identity in 10-year-old children

Middle childhood seems to be crucial for the emergence of a moral identity, that is, an evaluative stance of how important it is for someone's sense of self to be moral. This study investigates the effects of moral identity on the neural processing of moral content in 10-year-old children. Participants were presented with scenes portraying prosocial and antisocial behavior, while electroencephalographic responses were collected. Analyses of event-related potentials (ERPs) showed that, for children with a strong moral identity, antisocial scenes elicited a greater early posterior negativity (EPN) as compared to prosocial scenes. Thus, for children with a strong moral identity, antisocial scenes capture more attentional resources than prosocial ones in early processing stages. In contrast to previous findings with adults, the implicit moral self-concept was not related to any ERP differences. Overall, the results show that, even in its developmental emergence, moral identity relates to the neurocognitive processing of third-party moral content. Together, the study supports the social-cognitive model of the development of moral identity, according to which moral identity is based on a chronical activation of moral schemas that guide a person's perception of the social world

The role of emotion and intentionality in moral dilemma resolution: Subjective, behavioral, and electrophysiological data

This thesis describes three studies that investigated the role of emotion in decision-making during the resolution of moral dilemmas, in which the individual is confronted with the choices of letting some people die (non utilitarian choice) or sacrificing a single person to save them (utilitarian choice). The studies presented in this thesis were aimed at testing the dual process model of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), according to which emotional processing plays a causal role in driving judgments and decisions in moral dilemmas, in competition with rational reasoning. The studies also focused on how the intentionality of the action involved in the decision choice interacts with emotional processing by producing different judgment and decision patterns. Moreover, in two of the three studies the neural correlates of the decision process during the resolution of the dilemmas were investigated by means of event-related potentials. Findings from the first study showed that taking legal consequences into account during the resolution of the dilemmas doesn’t affect participants’ choices. Moreover, the percentage of utilitarian choices was lower when the sacrifice of a person is the intentional means by which more lives were saved than when it is an unintentional side effect of saving more lives, irrespective of whether legal considerations are taken into account. However, taking legal considerations into account reduces the overall emotional impact of the decision and increases the neural preparation to execute the action corresponding to the selected choice, suggesting a reduced conflict between the two options (utilitarian and non-utilitarian). The second study showed that emotional hyporeactivity, as typical of individuals with high trait psychopathy, reduces the perceived unpleasantness experienced during the decision and increases the number of utilitarian choices, irrespective of the intentionality of the sacrifice. The final study showed that decisions in moral dilemmas are driven by the attempt to reduce the negative emotions experienced after the decision. This study also shows that the emotional conflict between alternative options does not influence the neural preparation for action. Overall, the results of the three studies presented in this thesis suggest that the intentionality of the sacrifice influences decisions independently of the emotional impact and legal considerations. At the same time, our findings are in line with the dual process model, as they show that emotional processing affects decisions in moral dilemmas, especially through the anticipation of the expected emotional consequences of the available options

How does the moral self-concept relate to prosocial behaviour? Investigating the role of emotions and consistency preference

The moral self-concept has been proposed as a central predictor of prosocial behaviour. In two experiments (one preregistered), we explored the nature of the relation between the moral self-concept (explicit and implicit) and prosocial behaviour. Specifically, we investigated the role of emotions associated with prosocial behaviour (consequential or anticipated) and preference for consistency. The results revealed a relation between the explicit moral self-concept and sharing behaviour. The explicit moral self-concept was linked to anticipated and consequential emotions regarding not-sharing. Importantly, anticipated and consequential emotions about not-sharing mediated the relation between self-concept and behaviour. Yet, the relation was independent of preference for consistency. The implicit moral self-concept was neither related to prosocial behaviour nor to emotions associated with behaviour. Overall, our study demonstrates the interplay between cognitive and emotional processes in explaining prosocial behaviour. More specific, it underlines the link between the moral self-concept and prosocial behaviour and highlights the role of emotions about the omission of prosocial behaviour

Emotion understanding and the moral self-concept as motivators of prosocial behavior in middle childhood

The moral self-concept reflects the view of oneself in terms of moral behavior and has been proposed to predict actual behavior. Theories also suggest emotions and emotion knowledge to predict prosocial behavior, but the interplay between the moral self-concept and emotions is largely unknown. This interplay is especially important to study in middle childhood, a relevant period for the ontogeny of the moral self-concept and when emotions regarding prosocial behavior are suggested to change. The current study explored the nature of the relation between the moral self-concept, prosocial behavior, and consequential emotions (Experiment 1) or anticipated emotions (Experiment 2) regarding prosocial behavior in 5- to 9-year-olds (together N=169). Moreover, we investigated whether emotions mediate the relation between the moral self-concept and prosocial behavior. Overall, the moral self-concept was positively related to prosocial behavior. In addition, emotional consequences as well as anticipated emotions explained age differences in sharing behavior. Moreover, the results hint to an indirect effect of the moral self-concept on sharing behavior through the anticipation of negative feelings when not-sharing. Interestingly, children who first reflected about the affective consequences of prosocial behavior seemed to share more. In line with theories, the results demonstrate that both the moral self-concept and emotions are relevant motivators of prosocial behavior in middle childhood

The role of emotion and intentionality in moral dilemma resolution: Subjective, behavioral, and electrophysiological data

This thesis describes three studies that investigated the role of emotion in decision-making during the resolution of moral dilemmas, in which the individual is confronted with the choices of letting some people die (non utilitarian choice) or sacrificing a single person to save them (utilitarian choice). The studies presented in this thesis were aimed at testing the dual process model of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), according to which emotional processing plays a causal role in driving judgments and decisions in moral dilemmas, in competition with rational reasoning. The studies also focused on how the intentionality of the action involved in the decision choice interacts with emotional processing by producing different judgment and decision patterns. Moreover, in two of the three studies the neural correlates of the decision process during the resolution of the dilemmas were investigated by means of event-related potentials. Findings from the first study showed that taking legal consequences into account during the resolution of the dilemmas doesn’t affect participants’ choices. Moreover, the percentage of utilitarian choices was lower when the sacrifice of a person is the intentional means by which more lives were saved than when it is an unintentional side effect of saving more lives, irrespective of whether legal considerations are taken into account. However, taking legal considerations into account reduces the overall emotional impact of the decision and increases the neural preparation to execute the action corresponding to the selected choice, suggesting a reduced conflict between the two options (utilitarian and non-utilitarian). The second study showed that emotional hyporeactivity, as typical of individuals with high trait psychopathy, reduces the perceived unpleasantness experienced during the decision and increases the number of utilitarian choices, irrespective of the intentionality of the sacrifice. The final study showed that decisions in moral dilemmas are driven by the attempt to reduce the negative emotions experienced after the decision. This study also shows that the emotional conflict between alternative options does not influence the neural preparation for action. Overall, the results of the three studies presented in this thesis suggest that the intentionality of the sacrifice influences decisions independently of the emotional impact and legal considerations. At the same time, our findings are in line with the dual process model, as they show that emotional processing affects decisions in moral dilemmas, especially through the anticipation of the expected emotional consequences of the available options.In questa tesi sono stati descritti tre studi finalizzati ad indagare il ruolo delle emozioni nel guidare le decisioni in dilemmi morali in cui si deve decidere se sacrificare la vita di una persona per salvarne un numero maggiore (scelta utilitaristica) o lasciar morire le persone in pericolo (scelta non utilitaristica). Gli studi presentati nella tesi avevano lo scopo di testare il modello del doppio processo del giudizio morale (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), secondo il quale l'elaborazione emozionale, in competizione con il ragionamento razionale, svolge un ruolo causale nel guidare il giudizio morale e la decisione nei dilemmi morali. Inoltre, si è indagato come l’intenzionalità attribuita all’azione interagisce con l’elaborazione emozionale nell’influenzare la decisione. Infine, in questo contesto sono stati rilevati, in due dei tre studi presentati, i correlati neurali del processo decisionale, tramite la registrazione di potenziali evento-relati. I risultati del primo studio hanno mostrato che tenere in considerazione ipotetiche ripercussioni legali dell’azione durante la risoluzione di dilemmi morali non influenza né le scelte dei partecipanti. Inoltre, a prescindere dalla considerazione di conseguenze legali, quando il sacrificio di una persona era intenzionale i partecipanti hanno compiuto un minor numero di scelte utilitaristiche rispetto a quando il sacrificio di una persona era una conseguenza non voluta del salvare le persone in pericolo. Tuttavia, tenere in considerazione conseguenze legali riduce l'impatto emozionale durante la decisione e produce facilitazione corticale e maggiore prontezza all’esecuzione dell'azione corrispondente all'opzione scelta, suggerendo un minor conflitto tra le due opzioni (utilitaristica e non utilitaristica). I risultati del secondo studio hanno mostrato che la condizione di iporeattività emozionale che caratterizza individui con alti tratti di psicopatia riduce la spiacevolezza esperita durante la decisione e aumenta il numero di scelte utilitaristiche, a prescindere dall’intenzionalità con cui il sacrificio viene compiuto. I risultati dell’ultimo studio hanno mostrato che le decisioni nei dilemmi morali sono guidate dal tentativo di ridurre le emozioni negative che ci si aspetta di esperire dopo la scelta, e che il conflitto emozionale tra le due opzioni non influenza l’attività corticale che precede immediatamente l’azione. Complessivamente, i risultati di questo lavoro di tesi suggeriscono che l'intenzionalità attribuita all’azione influenza la decisione indipendentemente dall’impatto emozionale e da considerazioni di carattere legale. Parallelamente, questi dati sono in linea con il modello del doppio processo nel mostrare come l’emozione influenzi la decisione nei dilemmi morali, in particolare tramite l'anticipazione delle conseguenze emozionali delle alternative disponibili