Extravehicular Activity Probabilistic Risk Assessment Overview for Thermal Protection System Repair on the Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission

The Shuttle Program initiated an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to assess the risks associated with performing a Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) repair during the Space Transportation System (STS)-125 Hubble repair mission as part of risk trades between TPS repair and crew rescue

Hubble Space Telescope Crew Rescue Analysis

In the aftermath of the 2003 Columbia accident, NASA removed the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) from the Space Shuttle manifest. Reasons cited included concerns that the risk of flying the mission would be too high. The HST SM4 was subsequently reinstated and flown as Space Transportation System (STS)-125 because of improvements in the ascent debris environment, the development of techniques for astronauts to perform on orbit repairs to damaged thermal protection, and the development of a strategy to provide a viable crew rescue capability. However, leading up to the launch of STS-125, the viability of the HST crew rescue capability was a recurring topic. For STS-125, there was a limited amount of time available to perform a crew rescue due to limited consumables (power, oxygen, etc.) available on the Orbiter. The success of crew rescue depended upon several factors, including when a problem was identified; when and what actions, such as powering down, were begun to conserve consumables; and where the Launch on Need (LON) vehicle was in its ground processing cycle. Crew rescue success also needed to be weighed against preserving the Orbiter s ability to have a landing option in case there was a problem with the LON vehicle. This paper focuses on quantifying the HST mission loss of crew rescue capability using Shuttle historical data and various power down strategies. Results from this effort supported NASA s decision to proceed with STS-125, which was successfully completed on May 24th 2009

2009 Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment Overview

Loss of a Space Shuttle during flight has severe consequences, including loss of a significant national asset; loss of national confidence and pride; and, most importantly, loss of human life. The Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) is used to identify risk contributors and their significance; thus, assisting management in determining how to reduce risk. In 2006, an overview of the SPRA Iteration 2.1 was presented at PSAM 8 [1]. Like all successful PRAs, the SPRA is a living PRA and has undergone revisions since PSAM 8. The latest revision to the SPRA is Iteration 3. 1, and it will not be the last as the Shuttle program progresses and more is learned. This paper discusses the SPRA scope, overall methodology, and results, as well as provides risk insights. The scope, assumptions, uncertainties, and limitations of this assessment provide risk-informed perspective to aid management s decision-making process. In addition, this paper compares the Iteration 3.1 analysis and results to the Iteration 2.1 analysis and results presented at PSAM 8