82 research outputs found
The Rise and Decline of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Asymmetric Bilateralism and the Limitations of Interregionalism
East Asiaâs economic dynamism attracted the attention of European political leadersin the 1980s leading to the publication of Asian strategy papers by most Europeangovernments. However, it was the 1994 publication by the European Commission of itscommunication Towards a New Asia Strategy and the holding of the first Asia-EuropeMeeting (ASEM) in Bangkok in September 1996 that marked the first pan-Europeanattempt by the European Union to enter into a process of dialogue with a considerably lessinstitutionally structured Pan-Asian region. This article is an attempt to explore how tenyears of the ASEM process have failed to live up to initial expectations of interregionalismas one level in multi-layered global governance. This reflects, on the European side, thecontinuing tensions between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism as the modusoperandi of the European Union. On the Asian side, it demonstrates the lack of a coherentAsian region with which the EU can dialogue. The decision at the Helsinki Summit inSeptember 2006 to expand participation to all members of an enlarged European Union(with the addition of Rumania and Bulgaria) and in Asia, with the membership of India,Pakistan and Mongolia will probably accentuate this problem. Moreover, asymmetriesbetween a highly institutionalised European Union and an Asia devoid of strong institutionsare exacerbated by significant disparities in capacities and levels of political will amongstthe member states of both regions. Thus what is somewhat loosely labelled asinterregionalism can more carefully be defined as asymmetric bilateralism. Trappedbetween the Charybdis of multilateralism and the Scylla of bilateralism, interregionalism asa phenomenon engendered by globalization is at best a second-best option for politicalleaderships in both Europe and Asia. Thus, without a solid basis for development on bothsides the future of Euro-Asian interregionalism seems problematical at best.international relations
Aung San Suu Kyi et lâautomne birman
Le 16 juin, aprĂšs plus de vingt ans, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader iconique du mouvement
dĂ©mocratique birman, libĂ©rĂ©e depuis fin 2010 de sa rĂ©sidence surveillĂ©e, a pu se rendre Ă
Oslo pour recevoir le Prix Nobel de la Paix qui lui avait été décerné en 1991. Son discours
dâacceptation met en exergue les Ă©lĂ©ments qui font de cette femme courageuse un symbole
fort de la lutte de son peuple pour les libertĂ©s. Tout dâabord, des rĂ©fĂ©rences trĂšs personnelles
Ă sa famille nous font comprendre pourquoi beaucoup de birmans lâappellent « MĂšre Suu » :
elle est la fille du pÚre de la Birmanie indépendante, le Général Aung San, assassiné en
1947 (...)
Globalizing comparative political science research on Southeast Asia
From my point of view, the scholar of Asia today is a âglobal scholarâ, embedded not only in his/her area studies specialization, but also in constant intellectual dialogue with others in the same discipline, but focused on other Area studies fields. In practice, by dint of the complexity of the âobjectâ, we are studying to becoming interdisciplinary. In short, the scholar of Asia today not only has greater savoir, s/he has an enhanced savoir faire: in a virtuous circle of scientific dialogue, greater interdisciplinarity leads to todayâs Asia scholar making a more substantial contribution to his/her âhomeâ discipline. Below, I shall argue the case for political science..
âChasing Pavementsâ: The East Asia Summit and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Discursive Regionalism as Disguised Multilateralism
Revolving around the concept of âCommunityâ, or âcommunityâ â the use of the capital âcâ being seen as indicative of cultural homogeneity - debate on an Asian region has ostensibly pitted those who favour an entity limited to East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea and the ten countries of ASEAN) against those who propose a much wider entity embracing India, North (and, perhaps, South) America, as well as Australasia. Previously these two conceptualizations possessed their eponymous translation in the East Asian Economic
Caucus (reincarnated as ASEAN +3) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum respectively. However with the creation in 2005 of the East Asian Summit (EAS) to include India, Australia and New Zealand and, above all, its 2011 enlargement to include the United States and Russia, the distinction between the two conceptualizations of an Asian region has become confused. In order to explain this development, this paper suggests that the language of âregionâ or âcommunityâ is a discursive smokescreen disguising changes in approaches to multilateralism. An examination of the EAS, contrasted with another recent regional project, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), suggests that the actors involved, both state and non-state, are seeking overwhelmingly to ensure the primacy of individual nationstates in intergovernmental multilateral relations
Thaïlande : aprÚs les inondations, le déluge
Les inondations qui ont frappĂ© la ThaĂŻlande au mois dâoctobre et coĂ»tĂ© la vie Ă plus de cinq cents personnes sont les plus graves que le pays ait connues depuis plus dâun demi-siĂšcle. Dans lâimaginaire thaĂŻlandais, cette catastrophe naturelle est bien plus quâun dĂ©sastre. Nâest-elle pas annonciatrice de la fin dâune Ă©poque ? En effet, dans lâancien Siam, le fondement du pouvoir royal reposait sur la maĂźtrise des eaux (travaux dâirrigation, construction de digues, canaux, etc.) et sur le contrĂŽle de la main-dâoeuvre employĂ©e Ă leur rĂ©alisation. LâincapacitĂ© Ă protĂ©ger ses sujets des forces de la nature tĂ©moignait donc de lâincompĂ©tence
du monarque et annonçait la fin dâune dynastie. Aux yeux de beaucoup, les consĂ©quences
des inondations sur « lâĂąme du pays » et sur son unitĂ© sont des plus inquiĂ©tantes car le dĂ©sastre semble clore, en quelque sorte, quinze annĂ©es de transformations Ă©conomiques, sociales et surtout politiques
Burmaâs Schizophrenic Transition
In April 2013, one year after the election to the Myanmar (Burma) Union Parliament of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi - described by Barack Obama as a âdemocratic iconâ during his meeting with her in Rangoon on 19th November 20121 â Burmaâs democratic transition does not appear to be as smooth and uncomplicated as many observers had suggested, or at least hoped. In her personal transition from charismatic opposition leader to politician and, perhaps, future presidential candidate she has come under a deal of criticism for her compromising attitude with her former military jailers. Now, as a member of the political establishment and with the distinct possibility of her party, the National League for Democracy, winning the legislative elections planned for 2015, she has shown herself sensitive to the daily concerns of her electorate and less prone to taking principled stances (...)
Executions signal a return to Sukarno-style foreign policy in Indonesia
On 29 April Indonesia executed seven foreigners and one Indonesian for drug offences. The refusal of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) to offer clemency despite pleas from foreign leaders has been analysed in a number of ways. Most have interpreted Jokowiâs decision as that of a contested head of state in a fragile democracy heeding public opinion, which seems to overwhelmingly (86 per cent in a recent poll) support the death penalty for drug trafficking. But was his decision instead a deliberate act of public diplomacy, designed to send signals to those missing the Sukarno era
Jokowiâs Indonesia: Executions, Diplomacy and the Sukarnoist Turn
What if the reprehensible execution in Indonesia of seven foreigners on 29th April was a deliberate form of public diplomacy? The refusal of President Joko Widodo to countenance the pleas of foreign leaders and offer clemency has been interpreted in a number of ways, notably as that of a contested head of state in a fragile democracy heeding the voice of public opinion which, apparently in Indonesia, overwhelmingly supports the death penalty for drug trafficking..
Thailand, Succession and Legitimacy: Mahaha Vajiralongkorn and TĂŽn Duc Thang
It may appear incongruous and, to some at least, offensive to compare the present Crown Prince (aged 62) and heir apparent to the Thai throne with the second president of North Vietnam and, after reunification, the first president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. After all, the putative âpredecessorâ of the former, King Bhumibol (Rama IX), while ailing, still remains on the throne and is still the more than ceremonial head of state of the Thai kingdom. As for TĂŽn Duc Thangâs predecessor, Ho Chi Minh, he died in 1969 and TĂŽn himself passed away in 1980 at the age of 92. Yet a recent trip to neighbouring Vietnam has caused me to think again on political developments in the Southeast country with which I am at present most concerned, Thailand, and the parallels and divergences in the historical trajectories of these two Southeast Asian nations..
Nationalizing Transnationalism? The Philippine State and the Filipino Diaspora
With over 8 million Filipinos living overseas, it could be argued that people have become the countryâs largest export commodity. With their remittances making up 13% of GDP, they are as well crucially important economic actors. Has the Philippine state been instrumental in this exodus and in harvesting its fruits? Addressing such a proposition requires further refinement of three basic concepts â state, diaspora and transnationalism â through the use of three structuring templates. As a preliminary, the dichotomy of state strength and weakness is grounded in an analysis of a particular sector, namely emigration. By drawing on the typologies of Robin Cohen, Filipino overseas communities are portrayed as possessing, to some extent, the characteristics of much more readily accepted diasporas. However, a sketch of the varied experience of a heterogeneous Filipino diaspora underlines the differences between permanent migrants, contract workers, sea-based workers and irregular migrants. The diverse lived experiences of these groups â and their relations with their âhomeâ nation â call into question the salience of notions of âtransnationalismâ. This questioning is reinforced by an examination of the Filipino stateâs role in creating a âself-servingâ diaspora through a review of the three phases in Filipino emigration policy since 1974. The characteristics that come to the fore are rather forms of âlong-distance nationalismâ and ârooted cosmopolitanismâ. Taking cognizance of the multiple identities and loyalties in the case of the Filipino diaspora, a process of âbinary nationalismsâ is posited as a more fruitful avenue for future research.Avec plus de 8 millions dâexpatriĂ©s, la population reprĂ©sente la principale exportation nationale des Philippines. Les transferts de fonds constituent 13 % du PIB et font des expatriĂ©s des acteurs Ă©conomiques centraux. LâEtat philippin a-t-il instrumentalisĂ© cet exode afin dâen rĂ©colter les fruits ? RĂ©pondre Ă cette question nĂ©cessite de distinguer trois concepts fondamentaux : lâEtat, la diaspora et le transnationalisme. Le texte suggĂšre que lâutilisation de la dichotomie de la force et de la faiblesse dâun Etat doit se fonder sur une analyse du rĂŽle de ce dernier dans lâĂ©migration. Les typologies de Robin Cohen servent par ailleurs Ă dĂ©montrer que les communautĂ©s philippines dâoutre-mer rĂ©pondent Ă des caractĂ©ristiques propres Ă des communautĂ©s diasporiques plus gĂ©nĂ©ralement reconnues. Reste quâil faut sâinterroger sur les expĂ©riences de cette diaspora hĂ©tĂ©rogĂšne pour mettre en avant la distinction entre Ă©migrĂ©s permanents, saisonniers, travailleurs en mer et personnes en situation irrĂ©guliĂšre. La vie de ces groupes et leurs relations avec leur « mĂšre patrie » remet en question la prĂ©dominance de la notion de « transnationalisme ». Cette analyse critique est renforcĂ©e par lâexamen du rĂŽle de lâEtat dans la crĂ©ation dâune diaspora instrumentalisĂ©e au cours de trois pĂ©riodes de politiques dâimmigration depuis 1974. Les caractĂ©ristiques qui ressortent de cette analyse sont des formes de « nationalisme longue distance » (Anderson, Schiller) et de « cosmopolitanisme enracinĂ© » (Appiah). Dâautres pistes de recherche plus fructueuses peuvent naĂźtre de lâexploration des multiples identitĂ©s, des loyautĂ©s et dans le cas philippin des « nationalismes binaires »
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