Softwood Lumber: Exact Significance of the Recent Canadian Victory before the WTO and Prospects in the Context of the Pending Second Lumber Case

Recently, the WTO Panel in charge of the softwood lumber case brought by Canada against the United States ruled in favor of Canada. The “benefit conferred” criterion played a critical role in the ruling, which concluded that the United States used a flawed cross-border methodology to demonstrate the existence of such a benefit. However, the Canadian victory would have been more decisive if the WTO panel had found the absence of a governmental financial contribution. The cross-border methodology will be once again at the heart of the pending second lumber case before the WTO. This article evaluates the prospects for the case in this context.Canada, cross-border methodology, dispute, financial contribution, softwood lumber, stumpage, United States, WTO, International Relations/Trade,

Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO-NAFTA “Spaghetti Bowl” Is Cooking

With the Doha round in trouble, the so-called spaghetti bowl of multilateral trade rules and proliferating regional trade deals, is, once again, prominently on the radar screen of the international trade community. Perfect examples of this image are the longstanding US-Canada softwood lumber and US-Mexico sweetener disputes. Both trade spats, extensively litigated in NAFTA and the WTO, are close to reaching a climax. Fueling the suspense is that the WTO and NAFTA may reach different results

Scripts European Trade Policies? Business-Government Relations in the EU-Canada Partnership Negotiations.

No abstract available

Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO): An Overview

[Excerpt] Dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is carried out under the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). In effect since January 1995, the DSU provides for consultations between disputing parties, panels and appeals, and possible retaliation if a defending party fails to comply with a WTO decision by an established deadline. Automatic establishment of panels, adoption of panel and appellate reports, and authorization of requests to retaliate, along with deadlines and improved multilateral oversight of compliance, are aimed at producing a more expeditious and effective system than had existed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). To date, 405 complaints have been filed, approximately half involving the United States as complainant or defendant. Expressing dissatisfaction with WTO dispute settlement results in the trade remedy area, Congress, in the Trade Act of 2002, directed the executive branch to address dispute settlement in WTO negotiations. WTO Members have been negotiating DSU revisions in the currently stalled Doha Development Round of trade negotiations but no final agreement on the DSU has been reached. Use of the DSU has revealed procedural gaps, particularly affecting the compliance phase of a dispute. These include a failure to coordinate procedures for requesting retaliation with procedures for tasking a WTO panel with determining whether a defending Member has complied in a case and the absence of a procedure for withdrawing trade sanctions imposed by a complaining Member where the defending Member believes it has fulfilled its WTO obligations. As a result, disputing Members have entered into bilateral agreements permitting retaliation and compliance panel processes to progress on an agreed schedule and have initiated new dispute proceedings aimed at removing retaliatory measures. Where a U.S. law or regulation is at issue in a WTO case, the adoption by the WTO of a panel or Appellate Body report finding that the measure violates a WTO agreement does not give the report direct legal effect in this country; thus federal law is not affected until Congress or the executive branch, as the case may be, takes action to remove the offending measure. Where a restrictive foreign trade practice is at issue, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides a mechanism by which the United States Trade Representative (USTR) may challenge the measure in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding and authorizes the USTR to take retaliatory action if the defending Member has not complied with the resulting WTO decision. Although Section 301 was challenged in the WTO on the ground that it requires the USTR to act unilaterally in WTO-related trade disputes in violation of DSU provisions requiring resort to multilateral WTO dispute settlement, the United States was ultimately found not to be in violation of its DSU obligations. H.R. 496 (Rangel) would create an Office of the Congressional Trade Enforcer that would, inter alia, investigate restrictive foreign trade practices in light of WTO obligations and call on the USTR to pursue WTO cases where alleged violations are found; express congressional dissatisfaction with WTO decisions; and restrict implementation of a revised methodology for calculating dumping margins adopted by the Commerce Department in 2007 in response to adverse WTO decisions. S. 363 (Snowe) would grant the U.S. Court of International Trade exclusive jurisdiction to review de novo certain USTR determinations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which may in some cases involve the initiation and conduct of WTO disputes, and would amend various Section 301 authorities themselves. S. 1466 (Stabenow) and S. 1982 (Brown) would establish mechanisms under the Trade Act of 1974 requiring the USTR to identify particularly harmful foreign trade practices and, where appropriate, to initiate WTO cases to remedy these practices

The WTO Comes to Dinner: U.S. Implementation of Trade Rules Bypasses Food Safety Requirements

A Special Report By Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch and Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program. A review of U.S. government "system" audits of five nations (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Australia and Canada) reveals that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)'s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) deemed "equivalent" systems with sanitary measures that differ from FSIS policy, and in some cases, violate the express language of U.S. laws and regulations. Because FSIS has refused to respond to Public Citizen Freedom of Information Act requests for correspondence and other documentation regarding these equivalency decisions, it is impossible to determine what is the current status of these issues and whether they have been resolved by regulators. - The U.S. law requiring meat to be inspected by independent government officials was violated by Brazil and Mexico and they retained their eligibility to export to the United States. - The USDA's zero tolerance policy for contamination by feces was repeatedly violated by Australia, Canada and Mexico. - U.S. regulations requiring monthly supervisory reviews of plants eligible to export be conducted on behalf of USDA by foreign government officials were violated by Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Mexico, several of whom are seeking to avoid this core requirement of U.S. regulation. Monthly reviews are vitally important to remind the meat industry that the meat inspector who works the line in the plant is backed by the weight of the government and to double-check the work of meat inspectors on a regular basis. - Even though U.S. regulations requiring that a government official -- not a company employee -- sample meat for salmonella microbial contamination, the USDA approved company employees performing this task as part of an equivalency determination with Brazil and Canada. - Even though U.S. regulations require certain microbial testing to be performed at government labs, the U.S. approved testing by private labs as part of the equivalency determination with Brazil, Canada and Mexico. - Unapproved and/or improper testing procedures and sanitation violations have been re-identified by FSIS year after year for Australia, Brazil, Canada and Mexico, but the countries have retained their eligibility to export to the United States. - After its regulatory systems was designated "equivalent," Mexico began using alternative procedures for salmonella and E. coli that had never been evaluated by FSIS, yet the country retained its eligibility to import to the United States. - Australia and Canada were allowed to export to the United States while using their own methods and procedures for such matters as E. coli testing, postmortem inspection, monthly supervisory reviews and pre-shipment reviews while awaiting an equivalency determination from FSIS. - FSIS auditors and Canadian food safety officials continue to disagree about whether particular measures have already been found "equivalent" by FSIS, yet Canadian imports remained uninterrupted. - The regulatory systems of Brazil and Mexico have been rated equivalent even though the countries plead insufficient personnel and monetary resources to explain their inability to carry out all required functions

THE WTO DAIRY EXPORT DECISION: WHAT NEXT FOR GROWTH IN THE CANADIAN DAIRY INDUSTRY

The Canadian dairy industry received the most unwanted of all presents just prior to Christmas 2002- a clear loss on the dairy export issue upon final WTO appeal. This leaves the Canadian dairy industry with protracted challenges if it is to grow in the future. It appears to be the final chapter in the long running WTO-Canadian dairy export saga, which we first analyzed in a George Morris Centre Special Report about 3 years ago. Now the challenges associated with the implications of the WTO decision must be faced. The purpose of this paper is to outline the basic points advanced by Canada, and by New Zealand and the US in the WTO appeal, and to illustrate the importance of the WTO decision in the context of growth in the Canadian dairy industry. Finally, the apparent challenges laid down by the WTO decision are analyzed in the context of needs for new marketing research to reform the milk marketing system.International Relations/Trade,

Compliance of Canada’s Utility Doctrine with International Minimum Standards of Patent Protection

This article analyzes the Canadian court case of Eli Lilly v. Novopharm and the utility doctrine in Canada, and international standards of patent protection including TRIPS and NAFTA. The ‘‘promise of the patent’’ doctrine in Canada seeks to ensure that firms do not obtain a legal monopoly on the basis of speculative claims about increased utility — especially claims about therapeutic efficacy — that were unsubstantiated at the time of filing. Under this test, some of Eli Lilly’s patented pharmaceutical products have been invalidated retroactively

Eliminating Trade Remedies from the WTO: Lessons from Regional Trade Agreements

As the global financial crisis threatens to manifest in enhanced protectionism, the economic irrationality of dumping, countervailing, and global safeguard measures (so-called ‘trade remedies’) should be of increased concern to the Members of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’). Long tolerated under the WTO agreements and perhaps a necessary evil to facilitate multilateral trade liberalisation, elimination of trade remedies is far from the agenda of WTO negotiators. However, a small number of regional trade agreements offer a model for reducing the use of trade remedies among WTO Members in the longer term, consistent with WTO rules and broader public international law

Navigating New Trade Routes: The rise of Value chains, and the Challenges for Canadian Trade Policy

In the new paradigm of international trade, Canada needs a trade policy that recognizes both the increasing importance of global value chains and the critical role of Canada-US commercial and regulatory integration in gaining full benefit from their exploitation.border papers, international policy

Implications of the U.S. Farm Act on Canadian Agriculture

This paper addresses the implications of the U.S. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 or "Farm Act" for Canadian agriculture. The Farm Act, which is expected to add at least US $45 billion in new price supports over its six-year timeframe, is expected to harm the position of less-subsidized and non-subsidized producers in Canada and other countries. Canadian farm products will be less competitive not only domestically, but also in the U.S. and in third-country markets. Canada will be most affected by subsidies for corn, soybeans, wheat, and pulse crops. New country-of-origin labeling rules under the Farm Act are also expected to be disruptive to Canadian livestock exports. In addressing these issues the paper also explores potential Canadian responses - including filing WTO or NAFTA complaints - as well as the broader implications for U.S.-Canada trade and international cooperation.U.S. Farm Bill, U.S.-Canada trade, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade,