Veldman, Jeannette Oral History Interview: Old China Hands Oral History Project I and II

This project was made possible by a grant from the Youthgrants 1n the Humanities Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities, a Federal agency established by Congress to promote research, education,and public activity in the humanities

Political Competition and Judicial Independence: How Courts Fill the Void When Legislatures Are Ineffective

What effect does political competition have in generating de facto judicial independence? We argue that competition in a legislature can drive increases in de facto judicial independence. Our game-theoretic model reveals that increased competition for seats impedes legislators’ ability to enact their platforms, regardless of government turnover probability, and increased legislative fractionalization also makes court intervention more likely. Utilizing a sample of democratic states, empirical evidence suggests when a country’s legislature is increasingly fractionalized among parties or has increasing seat turnover, we observe increases in de facto independence. This research provides new perspectives on the link between independence and competition