New issues in NGA regulation: is there a scope for geographic regulation?

The adoption of geographically differentiated remedies may be a new regulatory instrument to foster NGAN investment. We present economic insights and review recent cases on the implementation of such regulatory interventio

Competition between Vertically Integrated Networks: a Generalized Model.

Using the Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) framework, a model of competition between vertically integrated telecommunications networks in a deregulated environment is developed. Two local operators compete in linear and non linear tariffs (i.e. two-part tariffs) in the subscribers market. In addition, they are integrated downstream in a potentially competitive sector (i.e. long distance sector) where they face competition of other firms which require (one way) access to local networks as an "essential facility". The purpose of the paper is to introduce a "downstream" competition in the usual framework of network competition and to focus on how the one way access charges are set in an oligopolistic market. In a mature phase of the industry, the presence of competition in both local and long distance sectors leads to lower local and long distance tariffs. The strategic role of the two-way and one-way access charges is pointed out, with particular reference to the effect that the reciprocal (two-way) access charge has on competition in the complementary sector. Finally, in case of competition in two-part tariffs, the paper investigates: 1) the asymmetric case in which only one network is integrated; 2) the entry process when the two local networks have different coverage. The results show how the level of the two-way and one-way access charges affects the "level playing field" between networks.Telecommunications; Interconnection; Integration; Competition Policy

“To Bid or Not to Bid, This is the Question: The Italian Experience in Competitive Tendering for Local Bus Services”

Competitive tendering is a popular mechanism for the provision of local bus services when a major objective is subsidy savings. Despite uncertainties in the legal rules some competitive tendering was implemented in Italy since 1998. The evidence so far is that participants were limited in number, the incumbents were almost everywhere able to gain the franchise, whilst subsidy savings were in many cases negligible. If some “political” conditions favouring more effective tendering procedures are not fulfilled, other regimes should be considered in order to obtain substantial subsidy savings.Local bus services; Competitive Tendering

Regulatory Independence and Political Interference: Evidence from EU Mixed-Ownership Utilities’ Investment and Debt

This paper examines the investment and financial decisions of a sample of 92 EU regulated utilities, taking into account key institutional features of EU public utilities, such as: a) regulation by agencies with various degrees of independence; b) partial ownership of the state in the regulated firm; and c) the government’s political orientation, which may ultimately influence the regulatory climate to be either more pro-firm or more pro-consumers. Our results show that regulatory independence matters for both investment and financial decisions. Investment increases under an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), while ownership has no effect. Leverage also increases when the IRA is in place, especially so if the regulated firm is privately controlled. Finally political orientation does matter, as firm investment increases under more conservative (pro-firm) governments, but this effect appears to revert when the IRA is in place.Regulated Utilities, Investment, Capital Structure, Private and State Ownership, Regulatory Independence, overnment’s Political Orientation

Access Regulation, Financial Structure and Investment in Vertically Integrated Utilities: Evidence from EU Telecoms

We examine theoretically and empirically the relationship between access regulation, financial structure and investment decisions in network industries, analyzing if financial variables can be used as a strategic device to influence the regulator’s price setting decisions. Using a panel of 15 EU Public Telecommunication Operators (PTOs) over the period 1994-2005, we first investigate the determinants of regulated prices (both wholesale and retail), firm financial structure and investment, and then test the relationship between leverage, regulated charges and firm’s investment. However, our model suggests that if leverage influences the regulated access charges, then it will also impact competition in the downstream segment. Therefore, we also investigate the impact of the PTO’s leverage on market competition. Our results show that leverage positively affects regulated rates, as well as the PTOs’ investment rate, as predicted by Spiegel and Spulber (1994). Moreover, higher leverage also leads to higher access charges and an increase in leverage is followed by a decrease in the number of competitors and by an increase of the incumbent’s market share. This suggests that the strategic use of debt to discipline the regulator’s lack of commitment within a vertically integrated network industry may somewhat impair or delay competition in the retail segment, but has a favorable counterpart in mitigating the underinvestment problem.

Artificial intelligence, firms and consumer behavior: A survey

AbstractThe current advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) are likely to have profound economic implications and bring about new trade‐offs, thereby posing new challenges from a policymaking point of view. What is the impact of these technologies on the labor market and firms? Will algorithms reduce consumers' biases or will they rather originate new ones? How competition will be affected by AI‐powered agents? This study is a first attempt to survey the growing literature on the multi‐faceted economic effects of the recent technological advances in AI that involve machine learning applications. We first review research on the implications of AI on firms, focusing on its impact on labor market, productivity, skill composition and innovation. Then we examine how AI contributes to shaping consumer behavior and market competition. We conclude by discussing how public policies can deal with the radical changes that AI is already producing and is going to generate in the future for firms and consumers

I servizi di igiene urbana: il passaggio dalla Tarsu alla tariffa.

Il settore dei rifiuti sta entrando in una fase di profonda trasformazione che dovrebbe a breve consentirgli di superare quei limiti strutturali e tecnologici che fino ad oggi lo hanno caratterizzato. La nuova normativa in vigore (D.lgs 5 febbraio 1997, n. 22) sembra costituita da un buon impianto di regolazione ambientale mentre appaiono del tutto insufficienti gli aspetti di regolazione economica. Il settore dei rifiuti è stato per troppi anni caratterizzato da una eccessiva frammentazione nella gestione a livello nazionale, da gestioni poco attente ai problemi di efficienza, da bassi livelli di investimenti e da condizioni di monopolio locale che hanno portato a rendite di posizione per gli operatori. Uno dei principali cambiamenti introdotti con la riforma in atto, su cui questo lavoro si sofferma, è l'abolizione della tassa di smaltimento dei rifiuti solidi urbani (la cosiddetta Tarsu) sostituita da una "tariffa normalizzata" che, nella sua articolazione originaria, dovrebbe incentivare l'impresa ad una maggiore efficienza e l'utente ad una produzione più razionale di rifiuti stimolandolo ad aumentare la raccolta differenziata degli stessi. Il lavoro si presuppone di affiancare ad un'analisi normativa sulla tariffa rifiuti un'analisi di tipo economico in cui si individuano le criticità del meccanismo predisposto dalla normativa nazionale (incentivi agli investimenti, all'efficienza produttiva, distorsione nel comportamento delle imprese, ecc.).

National FTTH plans in France, Italy and Portugal

In this paper, we analyze the specific national broadband plans which have been developed by some European governments to foster the deployment of next generation access networks, namely in France, Italy, and Portugal. In particular, we discuss the strategies adopted to achieve wide fibre coverage and encourage co-investment between competing operators. Finally, we highlight the similarities and differences between the strategies followed in these three countries.broadband; fibre; next generation access networks; regulation.

National FTTH plans in France, Italy and Portugal

In this paper, we analyze the specific national broadband plans which have been developed by some European governments to foster the deployment of next generation access networks, namely in France, Italy, and Portugal. In particular, we discuss the strategies adopted to achieve wide fibre coverage and encourage co-investment between competing operators. Finally, we highlight the similarities and differences between the strategies followed in these three countries.broadband; fibre; next generation access networks; regulation