The Rise and Decline of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Asymmetric Bilateralism and the Limitations of Interregionalism

East Asia’s economic dynamism attracted the attention of European political leadersin the 1980s leading to the publication of Asian strategy papers by most Europeangovernments. However, it was the 1994 publication by the European Commission of itscommunication Towards a New Asia Strategy and the holding of the first Asia-EuropeMeeting (ASEM) in Bangkok in September 1996 that marked the first pan-Europeanattempt by the European Union to enter into a process of dialogue with a considerably lessinstitutionally structured Pan-Asian region. This article is an attempt to explore how tenyears of the ASEM process have failed to live up to initial expectations of interregionalismas one level in multi-layered global governance. This reflects, on the European side, thecontinuing tensions between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism as the modusoperandi of the European Union. On the Asian side, it demonstrates the lack of a coherentAsian region with which the EU can dialogue. The decision at the Helsinki Summit inSeptember 2006 to expand participation to all members of an enlarged European Union(with the addition of Rumania and Bulgaria) and in Asia, with the membership of India,Pakistan and Mongolia will probably accentuate this problem. Moreover, asymmetriesbetween a highly institutionalised European Union and an Asia devoid of strong institutionsare exacerbated by significant disparities in capacities and levels of political will amongstthe member states of both regions. Thus what is somewhat loosely labelled asinterregionalism can more carefully be defined as asymmetric bilateralism. Trappedbetween the Charybdis of multilateralism and the Scylla of bilateralism, interregionalism asa phenomenon engendered by globalization is at best a second-best option for politicalleaderships in both Europe and Asia. Thus, without a solid basis for development on bothsides the future of Euro-Asian interregionalism seems problematical at best.international relations

Aung San Suu Kyi et l’automne birman

Le 16 juin, après plus de vingt ans, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader iconique du mouvement démocratique birman, libérée depuis fin 2010 de sa résidence surveillée, a pu se rendre à Oslo pour recevoir le Prix Nobel de la Paix qui lui avait été décerné en 1991. Son discours d’acceptation met en exergue les éléments qui font de cette femme courageuse un symbole fort de la lutte de son peuple pour les libertés. Tout d’abord, des références très personnelles à sa famille nous font comprendre pourquoi beaucoup de birmans l’appellent « Mère Suu » : elle est la fille du père de la Birmanie indépendante, le Général Aung San, assassiné en 1947 (...)

Globalizing comparative political science research on Southeast Asia

From my point of view, the scholar of Asia today is a ‘global scholar’, embedded not only in his/her area studies specialization, but also in constant intellectual dialogue with others in the same discipline, but focused on other Area studies fields. In practice, by dint of the complexity of the ‘object’, we are studying to becoming interdisciplinary. In short, the scholar of Asia today not only has greater savoir, s/he has an enhanced savoir faire: in a virtuous circle of scientific dialogue, greater interdisciplinarity leads to today’s Asia scholar making a more substantial contribution to his/her ‘home’ discipline. Below, I shall argue the case for political science..

“Chasing Pavements”: The East Asia Summit and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Discursive Regionalism as Disguised Multilateralism

Revolving around the concept of “Community”, or “community” – the use of the capital “c” being seen as indicative of cultural homogeneity - debate on an Asian region has ostensibly pitted those who favour an entity limited to East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea and the ten countries of ASEAN) against those who propose a much wider entity embracing India, North (and, perhaps, South) America, as well as Australasia. Previously these two conceptualizations possessed their eponymous translation in the East Asian Economic Caucus (reincarnated as ASEAN +3) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum respectively. However with the creation in 2005 of the East Asian Summit (EAS) to include India, Australia and New Zealand and, above all, its 2011 enlargement to include the United States and Russia, the distinction between the two conceptualizations of an Asian region has become confused. In order to explain this development, this paper suggests that the language of “region” or “community” is a discursive smokescreen disguising changes in approaches to multilateralism. An examination of the EAS, contrasted with another recent regional project, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), suggests that the actors involved, both state and non-state, are seeking overwhelmingly to ensure the primacy of individual nationstates in intergovernmental multilateral relations

Thaïlande : après les inondations, le déluge

Les inondations qui ont frappé la Thaïlande au mois d’octobre et coûté la vie à plus de cinq cents personnes sont les plus graves que le pays ait connues depuis plus d’un demi-siècle. Dans l’imaginaire thaïlandais, cette catastrophe naturelle est bien plus qu’un désastre. N’est-elle pas annonciatrice de la fin d’une époque ? En effet, dans l’ancien Siam, le fondement du pouvoir royal reposait sur la maîtrise des eaux (travaux d’irrigation, construction de digues, canaux, etc.) et sur le contrôle de la main-d’oeuvre employée à leur réalisation. L’incapacité à protéger ses sujets des forces de la nature témoignait donc de l’incompétence du monarque et annonçait la fin d’une dynastie. Aux yeux de beaucoup, les conséquences des inondations sur « l’âme du pays » et sur son unité sont des plus inquiétantes car le désastre semble clore, en quelque sorte, quinze années de transformations économiques, sociales et surtout politiques

Burma’s Schizophrenic Transition

In April 2013, one year after the election to the Myanmar (Burma) Union Parliament of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi - described by Barack Obama as a “democratic icon” during his meeting with her in Rangoon on 19th November 20121 – Burma’s democratic transition does not appear to be as smooth and uncomplicated as many observers had suggested, or at least hoped. In her personal transition from charismatic opposition leader to politician and, perhaps, future presidential candidate she has come under a deal of criticism for her compromising attitude with her former military jailers. Now, as a member of the political establishment and with the distinct possibility of her party, the National League for Democracy, winning the legislative elections planned for 2015, she has shown herself sensitive to the daily concerns of her electorate and less prone to taking principled stances (...)

Executions signal a return to Sukarno-style foreign policy in Indonesia

On 29 April Indonesia executed seven foreigners and one Indonesian for drug offences. The refusal of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) to offer clemency despite pleas from foreign leaders has been analysed in a number of ways. Most have interpreted Jokowi’s decision as that of a contested head of state in a fragile democracy heeding public opinion, which seems to overwhelmingly (86 per cent in a recent poll) support the death penalty for drug trafficking. But was his decision instead a deliberate act of public diplomacy, designed to send signals to those missing the Sukarno era

Jokowi’s Indonesia: Executions, Diplomacy and the Sukarnoist Turn

What if the reprehensible execution in Indonesia of seven foreigners on 29th April was a deliberate form of public diplomacy? The refusal of President Joko Widodo to countenance the pleas of foreign leaders and offer clemency has been interpreted in a number of ways, notably as that of a contested head of state in a fragile democracy heeding the voice of public opinion which, apparently in Indonesia, overwhelmingly supports the death penalty for drug trafficking..

Thailand, Succession and Legitimacy: Mahaha Vajiralongkorn and Tôn Duc Thang

It may appear incongruous and, to some at least, offensive to compare the present Crown Prince (aged 62) and heir apparent to the Thai throne with the second president of North Vietnam and, after reunification, the first president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. After all, the putative ‘predecessor’ of the former, King Bhumibol (Rama IX), while ailing, still remains on the throne and is still the more than ceremonial head of state of the Thai kingdom. As for Tôn Duc Thang’s predecessor, Ho Chi Minh, he died in 1969 and Tôn himself passed away in 1980 at the age of 92. Yet a recent trip to neighbouring Vietnam has caused me to think again on political developments in the Southeast country with which I am at present most concerned, Thailand, and the parallels and divergences in the historical trajectories of these two Southeast Asian nations..

Nationalizing Transnationalism? The Philippine State and the Filipino Diaspora

With over 8 million Filipinos living overseas, it could be argued that people have become the country’s largest export commodity. With their remittances making up 13% of GDP, they are as well crucially important economic actors. Has the Philippine state been instrumental in this exodus and in harvesting its fruits? Addressing such a proposition requires further refinement of three basic concepts – state, diaspora and transnationalism – through the use of three structuring templates. As a preliminary, the dichotomy of state strength and weakness is grounded in an analysis of a particular sector, namely emigration. By drawing on the typologies of Robin Cohen, Filipino overseas communities are portrayed as possessing, to some extent, the characteristics of much more readily accepted diasporas. However, a sketch of the varied experience of a heterogeneous Filipino diaspora underlines the differences between permanent migrants, contract workers, sea-based workers and irregular migrants. The diverse lived experiences of these groups – and their relations with their “home” nation – call into question the salience of notions of “transnationalism”. This questioning is reinforced by an examination of the Filipino state’s role in creating a “self-serving” diaspora through a review of the three phases in Filipino emigration policy since 1974. The characteristics that come to the fore are rather forms of “long-distance nationalism” and “rooted cosmopolitanism”. Taking cognizance of the multiple identities and loyalties in the case of the Filipino diaspora, a process of “binary nationalisms” is posited as a more fruitful avenue for future research.Avec plus de 8 millions d’expatriés, la population représente la principale exportation nationale des Philippines. Les transferts de fonds constituent 13 % du PIB et font des expatriés des acteurs économiques centraux. L’Etat philippin a-t-il instrumentalisé cet exode afin d’en récolter les fruits ? Répondre à cette question nécessite de distinguer trois concepts fondamentaux : l’Etat, la diaspora et le transnationalisme. Le texte suggère que l’utilisation de la dichotomie de la force et de la faiblesse d’un Etat doit se fonder sur une analyse du rôle de ce dernier dans l’émigration. Les typologies de Robin Cohen servent par ailleurs à démontrer que les communautés philippines d’outre-mer répondent à des caractéristiques propres à des communautés diasporiques plus généralement reconnues. Reste qu’il faut s’interroger sur les expériences de cette diaspora hétérogène pour mettre en avant la distinction entre émigrés permanents, saisonniers, travailleurs en mer et personnes en situation irrégulière. La vie de ces groupes et leurs relations avec leur « mère patrie » remet en question la prédominance de la notion de « transnationalisme ». Cette analyse critique est renforcée par l’examen du rôle de l’Etat dans la création d’une diaspora instrumentalisée au cours de trois périodes de politiques d’immigration depuis 1974. Les caractéristiques qui ressortent de cette analyse sont des formes de « nationalisme longue distance » (Anderson, Schiller) et de « cosmopolitanisme enraciné » (Appiah). D’autres pistes de recherche plus fructueuses peuvent naître de l’exploration des multiples identités, des loyautés et dans le cas philippin des « nationalismes binaires »