848 research outputs found
How to herd cats: economic policy coordination in the Euro zone in tough times
How to herd cats: economic policy coordination in the Euro zone in tough times
Integrity and Efficiency in the EU: The Case Against the European Economic Constitution. CES Working Paper, no. 130, 2006
The European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) was presented by its drafters as an explicit constitution for the European Union (EU 25). A possible explanation for its rejection by the French and Dutch citizens in the course of spring 2005 is that it did not sufficiently amend the implicit constitution of the EU 25, the European Union Treaty (EUT), which was truly the object of votersâ aversion. Assuming this to be true, there should be a thorough debate on the relevance and viability of the de facto current constitution of the European Union. In this paper, we engage in this debate by identifying what is essentially wrong with the economic provisions of the EUT, which we designate as the âEuropean economic constitution.â Using a constitutional political economy approach, we first attempt to demonstrate that both what we define as the âprinciple of integrityâ and the âprinciple of efficiencyâ of collective action appear to be violated by the European economic constitution. This occurs, respectively, because its provisions are not neutral, nor revisable, and because they do not sufficiently allow for the possibility of cooperative collective decision (leading to convergence in welfare) in a more than ever numerous and heterogeneous EU. Our essential argument in this respect regards the implications of the structurally different economic performances and incentives of small and large countries under the European economic constitution. Finally, since the present European trade-off between âintegrityâ and âefficiencyâ appears sub-optimal, we present two original ways of achieving potentially better ones in the EU, through a âGreat compromiseâ or âEconomic constitution(s),â expressing a preference for the latter
Negotiating the Medium-term Financial Perspectives for the Enlarged EU: the Future of the European Budget.
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Inflation divergence and public deficits in a monetary union
We reconsider the link between domestic public debts and average and domestic inflation rates in a monetary union, using a modified version of a model by Beetsma and Vermeylen (2002). It is thus possible to show that the causation between the inflation dynamics and the public finances might go from the former to the latter. We are thus able to tackle the issue of persistently divergent inflation rates within the euro area. We also demonstrate that the homogeneous fiscal rules defined in the Stability and Growth Pact are ill-suited and might even be counterproductive. This conclusion is all the more true as the EU is on the eve of enlargement towards the CEECs: our results show that imposing homogeneous fiscal rules to the CEECs may prove disruptive.inflation, public debt, monetary union, fiscal rule
Country size and strategic aspects of structural reforms in the EU. NERO meeting, OECD, Paris, June 12, 2006.
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Delegation in inconsistency: the Lisbon strategy record as an institutional failure
In this paper, we develop an analysis of the reasons for the apparent failure of the âLisbon strategyâ (2000) so far. After having made the general case for a comprehensive âinstitutionalist perspectiveâ on the European economy, we first try to formalise the objectives of âLisbonâ in order to present a mid-term review of the results attained. Since we find, like many others, that too little has been achieved, we then offer some possible explanations. Apart from an inconsistency problem between the different objectives set, we argue that the major reason for this failure appears to lie in the contradiction between the EU macroeconomic policy framework, based on the logic of delegation of power and control to independent authorities with conservative objectives, and the proactive policies required by the âLisbon strategyâ, which objectives the EU member states eventually find themselves accountable for (not) achieving individually.European Union, âLisbon strategyâ, Institutions, Delegation, Inconsistency, Macroeconomic policy, Structural Reform
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