L e s   É t u d e s   d u   C E R I
N° 152 - décembre 2008

Nationalizing Transnationalism?
The Philippine State
and the Filipino Diaspora

David Camroux

Centre d'études et de recherches internationales
Sciences Po

David Camroux

Nationalizing Transnationalism?
The Philippine State and the Filipino Diaspora

Abstract

With over 8 million Filipinos living overseas, it could be argued that people have become the country's largest export commodity. With their remittances making up 13% of GDP, they are as well crucially important economic actors. Has the Philippine state been instrumental in this exodus and in harvesting its fruits? Addressing such a proposition requires further refinement of three basic concepts – state, diaspora and transnationalism – through the use of three structuring templates. As a preliminary, the dichotomy of state strength and weakness is grounded in an analysis of a particular sector, namely emigration. By drawing on the typologies of Robin Cohen, Filipino overseas communities are portrayed as possessing, to some extent, the characteristics of much more readily accepted diasporas. However, a sketch of the varied experience of a heterogeneous Filipino diaspora underlines the differences between permanent migrants, contract workers, sea-based workers and irregular migrants. The diverse lived experiences of these groups – and their relations with their "home" nation – call into question the salience of notions of "transnationalism". This questioning is reinforced by an examination of the Filipino state's role in creating a "self-serving" diaspora through a review of the three phases in Filipino emigration policy since 1974. The characteristics that come to the fore are rather forms of "long-distance nationalism" and "rooted cosmopolitanism". Taking cognizance of the multiple identities and loyalties in the case of the Filipino diaspora, a process of "binary nationalisms" is posited as a more fruitful avenue for future research.

David Camroux

Nationalisation du transnationalisme ?
L'Etat philippin et sa diaspora

Résumé

Avec plus de 8 millions d'expatriés, la population représente la principale exportation nationale des Philippines. Les transferts de fonds constituent 13 % du PIB et font des expatriés des acteurs économiques centraux. L'Etat philippin a-t-il instrumentalisé cet exode afin d'en récolter les fruits ? Répondre à cette question nécessite de distinguer trois concepts fondamentaux : l'Etat, la diaspora et le transnationalisme. Le texte suggère que l'utilisation de la dichotomie de la force et de la faiblesse d'un Etat doit se fonder sur une analyse du rôle de ce dernier dans l'émigration. Les typologies de Robin Cohen servent par ailleurs à démontrer que les communautés philippines d'outre-mer répondent à des caractéristiques propres à des communautés diasporiques plus généralement reconnues. Reste qu'il faut s'interroger sur les expériences de cette diaspora hétérogène pour mettre en avant la distinction entre émigrés permanents, saisonniers, travailleurs en mer et personnes en situation irrégulière. La vie de ces groupes et leurs relations avec leur « mère patrie » remet en question la prédominance de la notion de « transnationalisme ». Cette analyse critique est renforcée par l'examen du rôle de l'Etat dans la création d'une diaspora instrumentalisée au cours de trois périodes de politiques d'immigration depuis 1974. Les caractéristiques qui ressortent de cette analyse sont des formes de « nationalisme longue distance » (Anderson, Schiller) et de « cosmopolitanisme enraciné » (Appiah). D'autres pistes de recherche plus fructueuses peuvent naître de l'exploration des multiples identités, des loyautés et dans le cas philippin des « nationalismes binaires ».

Nationalizing Transnationalism?
The Philippine State and the Filipino Diaspora

David Camroux
Sciences Po CERI

   People are now the Philippines' largest export. The statistics are eloquent. Over 8 million Filipinos live overseas, i.e. 10% of the Filipino population.[1] Each day they are joined by an average of another 3,000 of their compatriots, i.e. a flow of over a million people per year. When seen in relation to the workforce, the figures are even more startling: some 7 million people out of a workforce of 32 million work overseas, i.e. 22% of the working population. For contemporary Filipino governments, Filipino Workers are "new national heroes" worthy of their own National Day.

   The research for this extended essay began with a sense of clear certainties and with the unreasonable ambition of dealing with the grassroots, lived experience of Filipino emigrants, as well as providing some overriding interpretation of the Filipino emigration experience. In the course of research and writing, the preliminary certainties have been cast aside and, at the same time, the ambitions for this extended essay have been significantly reduced. In particular, the study focuses essentially on the macro level and does not attempt to analyze in depth the varied lived experiences of diverse Filipino communities overseas, each of which would require a monograph in its own right. As a result, the following has become a first step in a much larger project that will focus more fully on the links between Filipino overseas communities and their "home" country in order to contribute to an understanding of state-civil society relations within the Philippines.

---

[1] Including several million who have taken on another nationality.

In the following, it is intimated that the Philippines is important per se. Above all, at the risk of seeming to be a cultural essentialist, within the Philippines, Western-inspired political structures both confront and integrate with localized forms of social and political behaviour, providing kaleidoscopic syntheses. Yet in making such a blatant assertion, the unintended implication would seem to be that of a cultural fixedness in the way in which Filipinos come to terms with the contemporary world both at home and abroad. Far from providing evidence for such an assertion, this extended essay will attempt to demonstrate the fluidity, adaptability and symbiosis between two kinds of social narratives: on the one hand, between a Filipino state and Filipino civil society, and, on the other hand, between Filipinos (both state and non-state actors) and a wider world.

A second important aspect of the following study is a salutary calling into question of the three major concepts that are at its heart. These are those of "state", "diaspora" and "transnationalism". In order to structure the argument, three templates drawn from the existing literature are used as a way of focusing attention on the Filipino case. It is suggested in the following that while the use of more nuanced and qualified notions of both "state" and "diaspora" reinforces their salience for studies of Filipino emigration, this is not the case for the term "transnationalism", which, it is argued, is of very limited usefulness in describing the Filipino experience. On the contrary, a concept or, rather, process of "binary nationalisms" is posited as more appropriate in describing overseas Filipino experience.

STATES AND EMIGRATION: THE PHILIPPINES AS UNEXCEPTIONAL?

Underlying the approach is an attempt to answer the call of James Hollifield (2008), echoing Theda Skocpol, to bring the state back into current research on migration. In doing so, this study is also an attempt to build on the work of a number of scholars of the Philippines (Abinales & Amoroso 2005; Ball 1997; Gonzalez 1998; Hawes 1989) who have made the state central to their analyses. While a great deal of research has been undertaken on the role of states in controlling entry into particular countries and the control of immigrant populations, far less research has been done by social scientists on the role of states in controlling both exit and, *a fortiori*, "their" populations overseas. Historically speaking, this is an anomaly. Observed over a longer period, states not only in Europe, but also in Asia – where both Chinese and Japanese emperors imposed restrictions on their subjects leaving their kingdoms – were much more concerned with exits rather than entries. In other words, state intervention on emigration has a much longer historical lineage than concerns with controlling immigration, a phenomenon that perhaps dates from the latter part of the nineteenth century. In looking for antecedents to the role of the Filipino state in both promoting emigration and then co-opting this emigrant population within the national polity, one needs to go back at least to Victorian Britain, where, in the high age of imperialism and the peopling of colonies of settlement,

state-orchestrated and, at times, -sponsored emigration was designed to achieve a number of Empire-building objectives (Murdoch 2004) as well as ridding Britain of its excess labour. It is from Victorian Britain that the instrumentalization of emigration as a social safety valve is derived, an objective which has been one of the unstated aims of the emigration policies of successive Filipino governments.

Closer to the Filipino experience are the two historical cases of Italy and Portugal. In 1911, roughly one-sixth of the population of the Italian peninsula lived abroad, their remittances providing a quarter of the balance of payments (Choate 2008). Many of the debates in Italy at the beginning of the twentieth century – for example on whether the reliance on remittances would lead to structural change in an undeveloped economy or merely be a crutch – find their echoes in Manila today. As in the contemporary Philippines today, the Italian state at the beginning of the twentieth century invested considerable resources in gathering, analyzing and distributing statistics on population movements. In 1901, an Emigration Commissariat was established, and the state took responsibility for regulating all aspects of the emigration experience, at least till the arrival in a foreign port (Choate 2008). Moreover, as in the contemporary Philippines, the Italian state relied on non-governmental organizations, and particularly the Catholic Church[2], to mitigate some of the worst features of emigration by providing emigrants with some of the social goods that the government could but inadequately supply. In fact, the objectives of all these measures were virtually identical to those voiced by Filipino politicians today: "the Italian state aimed to cultivate loyalty and sentimentality (*italianità*) among all Italian expatriates in a mutually beneficial relationship, intervening 'from above' to cultivate 'transnationalism from below' "(Choate 2007: 736).

While the Italian situation from the late nineteenth century till the 1930s reflects a number of similarities with the Philippine case, the Portuguese experience has a number of dissimilarities. Above all, as Elizabeth Leeds (1985) has demonstrated in her alas unpublished PhD dissertation, the Portuguese state used emigration as an instrument in maintaining and consolidating its empire in Africa and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere. Going well into the fascist era, there was, however, a tension between the needs of maintaining an empire (such as the needs of the military) and the demands of internal economic development. Leeds shows how the state was compelled to negotiate, not only this contradiction, but also competing demands within Portugal from landowners and industrialists. These tensions finally become resolved with the revolution of 1974, the collapse of the Portuguese Empire and entry into the European Union. While, to express the obvious, the Philippines does not possess an empire, there is nevertheless, as also in the Portuguese example, a contemporary preoccupation with the diaspora as a form of projection of national power and prestige overseas. Anecdotally, one hears in the bitter-sweet comments on the role of Filipino nurses and nannies as "care-givers to the world" a reflection, on the one hand, on the quality of the

---

[2] With the support of the papacy and the Italian state, Monsignor Giovanni Battista Scalabrini, Bishop of Piacenza, worked vigorously to create congregations of priests and nuns to meet the needs of overseas Italian communities. Today in the Philippines, the Congregation of Scalabrinians remains active both in fostering research on migration and as an advocacy group for Filipino emigrants.

Philippines' human capital, education system and social norms, and, on the other hand, an admission of the fundamental weaknesses of a society that cannot find useful employment for its own people.

The Philippines shares many of the characteristics, both historically and in the contemporary world, of a less developed country providing development assistance to more developed countries through the provision of labour. Two features are however unique in the Filipino case: the size and socioeconomic diversity of the emigrant population and the role of both Filipino governments and civil society groups in grounding – and legitimizing – the place of the Filipino diaspora in cultural terms. Through the discourses and narratives surrounding the "new national heroes", a reflection of a weakness in Filipino national development is reformulated as an expression of Filipino strength.

It is precisely a sense of weakness that is at the heart of many characterizations of the Filipino state in the weak state/strong society dichotomy proposed by Joel Migdal (1988), which is a continuing theme of the most recent historical overview to address the subject of state-society relations (Abinales & Amoroso 2005). Certainly, if we take as a basis a Weberian definition of a state as possessing a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence or force and an ability to ensure sovereignty within its territory, then the Philippines indeed possesses a weak state. Not only do a long-running insurrection in Mindanao and a continuing insurgency in central Luzon threaten the territorial integrity of the Filipino nation, but the Filipino state is incapable of ensuring its own policing functions.

From observing the illegitimate activities of private paramilitary forces outside state control, to the sanctioned role of the ubiquitous private security companies who maintain security in Manila's fortified suburbs, the Filipino state indeed seems weak. However, if our gaze is moved to other sectors of state responsibility, for example the ability to co-opt the resources of its overseas populations, then the picture becomes more blurred. For example, within Southeast Asia, the brutal and kleptocratic military dictatorship in Burma-Myanmar is at the head of a powerful garrison state with the capacity to wield overwhelming force. However, unlike the Filipino state, it has virtually no traction with its expatriate communities and is virtually incapable of capturing any part of their remittances, the vast bulk of which goes through informal channels beyond government control (Hugo 2005a). Which state is therefore the weakest? Remittances, as will be argued later, are a central element in a Filipino state developmentalist (or, perhaps, non-developmentalist) strategy. We need therefore to conceptualize in more nuanced terms our thinking on the state and adapt it to non-Western situations (Nettl 1968; Geertz 2004).

In order to liberate ourselves both of the Weberian possibilities and the ensuing Marxian constraints of a "rational" view of statehood, a parallel and contrasting perspective comes from Southeast Asia and its observers, in quoting the most influential cultural anthropologist of the last three decades, Clifford Geertz, in his analysis of the "theatre politics" of Bali in the nineteenth century: "That master noun of modern political discourse, *state*, has at least three etymological themes diversely condensed within it: status in the sense of station, standing rank, condition – *estate* ("The glories of our blood and state"); pomp, in the sense of splendour, display, dignity, presence – *stateliness* ("In pomp ride forth; for pomp becomes

the great/And Majesty derives a grace from state"); and governance" in the sense of regnancy, regime, dominion, mastery – *statecraft* ("It may pass for a maxim in state that the administration cannot be placed in too few hands, nor the legislature in too many)." (Geertz 1980: 121)

In terms of an examination of emigration and relations with its diaspora, inversing his order, it could be argued that the state acts in three fields: *statecraft*, i.e. what the state "does" at the local level, as in imposing rules and norms; *stateliness*, i.e. its actions in relation to other states, including the negotiating of diplomatic agreements, bargains and other compromises; and *estate* (status), which is what permeates the following, suggesting that the Filipino state is strong in imposing itself as the central interlocutor in relation to overseas Filipino communities.

In a comparative study of states and industrial transformation, Peter Evans (1995) suggests that, as well as going beyond a weak state/strong state dichotomy, we also need to call into question the predatory/developmentalist juxtaposition. For example, the Filipino state's control of emigration and its partial cooptation of its expatriate population is indeed both predatory (in skimming off rents) and also developmentalist (in encouraging reinvestment in the "homeland"). Evans further suggests that we should concentrate on examining state roles in relation to particular sectors. He also posits embeddedness within the context of an evolving political space shared with civil society actors. His views are summarized in table 1[3].

As suggested, this typology is an attempt to go beyond the classical dichotomy between regulatory and producer states, for this distinction is meaningless in the case of emigration and the cooptation of expatriate communities. Certainly the custodian role of the Filipino state – through both its role in licensing recruitment agencies for overseas workers and its regulations in areas such as dual citizenship, overseas voting or banking – is pre-eminent. Nevertheless, if one in a lapse of good taste considers OFWs as an "export product", then the Filipino state has also been involved in the productive function, at the very least in the provision of publicly financed education for prospective emigrants, thus performing in Evans's terms a demiurge function. Furthermore, in responding to changes in the global labour market, for example a massive dearth of nurses in the developed world, the Filipino state has encouraged, or at least accompanied, private sector actors to meet this demand. Finally, in the creation of a series of public bodies to oversee its labour export strategy, the Filipino state has diminished the risks for the private sector. Above all the Filipino state has been central in both the naming and promotion of a so-called Filipino diaspora as an instrument of national development. It is this naming process, and its context, that is examined in the following section.

---

[3] Refer to the appendices for the tables.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE FILIPINO DIASPORA'S CREATION[4]

It is very difficult to disagree with Stéphane Dufoix (2003) who sees the word "diaspora" becoming a "*mot passe-partout*", a catch-all term[5] used today in the media to describe overseas communities emanating from a particular national origin. Originally restricted to peoples dispersed because of persecution (the Jewish and Armenian diasporas, for example), the term took on a much wider use with the success in the mid-1990s of a business book, *Tribes*, by Joel Kotkin (1994), which traced the links between race, religion, identity and success in business. Yet applying the epithet to the Filipino case is not at all commonly accepted. Neither in the original 1997 edition nor in the more recent second edition (2008) of his seminal study on global diasporas does Robin Cohen mention a Filipino diaspora. Other comparative studies, such as the edited volume by Gabriel Sheffer (1986) or his 2003 study of diaspora politics, never, or barely, mention the existence of a possible Filipino diaspora. Two major readers published respectively in 1999 (Vertovec & Cohen) and in 2003 (Evans Braziel & Mannur), compiling articles written in recent decades, do not deem the Philippines worthy of a mention. As for the comparative literature in French, not only do Gérard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau (1991) consider the Philippines unworthy of a map in their atlas, but both Stéphane Dufoix (2003) and Michel Bruneau (2004) dismiss the existence of a Filipino diaspora. Bruneau, for example, prefers to categorize overseas Filipinos as a "transnational community", for these communities "do not possess the historical depth of diasporas" and, significantly, because they are "linked to a (sending) state which attempts to use its emigrants in order to become a transnational state" (Bruneau 2004: 191). We have to wait till the publication in 2004 of the first *Encyclopedia of Diasporas* to see a Philippine diaspora drawn into a pantheon of diasporic communities (Lawless 2004). Lest it appear that the reason for this neglect is some kind of Orientalist disdain for the peoples of an Asian country, both China and India are deemed worthy of a prodigious amount of literature on their respective diasporas. Moreover, when one turns to Europe, while 10% of British citizens live overseas (*The Economist* 5/1/2008), a proportion similar to that of Filipinos living overseas, both scientific and media discussion of a British diaspora is virtually non-existent.[6]

---

[4] The present author, who has dual citizenship, discovered in the course of his research that, much to his surprise, he is a putative member of a diaspora. The most eminent geographer in Australia has declared the existence of an "Australian diaspora" (Hugo 2005). Two points can be drawn from this anecdote. Firstly, the role of the external observer in constructing membership within new emotionally charged categories. Secondly, his categorization fits rather well into attempts by recent Australian governments to channel overseas Australian elites as vectors for promoting national development.

[5] My translation as "catch-all term" rather than another possible translation is deliberate. In particular, I wish to invoke the notion of "mobilizing" and co-opting that is found in political science literature, say in the term "catch-all political party".

[6] The exception is the study of Constantine (2003).

How then can we explain the entry, so to speak, of a Filipino diaspora into both comparative studies of migration and, more particularly, into daily language? Two complimentary explanations are possible. First of all, the cumulative impact of a substantial literature written by both Filipino and Filipino-American social scientists on Filipinos overseas – in which the term "diaspora" has been common currency for at least a decade – has been at last to break down the resistance to a broadened conceptualization of the notion so as to embrace the Filipino case. Nevertheless, another explanation can be posited, namely an overpowering fascination with the question of remittances that impacted on the international community in the first half of the decade (Kutznetsov 2006). As the mainstream media reported in the following year, the remittances of overseas workers globally had overtaken Overseas Development Assistance as a source of wealth and, potentially at least, of development assistance for developing countries. As a result, interest in overseas workers generally, and Filipino overseas workers as an exemplary case in particular, as vectors for development in the developing world, intensified with studies by the World Bank (World Bank 2005; Maimbo & Ratha 2005) as well as by its affiliates both the Asian Development Bank (2004) and the Inter-American Development Bank (Terry & Wilson 2005). Other international financial bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (Burgess & Vikram 2005) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2005), jumped, so to speak, on the bandwagon in making remittances the new development mantra of the new century (Kapur 2005). Moreover, the remittance issue provided an opportunity for institutions such as the International Organization for Migration (Ghosh 2006, Ionescu 2006) and other UN development-oriented agencies, as well as international advocacy groups in favour of immigrant rights, to find common cause with the guardians of the international financial system. As a result of the research by these varied international actors, emerged a new normative agenda that argued that, as overseas workers contributed significantly to the development of their home countries, their migration should be facilitated and their rights protected.

In such a normative climate, it could be argued that if a Filipino diaspora did not exist it would have needed to be invented. As tables 2-4 suggest, the Philippines ranks in the top league of remittance receiving countries. While in terms of absolute amounts (table 2) it ranked in 2007 fourth behind India, China and Mexico, these countries benefit, in the first two cases from a labour pool that is twelve to twenty times higher, or, in the case of Mexico, from extremely close proximity to a labour-receiving country whose dual labour market depends on reliable sources of low-cost workers. However, when the percentage contribution to GDP is considered, the 13% of the Philippines dwarfs the maximum of 2.9% in the other three countries (table 3). Moreover, in a quarter century, the proportion of contribution to GDP has gone from 2.3% in 1981 to 13% in 2007.

Remittances, both by regular and informal channels of Filipinos living overseas, contributed some $17 billion to the Filipino economy in 2007, a sum that, as previously mentioned, came to almost 13% of Filipino GDP and half of the total foreign reserves of the country.[7] Their contribution to the GDP of their home country is exceeded only by the contributions

---

[7] *Financial Times,* 17/10/06, *The Economist* 25/11/06.

of populations from small countries, such as Lebanon (25.2%). Within Asia, Bangladesh, the only country of similar demographic size, is well behind, with a contribution to GDP of 8.8%. The 13% figure would seem to include remittances sent through informal channels, remittances which, almost by definition, remain difficult to quantify, and explain the 3% difference in contribution to GDP in relation to the 10% calculated in table 4 by the Philippines Central Bank. These transfers enabled the Philippines to be relatively little effected by the 1997-98 Asian Economic Crisis.[8] Indeed in 1998, at the height of the crisis, overseas remittances enabled the Philippines to experience a negative growth rate of only 0.6%, compared with an estimated negative rate of 1.1% without remittances (IBON 2008: 13). Since then, Filipino growth rates have been respectable, although the 2005 rate of 5.1% was significantly lower than that of Vietnam (8.4%) or of China (9.9%).[9] Be that as it may, the newly discovered Filipino diaspora had been elevated to the role of a pre-eminent economic actor within the Philippines. Thus, rather than being an indication of the failure of development policies within the Philippines, the fact that people had now become the major Filipino export indicated that the Philippines had not only fully taken on its role within an international division of labour, but had, more importantly, turned its expatriate population into a vector of its own economic growth.

While the debate on diaspora within the social sciences has moved on – notably with the contribution of anthropologists (e.g. Ong 1999) who see diaspora as constructed and as a strategic process – this does not obviate the usefulness of examining particular overseas communities in the light of a number of generally accepted criteria. In his previously mentioned introduction to global diasporas, Robin Cohen proposes a larger number of ideal types of diaspora than the more commonly accepted definitions related to victimhood (the Jewish and Armenian communities) or commerce (the Chinese and, to some extent, Indian). He has summarized these ideal types in table 5.

Thoroughly examining overseas Filipino communities using Cohen's typologies as a template would require a series of book-length, historically grounded and sociologically sensitive studies. Nevertheless a cursory examination would suggest that overseas Filipino communities share attributes of all five ideal types. Clearly the labour element is pre-eminent in the overseas Filipino experience, with the Filipino case corresponding to John Armstrong's (1976) definition of a proletarian diaspora. Yet other elements come into play. At least in some of the narratives of the overseas Filipino communities, a strong sense of victimhood, particularly in regard to racism, is apparent (Aguilar 2005; Baldoz 2004; Lindio-McGovern 2004). Such a sense of the Pinoy (overseas Filipino) as victim is also fed by a particularly vibrant and historically profound (and at times morbid) Catholic tradition (Rafael 1993), one that places a particular eschatological emphasis on martyrdom. Indeed as Reynaldo Ileto (1979) demonstrated in one of the classics of Filipino historiography, social struggles

---

[8] This author remembers vividly the frenzy of activity in cavernous Filipino shopping malls in the Christmas period of 1997. With the devaluation of the peso from 25 to 40 to the US dollar, those benefiting from overseas remittances suddenly found themselves a third wealthier.

[9] Statistics from the Annual Report of the Asian Development Bank (**www.adb.org**).

within the Philippines during the nineteenth century were interpreted through the lens of the Passion of Christ. Lest this interpretation appear far-fetched, the passions aroused throughout the Philippines by the hanging of Flor Contemplacion, a Filipino maid executed in Singapore in 1995, were ignited by a sense of both her martyrdom (by an unmerciful, albeit fraternal Southeast Asian government) and her depiction as a victim of the poverty that drives some Filipinos from home. It could be suggested that the sense of victimhood is also exacerbated through the experience of servitude, either as maids or even as caregivers, that a gender-determined part of the diasporic population feels.

Both the possibilities of emigration and a certain predisposition to emigrate are intelligible only when membership – unwilling though at times it may have been – of an imperial order is taken into account. During the three and a half centuries of Spanish colonial rule, seafarers from what is today the Philippines were employed in small numbers on Spanish vessels. Yet it was the annexation of the Philippines into an American Empire in 1898 that marked the real beginnings of Filipino emigration, with Filipino workers sent to work on plantations in both Hawaii and California. As Filomeno Aquilar (2000) has suggested, the "long-distance nationalism"[10] demonstrated by some Filipinos overseas today remains tinged with a great deal of ambivalence towards the former (and present?) imperial power. At the very least, like their British counterparts of another age, Filipinos overseas have performed a role in the imperial mission (both past and present). After an initial five-year phase of violent subjugation to destroy the first Asian republic, the American imperial presence in the Philippines was essentially one based on persuasion in order to recreate, so to speak, Filipinos as Americans through their acceptance of American political, social and economic norms. Particularly in the establishment of an education system based on the US model, American colonial policy can be seen as an exercise in imperial social engineering (May 1980). In the contemporary Philippines, the renewed emphasis placed on English language learning to prepare for emigration remains in continuity with that past (Simon 2008). Nor, given the pre-eminence of the Filipino-American as the archetypical member of the Filipino diaspora, is it an exaggeration to see an imperial strand permeating such conceptualizations.

Within Cohen's ideal types, the distinction between "trade" and "labour" is perhaps more difficult to justify. Amongst the trade diaspora *par excellence*, the ancestors of many an overseas Chinese businessperson were indentured labourers fleeing the poverty and internal warfare in late nineteenth century China. In the contemporary world, where much of the international economy relies on the trade of services, the distinction perhaps has even less salience. Some expatriate Filipinos would consciously describe themselves as traders of sorts within the global economy. Finally, as far as the ideal type of deterritorialization is concerned then, on one level, given the existence of a territorially-bounded sovereign homeland, this category is not applicable. However, as will be argued later, given the reified

---

[10] In the final section of the paper Filipino forms long-distance nationalism will be examined. Building on an idea of Benedict Anderson (1998), Schiller (2004) and Schiller & Fouron define long-distance nationalists as asserting that "people living in various disparate geographic locations within different nation states share a common identification with an ancestral territory and government. Hence, long-distance nationalism provides a justification for such a government to re-configure itself as a transnational state." (Schiller & Fouron 2001:20). See also Schiller 2004.

sense of a Filipino nation amongst some Filipinos overseas, it does not remain a "place" to which a physical return is either possible or sought after. In short, one can posit a degree of deterritorialization in a sense of "national" identification, which is, however, accommodated and reterritorialized in the forms of binary nationalism suggested below.

THE FILIPINO DIASPORA: AN INTERROGATIVE SKETCH

Once a wide definition of diaspora is accepted, as has been proposed in the preceding discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a Filipino diaspora exists. The obvious ensuing question is, who are its members? The Filipino diaspora is, above all characterized by its incredible occupational diversity, going from maids to senior executives, labourers to nurses, and entertainers to academics. The appendix provides a statistical breakdown of the over 8 million Filipinos of the Filipino diaspora, one that can be divided into permanent emigrants (43%) and temporary and irregular emigrants (57%). As the table indicates, the vast majority of permanent emigrants (82%) are in the United States and Canada, with smaller groups of a similar size (6.7%) in various European countries and in Australia and New Zealand. Given existing citizenship laws in those countries, it is reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of these people have taken up the citizenship of their receiving countries.

The 1.8 million Filipinos living in the Middle East, including more than 1 million in Saudi Arabia alone, are almost entirely temporary residents on fixed work contracts with almost zero possibility of attaining the nationality of their receiving countries. Much of the hype surrounding the existence of a Filipino diaspora and, above all, a Filipino transnationalism, totally neglects the lived experience of these sojourners. For example, a former construction site foreman just returned from Saudi Arabia described his twenty years there as "mental torture" in an interview, going on to say how proud he was that his remittances had meant that his two sons were now trained professionals who would never have to leave the Philippines to find satisfying jobs.[11] While Filipinos in the US, irrespective of socioeconomic status, and Filipino nurses and domestic workers, particularly in Asia, have been the subject of a great deal of research, Filipino manual workers in the Middle East are today virtually absent from most narratives of the Filipino experience overseas. While this population was an object of study some two decades ago (Arcinas *et al* 1989; Go & Postrado 1986), for the most part today it no longer figures in the social science literature.[12] Put prosaically, the

---

[11] Interview with the author, Pasig City, 26 February 2008.

[12] The exception is the research of Jane Margold (1995, republished in Aguilar 2002). One can only assume that the dearth of studies on Filipino workers in the Middle East is a result of authoritarian regimes in those countries restricting access to researchers. Once again, here is an example of state intervention in determining

world-view, self-identity and loyalties of a contract worker in Riyadh are, to say the least, rather different from a dual-national Filipino academic in California. However the "catch-all" category of diaspora obscures such differences. It could be argued that the contract worker in Saudi Arabia "will always be a Filipino", with virtually no possibility of integration in the Saudi polity because of the parameters on his existence determined by two states: the Saudi and the Filipino. As the result of a similar dual statist intervention, namely that of the American authorities and that of the Philippine state, the dual citizenship Filipino academic in California has before him/her a wide political space in which he/she is able to maintain not only dual identities, but also dual loyalties.

And how are we to situate the literally "landless" 275,000 sea-based workers, an extraordinary one-quarter to one-third of all sea-based workers internationally? As Steven McKay (2007) argues, their experience reinforces a sense of a particular Filipino masculinity accentuated by their presence in a hierarchical, largely ethnically defined, labour niche in which they find themselves generally at the bottom of the ladder. Significantly, the massive growth in the number of Filipino seafarers from virtually none in the late 1960s to the one-third of the total mentioned above is in large part a result of the promotion, and the control, of the Filipino state. Yet, if one of the characteristics of a diaspora is to be nomadic, then Filipino seafarers could be seen to meet this criterion. However, if another characteristic is to have a "here" (a host country) in reference to a "there" (a lost home), then situating sea-based workers as part of a diaspora is much more problematical. Sea-based workers, as the ultimate sojourners, are not localised other than in the Philippines, a context that seems to be reflected in the seeming need to be in constant contact, either by mobile telephone or by the internet, with their families back home. A sense of deprivation and separation from home is particularly acute in this part of the Filipino population (Fernandez & Krootjes 2007). Moreover, it is important to note that while sea-based workers make up only 3.3% of the total Filipinos overseas, they provide 15.3% of total remittances (cf. table 9 in the appendices). Various complementary explanations can be given for this, ranging from the ability of sea-based workers, most of whom have had at least four years of study, to command higher salaries, and therefore greater disposable incomes than some other occupational groups, to a stronger emotional commitment to home and family. However, an important element is in the contract provisions for sea-based workers imposed by the Filipino authorities that freeze a percentage of salaries for remittances.

A catch-all diasporic classification also distracts from the gender-occupation nexus amongst Filipino overseas workers (Tyner 2004). The Filipino state has been quick to react to overseas employment possibilities (Oishi 2005, Yamanaka & Piper 2005), and has progressively brought about a gender reorientation, notably through the increase in the supply of domestic helpers and care-givers. Today it is estimated that two thirds of OFWs are women (Asis 2005). Filipina domestic workers are ubiquitous in Hong Kong (Constable 2007), Singapore (Huang & Yeoh 1996) and Taiwan (Lan 2006). Their presence in Western Europe has been the subject of an edited volume dealing with individual countries (Hogsholm 2007), as well as individual studies of France and Italy and, across the Atlantic, in Canada (McKay

---

the parameters of the diasporic experience by limiting the possibility of its narration.

2005). Yet, once again, the thousands of domestic workers in the Middle East remain largely invisible in the social science literature, whereas in the popular press, periodic cases of abuse bring their situation to the attention of a Filipino public. The obfuscating behaviour of authoritarian regimes – requiring at the least a quiet, and complicit, acquiescence of the Filipino and other governments – largely ensures that their narratives of lived experience do not enter into the larger narrative of the Filipino diaspora.

Yet, despite this caveat, as the prodigious amount of research of Rhacel Salazar Parrenas (2006; 2008) in particular indicates, the entry of Filipina overseas workers into a niche market at the global level impacts into the smallest villages of parts of the Philippines. In 2007, the academic journal *Philippine Studies* published a special issue on Filipinas as "global householders" (Porrio 2007) that explored some of these consequences. Nevertheless with a couple of exceptions (Arboleda & Nuqui 2007; Asis *et al* 2004), Filipina domestic workers and their families are more described and their lives interpreted by outsiders, than do they articulate their experience themselves. In this preliminary, and deliberately macro, extended essay on Filipino emigration, it has not been an objective to enter into the social consequences "back home" of the reliance on remittances, itself requiring family separation. As the international press has reported, the consequence is mono-parental families or families in which children are brought up by grandparents or other family members (*Time* 24/11/2008). Much is made also of the villages where the men no longer work, relying on the remittances of their wives working as maids or in the "entertainment industry" (Pertierra 1992). Yet the question remains as to what extent these domestic workers are part of a global nation (Kelly 2008). Once again, under the impulsion of the Filipino state and in response to an early twenty-first century obsession with popular capitalism, overseas domestic workers have seen their role within the diaspora evolve from being merely expatriate breadwinners to potential investors within a struggling Filipino economy (Weekley 2006).

Of the total number of Filipinos overseas, just over 10% are categorized as irregular migrants (Battistella & Asis 2003). Without the state sanctioning provided both by their home country and their place of sojourn and settlement, where do these individuals fit within the Filipino diaspora? Moreover between 5% and 10% of the population of irregular migrants, i.e. between 40,000 and 80,000 individuals, are, according to Filipino NGOs, victims of people trafficking, 80% of them being women forced into commercial sex.[13] To state what may appear obvious, the negotiation of an existence as a member of the Filipino diaspora is fraught with significant difficulties for a population without even basic legal forms of protection, despite the terms of the 1987 Filipino Constitution (Emerton & Peterson 2006). In Europe, undocumented Filipino maids are not only in a fragile situation in relation to their employers and the authorities, their possible links with home are also constrained, for any potential visit to family in the Philippines is accompanied by the risk of not being able to re-enter their new place of residence. Much of the hype concerning new instantaneous forms of communication (mobile telephones, the internet) completely misses the point that the "longing for home" would seem to require being fed with real human contact.

---

[13] Interview with Attorney Golda Myra of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 24 January 2008.

We will now move on to the Filipino expatriate who has become almost *the* symbol of the overseas Filipino, namely nurses. Since the mid-1990s the number of Filipino nurses going overseas has risen exponentially (Kingma 2006) as a result of massively increasing demand in countries having to cope with ageing populations, and in which the low salaries and poor working conditions offered to locally educated nurses make working in this profession an unattractive proposition. After the largely gendered market niche of sea-based workers, the Filipino state again has found a new labour market opportunity in the nursing profession. That being said, the expatriation of Filipino nurses is not a new phenomenon, for as Choy (2003) has shown, Filipinos have taken up nursing roles in the United States since the early part of the American chapter in the short-lived, but seminal, period of American colonization. A Filipino who passes the US Registered Nurses examination is virtually assured of an entry permit not only to the United States but also, with greater difficulty, to the UK or Germany. In these countries his/her salary will be five to ten times greater than that in the Philippines.[14] Within the Philippines, the education system has adapted to this demand from the global health market with a proliferation of nursing schools to produce for the export market. Newly graduated nurses, this author was told, in certain cases do not receive salaries in their first years in Filipino hospitals and clinics, for employers know they require this experience in order to sit for the registration examinations that make them employable overseas.

As a perusal of the bibliography at the end of this essay would indicate, the most widely studied group within the Filipino diaspora is that living within the United States (Bonus 2000; Espiritu 1992, 2003; Gonzalez 2002; Ignacio 2005; Mendoza 2002; Okamura 1998; Root 1997; San Juan 1998). A summary of this copious literature is beyond the bounds of this present piece of work. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is largely from observation of the US experience that theories concerning transnationalism developed. Yet does the experience of Filipino-Americans in itself provide evidence for such transnationalism? At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the term "Filipino-Americans" covers a community whose members may enjoy one of at least three types of legal status: temporary or permanent residents in the US who maintain only their Filipino citizenship, dual citizens of the Philippines and the United States, or people born only as US citizens or have opted for US citizenship. Without labouring the point, it is the social and political space determined by both the American and Filipino state that enables these three possibilities.[15]

Ostensibly diasporic behaviour amongst Filipino-Americans can be diversely interpreted, as the following example suggests. For the children of Filipino immigrants in the United States, living in binary worlds requires forms of often emotionally charged negotiations (Wolf 2002). Many thousands of students of Filipino origin enrol both in Tagalog language classes (despite the fact that Tagalog may not have been the language of their parents or

---

[14] In 2007 it was widely reported that the top graduate of the University of Philippines medical school had renounced practising as a doctor and had enrolled in a nursing school in order to obtain his RN certificate and practise overseas.

[15] A similar argument could be made for "Filipino-Canadians" (Silva 2006), even if, significantly, such a categorisation does not seem to exist.

grandparents) and in courses in Philippine Studies. At one level, this can be interpreted as the "search for roots" common amongst many second- or third-generation immigrants irrespective of their ethnic origins or host country. On another level, from the perspective of transnational theorists, this provides tangible evidence of transnational identities. However, relying on the earlier research of Yen Le Espiritu (1992), a third interpretation is also convincing, namely the search for a specific identity within a larger, constructed community of Asian-Americans or American ethnics (Aguilar 2004 quoting Vicente Rafael) in relation to a dominant "European-American" society.[16] Such an interpretation would seem better to approximate Filipinos' senses of self-identity in the US. While within a group of other Filipinos, people of Filipino origins tend to define themselves in local terms (from Manila, Luzon, Illocos, Visayas, etc.), within a diverse Asian-American context, the Filipino specificity is emphasized. Finally, as Espiritu demonstrates, there are considerable social pressures militating towards the construction of a "pan-ethnic" Asian-American community. Such a self-definition is particularly attractive for Filipino-Americans, for Asian-Americans are popularly perceived as being endowed with a number of ostensibly Confucian values: thrift, hard work, a desire for education, family loyalty, etc. It is paradoxical that while a sort of internationalist pan-Asianism as ideology was discredited during the Second World War – and ultimately collapsed (after a brief moment of respite at Bandung in 1955) during the Cold War – it has been resurrected domestically as a sub-national, normatively loaded, identifier in the United States and other Western countries.

The emigration of Filipinos to the United States or other countries is certainly transnational in the sense that boundaries are crossed and resettlement occurs in another nation state. But just as dwelling in a nation does not necessary make an individual an adherent to the nationalism[17] of that nation, so is it not at all obvious that being a transnational migrant makes an individual a transnationalist. This author concurs both with the theoretical objections to the concept expressed by Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald (2004) that much of the present preoccupation with "transnationalism" involves merely the relabelling of some, if not at all, contemporary forms of multiple identities amongst migrant groups. Underlying this retreat into new labels is a certain lack of comparative historical understanding of migratory phenomena. In the case of the US, Ewa Morawska (2001) sees the "new transnationalist" theorists basing their interpretations on incorrect historical assumptions about the previous great wave of immigration dating from the 1880s to 1914. As has been suggested earlier, a failure to contemplate the role say of the Italian, Portuguese or even British states in emigration neglects fundamental parameters in which overseas communities exist and relate to their homelands. Perhaps anthropologists and sociologists would have a different

---

[16] Observing the 2008 US presidential election campaign with its discursive references to a "true" and "false" America and its McCarthyist references to "un-American" behaviour, it seems striking that the only part of the population deemed not to require a hyphenated eponym were the majority of distant and varied English origins.

[17] Anthony Smith's standard definition of nationalism is "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation" (Smith 2000: 1).

perception, but it is difficult to disagree with the Filipino historian Filomeno Aguilar – who feels that for transnationalism to exist there must also exist a transnation – when he states: "It is doubtful if the transnation exists or if its discursive existence can be made to jibe with social practices and realities, or if there is even coherence in the ambivalent and discordant voices of transnationalism." (Aguilar 2004: 114)

If, therefore, we are not witnessing in the Filipino case forms of transnationalism, are there at least indications of what Riva Kastoryano (2007) has described as "transnational nationalism", i.e. forms of nationalism articulated from overseas? The evidence from the case of Filipino-Americans does not support such an interpretation either. Rather we have evidence of what could be termed "bi or dual nationalism" (i.e. twofold nationalist sentiments) or even more potently what this author would describe as a "binary nationalism" involving both juxtaposition and synthesis between identification with a Filipino homeland and an American homeland. Research carried out on the ultimate transnational media, the worldwide web, would seem to support this interpretation. Emily Ignacio's (2005) analysis of Filipino community formation through an examination of Filipino-American newsgroups debates, listservers and website postings reveals a predominant dialectic in imagining a Filipino diaspora: Filipinos are being defined constantly in relation to Americans and the Philippines in relation to the US. Other studies (Martinez 2007; Tyner & Kuhike 2000) would seem to support this view. The appropriate means to escape from these binary constraints is entry into a kind of globalized epistemic community, which is sometimes, inappropriately, labelled as a kind of deterritorialized diaspora, but which it may be more appropriate to define as merely another form of cosmopolitanism, albeit of a rooted type (Appiah 2005). Be that as it may, diasporic communities rarely escape the state-orchestrated parameters that both limit and mobilize their energies, as will, hopefully, be demonstrated in the following section.

STATE-ORCHESTRATED EMIGRATION FROM THE PHILIPPINES

Unlike social science observers, actors within the Filipino state lose little sleep over the status of their expatriate populations. What is primordial is to appeal to a sense of Filipino nationalism as a mobilizing factor for emigration, expatriation, work, sacrifice and... reinvestment. By, in a sense, integrating into its action the long-distance or binary nationalisms referred to above, the Filipino state can legitimize its control over this overseas population and extra-territorialize the sway of its sovereignty.

As mentioned, the American colonial state within the Philippines sought to channel Filipino workers overseas into serving its interests through their participation in a racially segregated labour market within the United States (Aguilar 2000; Baldoz 2004). However, with restrictive immigration policies introduced in the US from the 1920s till after the Second

World War, Filipino emigration declined. In the first couple of decades after independence in 1946, there was a sense that internal change and economic development could solve the problems of political contestation, poverty and a rapidly growing labour force. When this failed as a way of removing peasant support for insurrectionist movements, internal transmigration within the Philippines to the sparsely populated areas of Mindanao remained an alternative. With the election of Ferdinand Marcos as president in 1965 and his declaration of martial law on 23 September 1972, the situation changed. In 1974, ostensibly to cope with the consequences of the first oil crisis, Marcos proposed that the Philippines encourage emigration of workers as a "temporary measure". Over three decades later, the temporary has become a permanent feature of the Filipino political economy. The period from about 1973 till the fall of Marcos marks the first of three periods in state intervention in contemporary Filipino emigration and, concomitantly, its relations with overseas Filipino communities.

The Marcos phase in emigration has a number of specific features. In order to ensure his continued rule, Marcos instituted a particular model of kleptocratic economic management involving both repressive measures through the military, but also the cultivation of a coterie of cronies with whom a Faustian bargain of mutual dependency had been sealed. Patronage-client relations were refined to percolate down to all levels of society and the Philippines gave to popular parlance the expression "crony capitalism". At the time of his fall in 1986, it was estimated that Marcos alone had siphoned some $10 billion into overseas bank accounts. Unlike, however, the comparable dictatorial situation in Korea, corruption did not facilitate economic development in the Philippines, but thwarted it (Kang 2002). Having nationalized the assets of his political enemies, in the words of David Kang: "Marcos created new oligarchs who were dependent solely on him for their success, and he also rewarded traditional elites who cooperated with him… Thus the direction of corruption shifted from the bottom-up plundering of the state to the top-down plundering of society." (Kang 2002: 138)

With the benefit of hindsight, emigration had a particular role to play. On one level, it performed the human capital element of an export-oriented development strategy, a strategy that, unlike in the Asian tiger economies, did not succeed (Hawes 1987). Emigration for Marcos, and indeed for his successors, offered a social safety valve to relieve the twin, underlying problems of Filipino society. On the one hand, to cope with chronic inequalities, with an effective programme of land reform in order to empower the landless peasantry, and, on the other hand, through a vigorous family planning programme to address the Philippines' demographic explosion that each year brings thousands of unemployable individuals into the labour force. These twin actions were the prerequisites for the economic take-off of other Asian countries, but, alas, not the Philippines (Camroux 2007).

While initially, the Filipino state sought to directly control recruitment for overseas employment through state agencies, the weakness of the state apparatus, and the need to provide sops to other crony interests, led to a degree of privatization (Abella 2004). From 1974 till 1982, the emigration programme was supervised by three separate state agencies: the National Seamen Board, the Overseas Employment Development Board and the Bureau of Employment Services. In 1984, these three agencies were merged to form a mega agency, the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), which today remains the main

government agency involved with Philippine labour emigration. Attached to the Ministry of Labour and Employment, POEA is composed of four divisions: pre-employment services, licensing and regulation, adjudication, and welfare and employment. The POEA's mandate is to facilitate and promote overseas employment, provide for the reintegration of returning workers, and offer protection and welfare to workers and their families.[18]

Overseas employment coupled, most importantly, with liberalized immigration laws in the United States engendered a significant outflow of Filipino professionals across the Pacific and was, in the end, to contribute to the end of the Marcos dictatorship. For those neither economically powerful nor politically well connected enough to join in the parasitic activity of Marcos and his cronies, emigration to the United States offered the only viable alternative. These expatriates coalesced as a force around Benigno Aquino, the main opponent of Marcos, who, after a number of years of imprisonment, was allowed to go to the US for medical treatment. Exiled in Boston, Aquino was able to mobilize the overseas Filipino communities in order to plan his return and to lobby for an end to US support for Marcos. On his return to Manila in 1983, Aquino was assassinated, contributing to a chain of developments, above all involving massive public protests that led to the election of his widow, Cory, as president in 1986 and the departure of Marcos under US pressure. With hindsight, the victory of Cory Aquino was to mark the high point of political activism amongst the Filipino diaspora. Long-distance and binary nationalisms had shown their potency as forces for political change when given channels for expression and unique circumstances.

Perhaps because she was a scion of one of the largest land-holding families in the Philippines, or perhaps because of her conservative Catholic beliefs, Aquino largely failed to implement serous land reform or even contemplate a family planning programme during her presidency. She did however acknowledge the importance of overseas Filipino workers as an economic and political force. It was Cory Aquino who in 1988 coined the expression "New National Heroes" for OFWs. During her administration, the Welfare Fund Administration created under Marcos in 1980 was made a quasi-governmental, if independent, financial agency, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). OWWA is essentially a trust fund pooled from a mandatory US$25 membership contribution from foreign employers and land- and sea-based workers. These funds are reinvested and some of the interest obtained redistributed (Agunias & Ruiz 2007). The overthrow of the dictatorship saw the Filipino Congress finally become concerned with OFWs: between 1987 and 1991, 23 Senate bills and 32 House of Representatives bills were filed in an attempt to investigate several mysterious OFW deaths.

However, the second phase of Filipino state action in relation to its emigrant communities begins in 1995 following the previously mentioned hanging of Flor Contemplacion, a Filipina domestic worker in Singapore convicted of murder. Despite the pleas of the new Filipino President, Fidel Ramos, and despite severe misgivings on the fairness of her arrest, trial and conviction, the execution was carried out. The hanging sparked massive protests throughout the Philippines, protests that fundamentally challenged the Filipino state's labour-export policy. Contemplacion's case was not an exception: between 1996 and 2001, the bodies

---

[18] The above relies on Gonzalez 1998 and Tyner 2004.

of about 1,224 Filipinos were repatriated to the Philippines, all of whom were claimed to have died in unknown or mysterious circumstances. With democratization, the Filipino media began to report widely on the abuse of Filipinos overseas, particularly those trafficked unwillingly into prostitution. In 1995, Congress passed the *Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act* (Republic Act 8042). Seen as a so-called Magna Carta of OFW Rights, the act signalled a new kind of relationship between the Philippine state and emigrant citizens to whom the state was required to offer protection (Rodriguez 2002). The passing of the act was followed by the creation of offices within Filipino embassies to cater for the protection and welfare of OFWs in the main labour-receiving countries. Since the passing of the act, the notion of citizenship rights has been extended to embrace these populations overseas, rights that are explicitly detailed in the *Handbook for Filipinos Overseas* published by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (2005).

A third and ongoing phase in state-diaspora relations began with the passing of the *Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003* (Republic Act 9189), which, as the name suggests, is designed to encourage overseas Filipinos to participate in the political process (Rojas 2005). This act, coupled with the *Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003* (Republic Act 9225), which liberalized the possibilities for dual citizenship, expanded the area of rights for overseas Filipinos. While not directly linked, these legislative developments followed another display of massive popular protest, popularly know as People Power II, or Edsa 2. These protests saw President Joseph Estrada removed from office and his replacement by his vice-president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Supported by the Filipino middle classes and, as was the case in 1986, by the Military and the Church, Arroyo seemed initially to emulate Cory Aquino, casting herself as a champion of democracy. The difference however was that Estrada, a former movie actor, enjoyed a great deal of popular support amongst the poorest elements of society. Unlike Marcos, who was in the end universally reviled except in his own fiefdom, Estrada was portrayed as the friend of the poor, his corruption (and womanizing) being but minor blemishes. President Arroyo, with her US education and her PhD in economics, on the contrary, portrays herself as the face of a modern cosmopolitan Philippines integrated in a globalized world. Under her administration, emigration has gone from being portrayed as an unfortunate necessity (under Marcos), through being lauded as a sacrificial act (under Aquino and Ramos), to being portrayed as the much-vaunted Filipino contribution to the global economy.[19] The rewards for this contribution, so to speak, are to found in incorporating the diaspora back within the nation.

Yet, paradoxically, the tangible rewards are in practice minimal, or perhaps not appreciated. For example, in 2005, OWWA had a total investment portfolio of some US$134 million, mainly in government banks. Of its assets, US$17 million on average were spent per year between 2002 and 2006, over half of which went to administrative and operating costs, leaving a mere US$7.6 million for programmes to actually benefit OFWs. Despite the possibilities of registering for absentee voting, the results have been meagre. For the 2004

---

[19] For example, at both the Asia-Europe Meeting in Beijing in late October 2008 and at the APEC Summit in Lima a month later, President Arroyo's specific contribution was a rhetorical defence of migrant workers' rights, a defence publicized on official government websites.

presidential elections, only approximately 360,000 had done so, of whom only half actually voted (*Financial Times* 8-9/5/2004). Few of the 1 million Filipinos in Saudi Arabia voted, although this may be due to the necessity to travel to Riyadh to the embassy to do so in person during the working week. In compact Hong Kong, on the contrary, 60% of registered voters actually did so. Of course, multiple factors could explain this low turnout: the complexity of enrolment, a lack of information, the unwillingness of those OFWs in an irregular situation not to become visible, etc. Nevertheless the degree of involvement in Filipino political life remains a moot point: in the last Philippine presidential elections, less than 10,000 Filipinos living in the United States actually voted. Above all, the voting situation raises questions as to the means, and limits, of state interventionism in mobilizing diasporic communities.

DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL GRID OF STATE-DIASPORA RELATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

What conceptual and theoretical implications can therefore be drawn from the succinct overview of the three phases in Filipino administrations' praxis with both emigration and its overseas population? In this final section, an attempt is made to draw some theoretical implications from the Filipino case. In doing so, we have synthesized a framework posited by Ingrid Therwath in a recent study of the Indian state and its diaspora. This framework is summarized in the third, and last, of the typologies designed to provide analytical templates within this study (table 6).

As the previous discussion suggests, the role of the Filipino diaspora is above all that of an economic actor and as an outlet, particularly as a social safety valve. In the Filipino case, both these functions are interrelated. The central objective of state activity since 1974 has been resource husbandry, i.e. harnessing the financial resources of the Filipino diaspora in the form of remittances. Not only in absolute terms has the Filipino state been successful, but it has progressively diminished the proportion of remittances transmitted through informal channels, which has declined from about 20% to something like 5% (Asian Development Bank 2004). However, despite a greater efficacy of Filipino remittances compared to those of some other groups (Menjivar *et al* 1998), and despite numerous studies and proposals to harness these resources for investment in productive activities (Agunias 2006; Asis 2006; Estipular *et al* 2007; Ionescu 2006), this has not largely occurred (Bagasao 2005). Certainly, remittances have helped Filipinos ride out a number of economic shocks (Yang 2008), nevertheless a cursory examination would suggest that only a small proportion of these remittances is invested in productive activities, the vast bulk being spent on consumer goods or, at best, in keeping the Filipino housing market buoyant (ADB 2004). In certain cases, it has actually had a demotivating effect on employment (Capistrano & Sta Maria 2007). In other words, the reliance on remittances can be seen as both a sign of underdevelopment (Dumlao

2005; IBON 2008; Opiniano 2004; Pernia 2007; Pertierra 1992) and a failure of a purported Filipino development state (Herring 1999). At the very least, the reliance on remittances and their uses suggests confusion between the objectives of economic growth and of economic development. As tables 7-10 suggest, the benefits of remittances are unequally spread both in terms of region and in terms of adding to household wealth. To simplify, wealthier families closer to Manila benefit the most.

As for the other forms of co-optation on the political level, the results have indeed been mixed. Since the period of the opposition to Marcos, the general overall tendency has been to lesser, not greater, political engagement with the Philippines. The possibility of absentee voting and more liberalized conditions for dual nationality have not been translated into greater implication in Filipino domestic political life. For example, the opposition to the present president, Arroyo, is less extraterritorial than was the case with Marcos or even Estrada. Yet the weakness of the relay function in the Filipino case compared to say, the Indian case, is not so much a result of inadequacies in the Filipino state, but rather the relative unimportance of the Philippines within the international environment. Nevertheless, in the United States in particular, pro-Philippines advocacy groups do have some resonance in Washington and have been particularly harnessed by presidents since Marcos, in ensuring continued US aid for example. Finally, the interlocutor function has come to the fore during the Arroyo presidency. On the one hand, each of her overseas trips is marked by well-publicized meetings with members of the local Filipino community in order to engage them as actors of development, or at least growth, domestically. Moreover, as the legislation protecting and promoting the welfare of OFWs and the liberalization of citizenship laws indicates, a preoccupation with the external has become a key issue within internal Filipino politics. The Filipinos' vibrant civil society has generated a number of migrant rights advocacy groups to whom, in a sense, the Filipino state has "sub-contracted" a number of its priorities. In other words, these national bodies are key actors internally in the co-optation of the Filipino diaspora.

CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS BINARY NATIONALISMS

In the preamble to this study, the question was raised as to the pertinence of concepts such as "state", "diaspora" and "transnationalism" in analyzing social and economic relations between a sending country and its communities overseas. In focusing both on the policies and the praxis of Filipino governmental bodies in relation to emigrant communities (both of a permanent and temporary kind), this paper has suggested that at least the first two concepts of "state" and "diaspora" are indeed helpful. For the concept of "state", this usefulness is conditional on conceiving the state as an actor whose role is variable and fluid depending on the particular sector examined. Emigration provides a case in which a state, often described

globally as weak, namely that of the Philippines, is able to display strong interventionist tendencies. This strength, it was argued, is related to the degree of embeddedness within Filipino society. In particular, the co-optation of numerous civil society actors as bridge-builders between the Philippines and its overseas communities has facilitated the integration of Filipinos overseas within a state-led development, or at least growth strategy. However, the externally generated nature of this developmental strategy has for some civil society actors meant internally generated development (as opposed merely to growth) has been neglected by the Filipino state.

The second conceptual question posed by this paper concerns the appropriateness of "diaspora" as a term to categorize overseas Filipino communities. By referring to a template of typologies elaborated by Robin Cohen, it has been suggested that overseas Filipino communities display, albeit in diffuse and diluted forms, many of the attributes of the five ideal types of diaspora he has postulated. Nevertheless, it is argued that there is a tendency to qualify as "diasporic" communities as diverse as itinerant sea-based workers or short-term contract workers in the Middle East on the one hand, and permanent emigrants in Europe and naturalized US citizens of Filipino origins in the United States on the other. These categorizations also have been watered down by a degree of fluidity between temporary and permanent emigrant status. A number of semantic permutations have been underlined. That, for example involving the changing of the term OCW (Overseas Contract Worker) to that of OFW (Overseas Filipino Worker) to designate temporary emigrants from the Philippines employed overseas. This involved a semantic "renationalization" of this population: while the term OFW should strictly speaking refer to deployed workers registered with the POEA, it has come to is used in a way that allows irregular emigrants (i.e. those without work contracts) to be brought back, so to speak, into the bosom of the Filipino nation.

The increasingly popular usage of the expression "diaspora" over the last five years has served a similar function. By classifying and, thus, co-opting temporary and permanent emigrants into the same broad category, even those who no longer possess Filipino nationality (either because of opting for another citizenship or merely because they of second- or third-generation Filipino origin) can be portrayed as part of the same Filipino family.[20] Attributing membership within a diaspora to Filipinos overseas incidentally demonstrates the role of the observer in not only defining, but also in providing a mobilizing mantra to those they observe. Ultimately, a Filipino diaspora exists because social scientists and journalists (many of whom are Filipino-Americans) deem it exists. However, this does not explain the adoption by the Filipino state of the language of diaspora. Two explanations have been posited. The first is encrusted within the political economy of remittances, that is the realization vectored by the major international organizations that financial transfers of overseas populations to their home country now exceed foreign public development assistance to those countries. Re-labelling, so to speak, the emigrant as diasporic is to make him or her an actor in the domestic economy. Moreover, his/her role as a political actor "back home" is legitimized in

---

[20] The use of such gender-loaded terms as "bosom" and "family" is deliberate, for the imagery of the Filipino nation articulated by the Filipino state is very much that of the motherland and the extended Filipino family.

ways that the emigrant viewed as somehow a traitor does not allow.[21] Both the introduction of voting procedures for Filipinos overseas and also a change in legislation to allow dual citizenship indicate that it is the Filipino state that determines some of the most important parameters of a diasporic existence.

The final concept whose usefulness we sought to examine is that of "transnationalism". The preceding examination of the Filipino situation would indicate two fundamental flaws in the notion: On the one hand, from an etymological perspective a root "nationalism" (defined as devotion to, and willingness to sacrifice for a nation) is elusive. On the other hand, the "trans" aspect of transnationalism, in the sense of a transcendence of the national, is even more questionable. Rather, the members of the Filipino diaspora would seem to possess multiple identities that not only evolve over time, but are subject to the vicissitudes of lived experience in home and host countries. This is hardly an earth-shaking discovery. Rather than supporting narratives of transnationalism, the Filipino case would indicate adherence to multiple, and above all, dual localisms, most forcefully displayed by Filipino-Americans. For those of Filipino origin who would see themselves as global citizens, it is difficult to see how an invocation of transnationalism adds anything to the more historically grounded concept of cosmopolitanism. Aiwa Ong's (1999) exploration of flexible citizenship and diasporic membership as negotiated and fluctuating phenomena offers a more promising path in the study of emigrant communities. To use the title of an important collection of articles on the Filipino diaspora, Filipinos may feel themselves" at home in the world" (Aguilar 2002), but, we would suggest, this sense of belongingness involves not a hypothetical transnationalism but rather a kind of "long-distance nationalism" and/or "binary nationalisms" that allow the diasporic individual to be both here and there simultaneously.[22]

In short, what appears to be lacking in conceptions of transnationalism is the sense of varied and diverse rootedness that the diasporic communities experience. Does a dual-citizenship Filipino-American, for example, feel a sense of dual loyalties and allegiances, a kind of dual nationalism, concomitant with his/her dual citizenship? Or what is the sense of identity and loyalty for someone who is simply an American citizen, but who feels a "home" is elsewhere? Perhaps dual nationalisms are not contradictory but share a symbiotic relationship. Moreover, the holding of two passports is not a prerequisite for such dualities. Filipino contract workers in the Middle East or domestic workers elsewhere in Asia find themselves part of an externalized Filipino nation precisely because of their expatriation. Back in the Philippines, their sense of roots and identity would be much more locally defined

---

[21] A comparison can be made with the Vietnamese situation, where, despite some attempts to encourage investment and remittances from the Viet Kieu, the latter are still regarded with some suspicion and not integrated into the Vietnamese policy.

[22] In some cases a kind of "biglocalism" could be invoked, a concept derived from the rather awkward notion of "glocalization", i.e. the perception of living in both a globalized world and very locally at the same time. Forms of popular culture shared by Filipinos and Americans may enter this category for they are both locally grounded but also "universal" at the same time.

in regional or linguistic terms. Overseas, the host society, reinforced by the state apparatus, disregards linguistic, regional and other differences to reify these individuals as one people, Filipinos.[23]

In order to better understand these complexities, as well as in order to encompass the role of the state, the notion of binary nationalisms has been posited in this extended essay as a contribution to our understanding of diaspora. By binary nationalism, it is suggested a double-mirrored identity in which a sense of one identity is contingent on a sense of the other, leading to dual – and indeed multiple – senses of non-exclusive loyalties. Such binary nationalisms would seem to preclude the transcendence of nation that transnationalism should logically imply, while at the same time not being anathema to rooted cosmopolitan ideals of global citizenship. Nevertheless, as it has been attempted to demonstrate from the Filipino case, it is not only the receiving state, but also the sending state that determines, to a large extent, both the ideational parameters, and the practical expressions, of such binary nationalisms.[24]

---

[23] An analogy can be made with the situation of "Italians" in the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century, prior to Italian unification. It was in exile so to speak, that these people "discovered" that as well as being Tuscans, Venetians or Neapolitans, etc. they were also Italians (Choate 2008).

Bibliography

Abinales, Patricio & Amoroso, Donna (2005) *State and Society in the Philippines*, Lanham MD, Rowman & Littlefield.

Aguilar, Filomeno (2000) 'Nationhood and Transborder Migrations: The Late Twentieth Century from a Late Nineteenth-Century Perspective', *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 9 (2), pp. 171-198.

Aguilar, Filomeno (ed.) (2002) *At Home in the World? Filipinos in Global Migrations,* Quezon City, Philippine Migration Research Network & Philippine Social Science Council.

Aguilar, Filomeno (2004) 'Is there a transnation? Migrancy and the national homeland among overseas Filipinos' in Brenda S.A. Yeoh & Katie Willis (eds) *State/Nation/Transnation: Perspectives on Transnationalism in the Asia-Pacific*, London, Routledge, pp. 93-119.

Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig & Ruiz, Neil (2007) 'Protecting Overseas Workers: Lessons and Cautions from the Philippines', *Migration Policy Institute Insight*, September.

Alegado, Dean (2003) 'International Labor Migration, diaspora and the emergence of Transnational Filipino Communities' in Mamoru Tsuda (ed.) *Filipino Diaspora: Demography, Social Networks, Empowerment and Culture*, Quezon City, Philippine Migration Research Network & Philippine Social Science Council, pp. 1-22.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2005) *The Ethics of Identity*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press.

Arboleda, Corazon & Nuqui, Carmelita (eds) (2007) *Migrants' Stories, Migrants Voices*, Quezon City, Philippine Migrants Rights Watch.

Armstrong, John (1976) 'Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas', *American Political Science Review* 70 (2), pp. 393-408.

Asian Development Bank (2004) *Enhancing the Efficiency of Overseas Workers Remittances*, Manila, ADB.

Asis, Maruja M.B. (2006) 'Desenvolviendo la caja de *balikbaya*n: los filipinos en el etrangeri y su pais de origen' in Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez (ed.) *Relations Estado-diaspora: approximaccernes des de cuatro continentes*, Tomio, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Instituto de les Mexicanos en El Exterior, pp. 23-51.

Asis, Maruja M.B. *et al* (2004) *Hearts Apart: Migration in the Eyes of Filipino Children*, Quezon City, Scalabrini Migration Center.

Bagasao, I.F. (2005) 'Migration and Development: the Philippine Experience' in Samuel Munzele Maimbo & Dilip Ratha (eds) *Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects*, New York, World Bank, pp. 133-142.

Baldoz, Rick (2004) 'Valorizing racial boundaries: Hegemony and conflict in the racialization of Filipino migrant labour in the United States', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27 (6), pp. 969-986.

Ball, Rochele (1997) 'The role of the state in the globalisation of labour markets: the case of the Philippines', *Environment and Planning A* 29 (9), pp. 1603-1628.

Battistella, Graziano & Asis, Maruja M.B. (2003) 'Irregular Migration: The Underside of the Global Migration of Filipinos' in Graziano Battistella & Maruja M.B. Assis (eds) *Unauthorized Migration in Southeast Asia*, Quezon City, Scalabrini Migration Center, pp. 35-127.

Bonus, Rick (2000) *Locating Filipino Americans: Ethnicity and the Cultural Politics of Space*, Philadelphia PA, Temple University Press.

Bruneau, Michel (2004) *Diasporas et espaces transnationaux*, Paris, Anthropos/Economica.

Burgess, Robert & Haskar, Vikram (2005) 'Migration and Foreign Remittances in the Philippines', *IMF Working Paper* WP/05/111

Cabegin, Emily (2006) 'The Effect of Filipino Overseas Migration on the Non-Migrant Spouse's Market Participation and Labor Supply Behavior', *IZA Discussion Papers* n° 2240 (accessed at **ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp2240**).

Camroux, David (2007) 'Les Philippines, le mauvais élève asiatique', *Revue des Deux Mondes* , October-November, pp. 50-53.

Capistrano, Loradel & Sta Maria, Maria Lourdes (2007) 'The Impact of International Labor Migration and OFW Remittances on Poverty in the Philippines', unpublished paper accessed at **images.gmanews.tv**.

Chaliand, Gérard & Rageau, Jean-Pierre (1991) *Atlas des diasporas*, Paris, Odile Jacob.

Choate, Mark (2007) 'Sending States', Transnational Interventions in Politics, Culture and Economics: The Historical Example of Italy', *International Migration Review* 41 (3), pp. 728-768.

Choate, Mark (2008) *Emigrant Nation: the Making of Italy Abroad*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.

Choy, Catherine Ceniza (2003) *Empire of Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History*, Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Cohen, Robin (2008) *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, second edition, London, Routledge.

Collado, Paula (2003) 'Who are the Overseas Filipino Workers?' in Mamoru Tsuda (ed.) *Filipino Diaspora: Demography, Social Networks, Empowerment and Culture*, Quezon City, Philippine Migration Research Network & Philippine Social Science Council, pp. 23-40.

Commission on Filipinos Overseas (2005) *Handbook for Filipinos Overseas*, seventh edition, Manila, Commission on Filipinos Overseas.

Constable, Nicole (2007) *Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Migrant Workers*, second edition, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press.

Constantine, Stephen (2003) 'British Emigration to the Empire-Commonwealth since 1880: From Overseas Settlement to Diaspora?' in Carl Bridge & Kent Fedorowich (eds) *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity*, London, Frank Cass, pp. 16-35.

Dufoix, Stéphane (2003) *Les Diasporas*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France.

Dumlao, Michael (2005) 'Balikbayan: Diffusion & Development through Remittances in Malinao, Philippines', unpublished paper (accessed at **www.michaeldumlao.com/PDFs/BALIKBAYAN/pdf).**

Espiritu, Yen Le (1992) *Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identity*, Philadelphia PA, Temple University Press.

Espiritu, Yen Le (2003) *Home Bound: Filipino American Lives Across Cultures, Communities and Countries*, Berkeley CA, University of California Press.

Estipular, Jhoanne, Goyena, Karen & Raymundo, Carlo (2007) 'Strengthening the Role of Filipino Migrants in National Development', *Asian Institute of Management Policy Center Discussion Paper*, November.

Evans Braziel, Jana & Mannur, Anita (eds) (2003) *Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.

Evans, Peter (1995) *Embedded Autonomy: States & Industrial Transformation*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press.

Fernandez, Basco & Krootjes, Roos (2007) 'Seafarers – Invisible Part of the Filipino Diaspora in Europe: Scenarios from Onboard Research' in Filomenita Mongaya Høgsholm (ed.) *In Der Olde Worlde: Views of Filipino Migrants in Europe*, Quezon City, Philippine Migration Research Network & Philippine Social Science Council, pp. 48-74.

Geertz, Clifford (1980) *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press.

Ghosh, Bimal (2006) *Migrants' Remittances and Development: Myths, Rhetoric and Realities*, Geneva, International Organization for Migration.

Go, Stella & Postrado, Leticia (1986) 'Filipino Overseas Contract Workers: Their Families and Communities' in Fred Arnold & Nasra Shah (eds) *Asian Labor Migration: Pipeline to the Middle East*, Boulder CO, Westview Press, pp. 55-69.

Gonzalez, Joaquin (1998) *Philippine Labour Migration: Critical Dimensions of Public Policy*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Hawes, Gary (1987) *The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export*, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press.

Herring, Ronald (1999) 'Embedded Particularism: India's Failed Developmental State' in Meredith Woo-Cummings (ed.) *The Developmental State*, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, pp. 306-334.

Hogshølm, Filomenita Mongaya (ed.) (2007) *In Der Olde Worlde: Views of Filipino Migrants in Europe*, Quezon City, Philippine Migration Research Network & Philippine Social Science Council.

Hollifield, James (2008) 'The Politics of International Migration: How Can We "Bring the State Back In"?' in Caroline Brettell & James Hollifield (eds) *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines*, second edition, London, Routledge, pp. 183-238.

Huang, Shirlena, Yeoh, Brenda S. & Lam, Theodora (2008) 'Asian Transnational Families in Transition: The Liminality of Simultaneity', *International Migration* 46 (4), pp. 3-13

Hugo, Graeme (2005a) 'Asian Experiences with Remittances' in Donald Terry & Steven Wilson (eds) *Beyond Small Change: Making Migrant Remittances Count*, Washington DC, Inter-American Development Bank, pp. 341-372.

Hugo, Graeme (2005b) 'Australian Diaspora: A Demographic Perspective', unpublished paper prepared for the Athens Roundtable Discussion, 20 September.

IBON (2008) 'OFWs, Remittances and Philippine Underdevelopment', *IBON Facts and Figures* (special release) 31 (9&10).

Ignacio, Emily Noelle (2005) *Building Diaspora: Filipino Cultural Community Formation on the Internet*, New Brunswick NJ, Rutgers University Press.

Ileto, Reynaldo (1979) *Payson and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*, Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press

Ionescu, Dina (2006) *Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers*, Geneva, International Organization for Migration.

Kang, David C. (2002) *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kapur, Devish (2005) 'Remittances: the New Development Mantra?' in Samuel Munzele Maimbo & Dilip Ratha (eds) *Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects*, New York, World Bank, pp. 331-360.

Kastoryano, Riva (2007) 'Transnational nationalism: redefining nation and territory' in Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro & Danilo Petranovic (eds) *Identities, Affiliations, and Allegiances*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 159-178.

Kelly, Claire (2008) 'Homeland and national belonging beyond borders: Filipino domestic workers and transmigrants as a global nation' in Penelope Graham (ed.) *Horizons of Home: Nation, Gender and Migrancy in Island Southeast Asia*, Melbourne, Monash Asia Institute, pp. 31-44.

Kingma, Mireille (2006) *Nurses on the Move: Migration and the Global Health Care Economy*, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press.

Kotkin, Joel (1994) *Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy*, New York, Random House.

Kuznetsov, Yevgeny (ed.) (2006) *Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills: How Countries Can Draw on Their Talent Abroad*, Washington DC, World Bank Institute.

Lan Pei-Chia (2006) *Global Cinderellas: Migrant Domestics and Newly Rich Employers in Taiwan*, Durham NC, Duke University Press.

Lawless, Robert (2004) 'Philippine Disapora' in Melvin Ember, Carol Ember & Ian Skoggard (eds) *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World*, vol. 1 *Overviews and Topics*, New York, Springer, pp. 244-253.

Leeds, Elizabeth (1984) *Labor Export, Development and the State: The Political Economy of Portuguese Emigration*, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge MASS.

Lindio-McGovern, Ligaya (2004) 'Alienation and labor export in the context of globalization', *Critical Asian Studies* 36 (2), pp. 217-238.

Maimbo, Samuel Munzele & Ratha, Dilip (eds) (2005) *Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects*, New York, World Bank.

Margold, Jane (1995) 'Narratives of Masculinity and Transnational Migration: Filipino Workers in the Middle East' in Aihwa Ong & Michael Peletz (eds) *Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia*, Berkeley CA, University of California Press, pp. 274-298.

Martinez, Kathleen (2007) "Finding a Home for Filipino-American Dual Citizens: Membership and the Filipino National Identity", unpublished Masters dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington DC.

May, Glenn (1980) *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913*, Westpoint CT, Greenwood Press.

McKay Deidre (2005) 'Success Stories? Filipina Migrant Domestic Workers in Canada' in Shirlena Huang, Brenda S.A. Yeoh & Noor Abdul Rahman (eds) *Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers*, Singapore, Marshall Cavendish, pp. 305-340.

McKay, Steven (2007) 'Filipino Sea Men: Identity and Masculinity in a Global Labor Niche' in Rhacel Salazar Parrenas & Lok C.D. Siu (eds) *Asian Diasporas: New Conceptions, New Frameworks*, Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, pp. 63-84.

Mendoza, S. Lily (2002) *Between the Homeland and the Diaspora: The Politics of Theorizing Filipino and Filipino American Identities*, London, Routledge.

Menjivar, Cecilia *et. al* (1998) 'Remittance Behavior Among Salvadoran and Filipino Immigrants in Los Angeles', *International Migration Review* 32 (1), pp. 97-126.

Migdal, Joel (1988) *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press.

Morawska, Ewa (2001) 'Immigrants, Transnationalism and Ethnicization: A Comparison of This Great Wave and the Last' in Gary Gerstle & John Mollenkopf (eds) *E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 175-212.

Murdoch, Alexander (2004) *British Emigration, 1603-1914*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Nettl, J.P. (1968) 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', *World Politics* 20, pp. 559-592.

OECD (2005) *Migration Remittances and Development*, Paris, OECD.

Ofrenco, Rene & Samonte, Isabelo (2005) 'Empowering Filipino Migrant Workers: Policy Issues and Challenges', *International Migration Papers* n° 64, Geneva, International Labour Office.

Oishi, Nana (2005) *Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies and Labor Migration in* Asia, Stanford CA, Stanford University Press.

Okamura, Jonathan (1998) *Imagining the Filipino American Diaspora: Transnational Relations, Identities, and Communities*, New York, Garland Publishing.

Ong, Aihwa (1999) *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*, Durham NC, Duke University Press.

Parrenas, Rhacel Salazar (200*n: Women, Migrants and Domestic Work*, Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Parrenas, Rhacel Salazar (2006) *Children of Global Migration: Transnational Families and Gendered Woes*, Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Parrenas, Rhacel Salazar (2008) *The Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalization*, New York, New York University Press.

Pernia, Ernesto (2007) 'Diaspora, Remittances, and Poverty' in Rodolfo C. Severino & Lorraine Carlos Salazar (eds) *Whither the Philippines in the 21st Century?*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 222-245.

Pertierra, Raul (ed.) (1992) *Remittances and Returnees: the Cultural Economy of Migration in Ilocos*, Quezon City, New Day Publishers.

Pertierra, Raul (1999) 'The relevance of the Philippine State for the state of Philippine studies', *Asian Studies Review* 23 (3), pp. 293-306.

Philippine Migrants Rights Watch (2003) *The Rights of Philippine Migrants / Mga Karapatan ng mga Migranteng Pilipino*, Quezon City, Philippine Migrants Rights Watch.

Porio, Emma (2007) 'Global Householding, Gender, and Filipino Migration: A Preliminary Review', *Philippine Studies* 55 (2), pp. 211-242.

Putzel, James (2000) 'Social capital and the imagined community: democracy and nationalism in the Philippines' in Michael Leifer (ed.) *Asian Nationalism*, London, Routledge, pp. 170-186.

Rafael, Vicente (1993) *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule*, Durham NC, Duke University Press.

Rodriguez, Robyn (2002) 'Migrant Heroes: Nationalism, Citizenship and the Politics of Filipino Migrant Labor', *Citizenship Studies* 6 (3), pp. 341-356.

Root, Maria (ed.) (1997) *Filipino Americans: Transformation and Identity*, Thousand Oaks CA, Sage Publications.

Rojas, Henry (2005) *Overseas Absentee Voting: The Philippine Experience*, Quezon City, Center for Migrant Advocacy Philippines, Inc.

Samonte, Elena (2003) "Filipino International Migration: A Continuing Saga" in Leonore Loeb Adler & Uw P. Gielen (eds) *Migration: Immigration and Emigration in International Perspective*, Westpoint CT, Praeger Publishers, pp. 251-269.

San Juan, E. (1998) *From Exile to Diaspora: Versions of the Filipino Experience in the United States*, Quezon City, Ugnayan Para sa Makabayang Kamulatan Inc.

San Juan, E. (2006) *Filipinos Everywhere: Displaced, Transported Overseas, Moving on in the Diaspora*, Quezon City, IBON Books.

Schiller, Nina Glick & Fouron, Georges (2001) *Georges woke up laughing: long-distance nationalism and the search for home*, Durham NC, Duke University Press.

Sheffer, Gabriel (2003) *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Silva, Jon (2006) *Engaging Diaspora Communities in Development: An Investigation of Filipino Hometown Associations in Canada*, unpublished Masters dissertation, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver BC.

Simon, Claire-Noëlle (2008) *Migration et développement : le rôle de l'éducation dans l'émigration philippine*, unpublished Master dissertation, Sciences Po, Paris.

Smith, Anthony 2000 'Theories of nationalism: alternative models of nation formation' in Michael Leifer (ed.) *Asian Nationalism*, London, Routledge, pp. 1-20.

Tabuga, Aubrey (2007) "International Remittances and Household Expenditures: The Philippine Case" *Philippine Institute for Development Studies Discussion Paper Series*, n° 2007-18.

Taylor, J. Edward (2004) "Remittances, Savings, and Development in Migrant-Sending Areas" in Douglas Massey & J. Edward Taylor (eds) *International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market*, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 157-173.

Terry, Donald & Wilson, Steven (eds) (2005) *Beyond Small Change: Making Migrant Remittances Count*, Washington DC, Inter-American Development Bank.

Therwath, Ingrid (2007) *L'Etat face à la diaspora: stratégies et trajectoires indiennes*, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Sciences Po, Paris.

Tignio, Jorge (2006) 'Overseas Employment from the Philippines – The Nexus between Development and Governance' in Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem & Noel M. Morada (eds) *Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges to Democratization & Development*, Quezon City, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman, pp. 267-281.

Tyner, James (2000) 'The Philippines: the Dilemma of Philippine International Labor Migration' in Maura Toro-Morn & Marixsa Alicea (eds) *Migration and Immigration: A Global View*, Westpoint CT, Greenwood Publishing, pp. 161-175.

Tyner, James & Kuhlke, Olaf (2000) 'Pan-national identities: representations of the Philippine diaspora on the world wide web', *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 41 (3), pp. 231-252.

Vertovec, Stephen & Cohen, Robin (eds) (1999) *Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.

Waldinger, Roger & Fitzgerald, David (2004) 'Transnationalism in Question', *American Journal of Sociology* 109 (5), pp. 1177-1195.

Weekley, Kathleen (2006) 'From wage labourers to investors? Filipina migrant domestic workers and popular capitalism' in Kevin Hewison & Ken Young (eds) *Transnational Migration and Work in Asia*, London, Routledge, pp. 193-212.

Wolf, Diane (2002) 'There's No Place Like "Home": Emotional Transnationalism and the Struggles of Second-Generation Filipinos' in Peggy Levitt & Mary Waters (eds) *The Changing Face of Home: the Transnational Lives of the Second Generation*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 255-294.

World Bank (2005) 'Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration' in *Global Economic Prospects 2006,* New York, World Bank.

World Bank (2008) *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008*, New York, World Bank.

Yang, Dean (2008) 'International Migration, Remittances and Household Investment: Evidence from Philippine Migrants' Exchange Rate Shocks', *The Economic Journal* 118 (528), pp. 591-630.

Yeoh, Brenda S.A, Yai, Karen, Charney, Michael & Tong Chee Kiong (2004) 'Approaching Transnationalism' in Brenda Yeoh, Michele Charney & Tong Chee Kiong (eds) *Approaching Transnationalisms: Studies on Transnational Societies, Multicultural Contacts, and Imaginings of Home*, New York, Kluwer Academic, pp. 1-14.

Appendices

Table 1 : A Typology of Roles of the Embedded Developmental State

1. Custodian
A variation of the conventional role of regulator, this involves regulatory efforts that privilege policing over promotion.

2. Demiurge
A variation of the conventional role of producer this involves the production and distribution of certain types of public goods (infrastructure, education) involving an extension to compete in markets in producing normal "private" goods.

3. Midwifery
Rather than substituting itself for private producers the state tries to assist in the emergence of new entrepreneurial groups and/or the reorientation of such groups into new areas of production.

4. Husbandry
This function overlaps with that of midwife; however, it involves activities from cajoling through a variety of incentives (or punishments) to the setting up of state organizations to take on risky tasks, such as research and development.

Source: Adapted from Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States & Industrial Transformation, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Table 2. Top Fifteen Remittance Receiving Countries, 2007
Expressed in US$ Billions

Country	US$ Billions
India[a]	27.0
China[a]	25.7
Mexico[a]	25.0
Philippines[a]	17.0
France[a]	12.5
Spain[a]	8.9
Belgium[a]	7.2
Germany[a]	7.0
United Kingdom[a]	7.0
Romania[a]	6.8
Bangladesh	6.4
Pakistan	6.1
Indonesia	6.0
Egypt, Arab Rep. of	5.9
Morocco	5.7

Source: World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2008*, New York, 2008

Table 3. Top Fifteen Remittance Receiving Countries, 2006
Expressed in percentage of GDP

Country	Percentage of GDP
India	2.8%
China	0.9%
Mexico	2.9%
Philippines	**13%**
France	0.6%
Spain	0.7%
Belgium	1.8%
Germany	0.2%
United Kingdom	0.3%
Romania	5.5%
Bangladesh	8.8%
Pakistan	4.0%
Indonesia	1.6%
Egypt	5.0%
Morocco	9.5%

Source: World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2008*, New York, 2008

Table 4. Overseas Filipino Remittances, Nominal and as Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 1981-2007

	1981-1990 ave.	1991-2000 ave.	2001-2005 ave.	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
In US$ '000	823,685	4,084,420	7,947,052	6,031,271	6,886,156	7,578,458	8,550,371	10,689,005	12,761,308	14,449,928
As % of GDP (%)	2.3	5.9	9.5	8.5	9.0	9.6	9.8	10.8	10.9	10.0

Source: IBON computations on data from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) and National Statistics Office (NSO)

Table 5. Ideal Type of Diaspora, Examples and Notes

Main types of diaspora	Main examples in this book	Also mentioned and notes
VICTIM	Jews, Africans, Armenians	Also discussed: Irish and Palestinians. Many contemporary refugee groups are incipient victim diasporas but time has to pass to see whether they return to their homelands, assimilate in their hostlands, creolize or mobilize as a diaspora.
LABOUR	Indentured Indians	Also discussed: Chinese and Japanese; Turks, Italians, North Africans. Many others could be included. Another synonymous expression is 'proletarian diaspora'.
IMPERIAL	British	Also discussed: Russians, colonial powers other than Britain. Other synonymous expressions are 'settler' or 'colonial' diasporas.
TRADE	Lebanese, Chinese	Also discussed: Venetians, business and professional Indians, Chinese, Japanese. Note also the auxiliary elements discussed in Chapter 5.
DETERRITORIALIZED	Caribbean peoples, Sindhis, Parsis	Also discussed: Roma, Muslims and other religious diasporas. The expressions 'hybrid', 'cultural' and 'post-colonial' also are linked to the idea of deterritorialization without being synonymous.

Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: an Introduction*, 2rd edn, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 18.

Table 6 : A Typology of Forms of State-Diaspora Co-optation

1.   Resource husbandry

a.   Economic: instrument of a development strategy (or lack thereof?).

b.   Political: financing political activity and/or intellectual/moral legitimizing inputs.

2.   As Outlet

a.   Rewarding the docile and/or support networks.

b.   Social safety valve.

3.   As Relay

a.   Vector in foreign relations.

b.   Extra-territorialized lobbying and interest groups.

4.   As Interlocutor

a.   Externally: a deterritorialized "domestic" constituency.

b.   Internally: external representatives of domestic diaspora-linked actors

Source: Adapted from Ingrid Therwath, L'Etat face à la diaspora : stratégies et trajectoires indiennes, unpublished PhD dissertation, Sciences Po, 2007 with additional insights from Nana Oishi, Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies and Labor Migration in Asia, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 2005 and Robyn Rodriguez, "Migrant Heroes: Nationalism, Citizenship and the Politics of Filipino Migrant Labor", Citizenship Studies 6 (3) 2002, pp. 341-356.

Table 7. Deployment of Newly-Hired OFWs by Skills Category: 1992, 2001, 2006

SKILL CATEGORY	Number				% of total			
	1992	2001	2006	1992-2006	1992	2001	2006	1992-2006
Professional and Technical Workers	72,881	97,448	41,258	1,012,768	27.7	37.7	13.4	26.8
Managerial Workers	289	385	817	6,118	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2
Clerical Workers	5,369	3,356	7,912	61,509	2.1	1.3	2.6	1.6
Sales Workers	2,701	3,188	5,517	43,247	1.0	1.2	1.8	1.1
Agricultural Workers	2,023	550	807	12,153	0.8	0.2	0.3	0.3
Production Workers	95,062	56,740	103,584	1,160,657	36.5	22.0	33.6	30.7
Service Workers	82,267	92,351	144,321	1,425,758	31.6	35.8	46.8	37.7
For reclassification	0	4,186	3,906	62,986	0.0	1.6	1.3	1.7
TOTAL	260,592	221,447	308,122	3,785,196	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)

Table 8. Number and Percentage Distribution of Overseas Filipino Workers by Selected Characteristics: 2007

Overseas Filipino Workers (in thousands)	1,747
By major occupation (%)	100.0
Officials of government and special-interest organizations, corporate executives, managers, managing proprietors and supervisors	2.6
Professionals	8.6
Technicians and associate professionals	6.3
Clerks	5.6
Farmers, forestry workers and fishermen	0.4
Service workers and shop and market sales work	14.3
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	13.4
Trades and related workers	13.8
Laborers and unskilled workers	35.0
Special occupations	0.0
Sex (%)	100.0
Male	50.9
Female	49.1

By region of origin (%)	100.0
National Capital Region (NCR)	16.0
Cordillera Administrative Region	2.1
I -Ilocos	7.7
II -Cagayan Valley	5.9
III -Central Luzon	14.3
IVA -CALABARZON	17.7
IVB –MIMAROPA	1.7
V -Bicol	3.0
VI -Western Visayas	8.5
VII -Central Visayas	5.1
VIII -Eastern Visayas	2.1
IX -Zamboanga Peninsula	2.0
X -Northern Mindanao	3.1
XI -Davao	2.6
XII -SOCCSKSARGEN	4.2
XIII -Caraga	1.0
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	3.1

Source: National Statistics Office (NSO, 2007), Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF)

Table 9. Percent Distribution of Families by Income Class and Income Source from Domestic or Abroad, Philippines: 2003

Income Class (PhP, annual)	Total families			Families with main income from abroad	
	(in '000)	%	%	(in '000)	%
Philippines	16,480	100.0	100.0	1,310	100.0
Under 10,000	30	0.2	28.3	67	5.1
10,000 – 19,999	273	1.7			
20,000 – 29,999	685	4.2			
30,000 - 39,999	1,133	6.9			
40,000 - 49,999	1,286	7.8			
50,000 - 59,999	1,255	7.6			
60,000 - 79,999	2,206	13.4	23.9	168	12.8
80,000 - 99,999	1,733	10.5			
100,000 - 149,999	2,840	17.2	33.6	618	47.2
150,000 - 249,999	2,704	16.4			
250,000 - 499,999	1,790	10.9	14.2	457	34.9
500,000 and over	545	3.3			

Source: National Statistics Office (NSO) Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) 2003

Table 10

OFW Remittances by Origin, Indicating Distribution of Top Ten Country Sources: 2006

Region/country	US$ '000	% of total
Asia	1,496,120	11.7
of w/c Japan	453,398	3.6
of w/c Hongkong	413,723	3.2
of w/c Singapore	285,126	2.2
of w/c Taiwan	168,998	1.3
Middle East	1,909,208	15.0
of w/c Saudi Arabia	1,117,915	8.8
of w/c United Arab Emirates	427,246	3.3
Europe	2,061,067	16.2
of w/c Italy	574,662	4.5
of w/c United Kingdom	561,670	4.4
Americas	7,198,212	56.4
of w/c United States of America	6,526,429	51.1
of w/c Canada	590,627	4.6
Africa	10,272	0.1
Oceania	85,610	0.7
Others	819	0.0
Total OFW Remittance	12,761,308	100.0
Monthly Remittance average	1,063,442	-
Of which:		
Landbased Total	10,812,018	84.7
Seabased Total	1,949,290	15.3

Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)

Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos: As of December 2006

REGION / COUNTRY	Number					%				
	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY & IRREGULAR	TEMPORARY	IRREGULAR (of w/c)	TOTAL	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY & IRREGULAR	TEMPORARY	IRREGULAR (of w/c)	TOTAL
WORLD TOTAL	3,556,035	4,677,137	3,802,345	874,792	8,233,172	100	100	100	100	100
AFRICA	553	89,245	71,503	17,742	89,798	0.0	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.1
Nigeria	18	14,128	13,428	700	14,146	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.2
Libya	75	10,155	9,475	680	10,230	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Equatorial Guinea	40	4,734	4,072	662	4,774	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Egypt	246	3,390	2,190	1,200	3,636	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Others / Unspecified	174	56,838	42,338	14,500	57,012	0.0	1.2	1.1	1.7	0.7
ASIA, East & South	196,968	1,026,710	789,110	237,600	1,223,678	5.5	22.0	20.8	27.2	14.9
Japan	124,722	134,255	103,555	30,700	258,977	3.5	2.9	2.7	3.5	3.1
Malaysia	26,001	213,372	88,372	125,000	239,373	0.7	4.6	2.3	14.3	2.9
Singapore	26,000	113,318	75,318	38,000	139,318	0.7	2.4	2.0	4.3	1.7
Hongkong	11,471	124,644	121,644	3,000	136,115	0.3	2.7	3.2	0.3	1.7
Taiwan	2,295	72,828	68,328	4,500	75,123	0.1	1.6	1.8	0.5	0.9
Korea (South)	5,611	64,600	50,600	14,000	70,211	0.2	1.4	1.3	1.6	0.9
Macau	56	19,735	18,735	1,000	19,791	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.2
Brunei	50	17,126	16,726	400	17,176	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.2
Others / Unspecified	762	266,832	245,832	21,000	267,594	0.0	5.7	6.5	2.4	3.3
ASIA, West	3,523	1,836,161	1,723,911	112,250	1,839,684	0.1	39.3	45.3	12.8	22.3
Saudi Arabia	247	1,019,330	1,001,330	18,000	1,019,577	0.0	21.8	26.3	2.1	12.4
Uae	430	311,363	291,363	20,000	311,793	0.0	6.7	7.7	2.3	3.8
Kuwait	94	144,861	133,361	11,500	144,955	0.0	3.1	3.5	1.3	1.8
Qatar	13	116,874	115,874	1,000	116,887	0.0	2.5	3.0	0.1	1.4
Israel	1,000	49,065	26,565	22,500	50,065	0.0	1.0	0.7	2.6	0.6
Bahrain	65	47,643	44,143	3,500	47,708	0.0	1.0	1.2	0.4	0.6
Lebanon	300	29,112	23,012	6,100	29,412	0.0	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.4
Oman	21	22,517	21,017	1,500	22,538	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.3
Jordan	108	21,430	14,430	7,000	21,538	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.3
Others / Unspecified	1,245	73,966	52,816	21,150	75,211	0.0	1.6	1.4	2.4	0.9
EUROPE	229,132	659,128	534,748	124,380	888,260	6.4	14.1	14.1	14.2	10.8
United Kingdom	62,606	102,958	93,358	9,600	165,564	1.8	2.2	2.5	1.1	2.0
Italy	23,108	104,972	84,972	20,000	128,080	0.6	2.2	2.2	2.3	1.6

Germany	43,706	10,289	8,189	2,100	53,995	1.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.7
France	6,931	40,814	964	39,850	47,745	0.2	0.9	0.0	4.6	0.6
Austria	24,094	5,724	3,794	1,930	29,818	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4
Greece	91	26,952	18,952	8,000	27,043	0.0	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.3
Spain	17,915	8,590	6,090	2,500	26,505	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Norway	16,231	3,060	3,060	0	19,291	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2
Netherlands	13,635	4,821	2,821	2,000	18,456	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2
Sweden	7,214	10,129	10,119	10	17,343	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.2
Belgium	3,858	8,952	3,352	5,600	12,810	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.2
Switzerland	8,207	3,789	1,789	2,000	11,996	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1
Ireland	100	11,400	10,800	600	11,500	0.0	0.2		0.1	0.1
Others / Unspecified	1,436	316,678	286,488	30,190	318,114	0.0	6.8	7.5	3.5	3.9
AMERICAS / TRUST TERRITORIES	2,887,129	690,163	333,763	356,400	3,577,292	81.2	14.8	8.8	40.7	43.4
United States	2,443,269	284,940	128,440	156,500	2,728,209	68.7	6.1	3.4	17.9	33.1
Canada	396,054	41,886	38,886	3,000	437,940	11.1	0.9	1.0	0.3	5.3
Guam	45,206	1,310	810	500	46,516	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6
Cnmi	1,288	14,280	12,880	1,400	15,568	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
Others / Unspecified	1,312	347,747	152,747	195,000	349,059	0.0	7.4	4.0	22.3	4.2
OCEANIA	238,730	101,233	74,813	26,420	339,963	6.7	2.2	2.0	3.0	4.1
Australia	218,425	18,100	15,100	3,000	236,525	6.1	0.4	0.4	0.3	2.9
New Zealand	19,549	862	742	120	20,411	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Papua New Guinea	720	9,405	7,505	1900	10,125	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Palau	5	4,102	3,702	400	4,107	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Others / Unspecified	31	68,764	47,764	21,000	68,795	0.0	1.5	1.3	2.4	0.8
SEABASED WORKERS	-	274,497	274,497	-	274,497	-	5.9	7.2	-	3.3

Note: Permanent - Immigrants or legal permanent residents abroad whose stay does not depend on work contracts.
Temporary - Persons whose stay overseas is employment related, and who are expected to return at the end of their work contracts.
Irregular - Those not properly documented or without valid residence or work permits, or who are overstaying in a foreign country.
Source: Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO)