L’argomento dell’uno sui molti. Il dilemma dello struzzo

The purpose of this paper is to defend the so-called Ostrich Nominalism against the influential criticism that has been put forward by David M. Armstrong. First, I reconstruct Armstrong’s “One over Many” argument for universals (§§ 1-2), reviewing his main reasons for rejecting the foremost kinds of nominalism (§ 3). I then argue that Ostrich Nominalism has been underrated by Armstrong (§ 4) and that, consequently, his strategy for dealing with it results in misleading and elusive conclusions. I conclude that Ostrich Nominalism represents an arduous challenge to Armstrong’s Realism in that it compels him either to give up his sparse Realism, or to acknowledge that all the solutions to the problem of universals are utterly meaningless (§§ 5-6)

La disputa nominalisti-universalisti

The inhabitants of the world are many yet somehow one: how is it possible? This conundrum gives rise to one of the most ancient but nevertheless topical debates in philosophy: the problem of universals. From Plato to Quine, via Aquinas, Galilei and Russell – just to name a few representative cases –, the problem of universals has had a great relevance for issues pertaining to epistemology, theology, science, mathematics and semantics. This paper is meant to be expository and it focuses on the core issue, i.e. how is it possible – if at all – for numerically different things to have an identical qualitative nature? In the following discussion, I will review the foremost solutions, viz. Universalism, Nominalism and Particularism, considering the pros and the cons of each.Gli enti che popolano il mondo devono essere molti ed in qualche modo uno. È questa la tensione teoretica fondamentale che dà luogo ad uno dei più annosi e nondimeno più attuali dibattiti filosofici: il problema degli universali. Da Platone a Quine, attraverso Tommaso d'Aquino, Galilei e Russell – solo per nominare alcuni casi rappresentativi –, il problema degli universali ha avuto grande rilevanza per questioni riguardanti l'epistemologia, la teologia, la scienza, la matematica e la semantica. Il presente lavoro intende essere espositivo e focalizzerà l'attenzione sul nucleo problematico principale, ossia su come sia possibile, se lo è, che enti numericamente differenti abbiano una natura qualitativa identica. In quanto segue passeremo in rassegna le soluzioni più eminenti, ossia l'universalismo, il nominalismo ed il particolarismo, vagliando per ciascuna di esse i relativi pro e contra

L’argomento dell’uno sui molti. Il dilemma dello struzzo

The purpose of this paper is to defend the so-called Ostrich Nominalism against the influential criticism that has been put forward by David M. Armstrong. First, I reconstruct Armstrong’s “One over Many” argument for universals (§§ 1-2), reviewing his main reasons for rejecting the foremost kinds of nominalism (§ 3). I then argue that Ostrich Nominalism has been underrated by Armstrong (§ 4) and that, consequently, his strategy for dealing with it results in misleading and elusive conclusions. I conclude that Ostrich Nominalism represents an arduous challenge to Armstrong’s Realism in that it compels him either to give up his sparse Realism, or to acknowledge that all the solutions to the problem of universals are utterly meaningless (§§ 5-6)

David Malet Armstrong

David Malet Armstrong (Melburne 8 July 1926 – 13 May 2014) has been one of the most influential contemporary metaphysician working in the analytic tradition and surely the greatest 20th century Australian philosopher. His main merit is to have reestablished metaphysics as a respectable branch of philosophy placing it at the heart of the philosophical debate, and giving it the status of an authoritative and competent interlocutor of both rational and empirical sciences. This paper aims to illustrate some of the most influential theses that constitute Armstrong’s metaphysical system.David Malet Armstrong, nato a Melbourne nel 1926, prestigiosa firma del panorama filosofico contemporaneo, appartiene alla nuova generazione di filosofi che a partire dalla seconda metà degli anni '70 ha contribuito in misura determinate alla cosiddetta 'rinascita' degli studi ontologico-metafisici. Personalità brillante, ha saputo declinare con equilibrio e originalità un austero spirito empirista alle istanze fondative di un autentico realismo metafisico, offrendo un progetto filosofico sistematico ed innovativo, rispondente al nome di «realismo scientifico». Il lavoro che qui proponiamo intende ricostruire alcuni punti nodali del suo complesso itinerario intellettuale

social objects from intentionality to documentality

What keeps society together? A popular answer has been that collective intentionality lies at the bottom of all manifestations of social reality. Several problems and criticisms have arisen against such a view in the very recent literature. An alternative approach replaces the notion of collective intentionality with the notion of “documentality”: the basis of social reality is the inscription of acts. The multifariousness of perspectives and topics addressed in the present volume witnesses the great vitality of the debate. Our guess is that such vitality is destined to increase in parallel to, and partly because of, the progressive complexification of contemporary societies