Game complete analysis for financial markets stabilization

The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to stabilize the financial markets using Game Theory and in particular the Complete Study of a Differentiable Game, introduced in the literature by David Carfì. Specifically, we will focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject and a financial institute (a bank, for example) with a big economic availability. For this purpose we will discuss about an interaction between the two above economic subjects: the Enterprise, our first player, and the Financial Institute, our second player. The only solution which allows both players to win something, and therefore the only one desirable, is represented by an agreement between the two subjects: the Enterprise artificially causes an inconsistency between spot and future markets, and the Financial Institute, who was unable to make arbitrages alone, because of the introduction by the normative authority of a tax on economic transactions (that we propose to stabilize the financial market, in order to protect it from speculations), takes the opportunity to win the maximum possible collective (social) sum, which later will be divided with the Enterprise by contract.Financial Markets; Game Theory; Stabilization of Financial Markets; arbitrages

Game complete analysis for financial markets stabilization

The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to stabilize the financial markets using Game Theory and in particular the Complete Study of a Differentiable Game, introduced in the literature by David Carfì. Specifically, we will focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject and a financial institute (a bank, for example) with a big economic availability. For this purpose we will discuss about an interaction between the two above economic subjects: the Enterprise, our first player, and the Financial Institute, our second player. The only solution which allows both players to win something, and therefore the only one desirable, is represented by an agreement between the two subjects: the Enterprise artificially causes an inconsistency between spot and future markets, and the Financial Institute, who was unable to make arbitrages alone, because of the introduction by the normative authority of a tax on economic transactions (that we propose to stabilize the financial market, in order to protect it from speculations), takes the opportunity to win the maximum possible collective (social) sum, which later will be divided with the Enterprise by contract

Game theory model for European government bonds market stabilization: a saving-State proposal

The aim of this paper is to present a proposal regarding the possible stabilization of the rapid variations on the value of government bonds issued by the States, using the ``Game Theory". In particular, we focus our attention on three players: a large bank that has immediate access to the market of government bonds (hereinafter called Speculator, our first player), the European Central Bank (ECB, the second player) and the State in economic difficulty (our third player). We propose on financial transactions the introduction of a tax (cashed directly by the State in economic difficulty), which hits only the speculative profits. We show that the above tax would probably be able to avert the speculation, and, even in case of speculation on its government bonds, the State manages to pull itself out of the crisis. Finally, we also propose a cooperative solution that enables all economic actors involved (the Speculator, the ECB and the State) to obtain a profit

A coopetitive approach to financial markets stabilization and risk management

The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to stabilize the financial markets by adopting Game Theory, in particular, the Complete Study of a Differentiable Game and the new mathematical model of Coopetitive Game, proposed recently in the literature by D. Carfì. Specifically, we will focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject and a financial institute (a bank, for example) with a big economic availability. For this purpose we will discuss about an interaction between the two above economic subjects: the Enterprise, our first player, and the Financial Institute, our second player. The only solution which allows both players to win something, and therefore the only one collectively desirable, is represented by an agreement between the two subjects: the Enterprise artificially causes an inconsistency between spot and future markets, and the Financial Institute, who was unable to make arbitrages alone, because of the introduction by the normative authority of a tax on economic transactions (that we propose to stabilize the financial market, in order to protect it from speculations), takes the opportunity to win the maximum possible collective (social) sum, which later will be divided with the Enterprise by contract. We propose hereunder two kinds of agreement: a fair transferable utility agreement on the an initial natural interaction and a same type of compromise on a quite extended coopetitive context

A game theory model for currency markets stabilization

The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to stabilize the currency markets by adopting Game Theory. Our idea is to save the Euro from the speculative attacks (due the crisis of the Euro-area States), and this goal is reached by the introduction, by the normative authority, of a financial transactions tax. Specifically, we focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject (as for example the Ferrari S.p.A., our first player), and a financial institute of investment (the Unicredit Bank, our second player). The unique solution which allows both players to win something, and therefore the only one collectively desirable, is represented by an agreement between the two subjects. So the Ferrari artificially causes an inconsistency between currency spot and futures markets, and the Unicredit takes the opportunity to win the maximum possible collective sum, which later will be divided with the Ferrari by contract

Robots with Different Embodiments Can Express and Influence Carefulness in Object Manipulation

Humans have an extraordinary ability to communicate and read the properties of objects by simply watching them being carried by someone else. This level of communicative skills and interpretation, available to humans, is essential for collaborative robots if they are to interact naturally and effectively. For example, suppose a robot is handing over a fragile object. In that case, the human who receives it should be informed of its fragility in advance, through an immediate and implicit message, i.e., by the direct modulation of the robot's action. This work investigates the perception of object manipulations performed with a communicative intent by two robots with different embodiments (an iCub humanoid robot and a Baxter robot). We designed the robots' movements to communicate carefulness or not during the transportation of objects. We found that not only this feature is correctly perceived by human observers, but it can elicit as well a form of motor adaptation in subsequent human object manipulations. In addition, we get an insight into which motion features may induce to manipulate an object more or less carefully.Comment: Accepted for publication in the Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Development and Learning (ICDL) 2022 - 12th ICD

In vivo angiogenic activity induction by collagen- soaked Poly-L-lactic acid scaffolds

Angiogenesis is essential in tissue integration and it is involved in the biological response to biomaterials. Poly-L-lactic acid (PLLA), a synthetic polymer, is utilized as scaffolding to regenerate new tissues. This study investigated the short and long term degradation and the induction of neovascularization of both native PLLA (n-PLLA) and collagen type I soaked PLLA (c-PLLA) porous scaffolds, implanted subcutane- ously in balb/c mice.The comparative analysis by phase contrast, optical, and scanning electron micros- copy (SEM) of scaffolds 7 and 21 days after implantation showed a mild inflam- matory response at the implant site of c-PLLA scaffold. No significant difference in systemic immune response was detected by hematology analyzer, and by histologi- cal evaluation of lymph node and spleen features. On the contrary, immune reaction was moderate in n-PLLA. Pores of both PLLA networks laying on the muscle fibers were partially infiltrated by appositional collagen/elastin tissue, phagocytic cells, and fibroblast, with respect to the inner side. The presence of numerous and large blood vessels into pores of c-PLLA scaffolds showed an enhancing vascularization rate. These characteristics appeared to be less conspicuous in n-PLLA.At longer time points (42 and 84 days), there was low difference in inflammato- ry cell presence into scaffold pores and the number of cells infiltrating each implant was significantly decreased. In fact, we did not observe difference in the migration of inflammatory cells into PLLA scaffolds. Polymer degradation was detected in both PLLA networks, but there are no considerable differences, as confirmed by the SEM analysis.Our results suggest that tissue integration of PLLA is enhanced when it is soaked with collagen, as well as the angiogenic activity on c-PLLA. Furthermore, the colla- gen soaking makes PLLA polymer more suitable for supporting cell attachment, pro- liferation, and function by mimicking the natural extra cellular matrix.

Structural characterization of the Hepatitis C Virus NS3 protease from genotype 3a: The basis of the genotype 1b vs. 3a inhibitor potency shift

AbstractThe first structural characterization of the genotype 3a Hepatitis C Virus NS3 protease is reported, providing insight into the differential susceptibility of 1b and 3a proteases to certain inhibitors. Interaction of the 3a NS3 protease with a P2–P4 macrocyclic and a linear phenethylamide inhibitor was investigated. In addition, the effect of the NS4A cofactor binding on the conformation of the protease was analyzed. Complexation of NS3 with the phenethylamide inhibitor significantly stabilizes the protease but binding does not involve residues 168 and 123, two key amino acids underlying the different inhibition of genotype 1b vs. 3a proteases by P2–P4 macrocycles. Therefore, we studied the dynamic behavior of these two residues in the phenethylamide complex, serving as a model of the situation in the apo 3a protein, in order to explore the structural basis of the inhibition potency shift between the proteases of the genotypes 1b and 3a