21 research outputs found

    Closing the Mind's Eye: Incoming Luminance Signals Disrupt Visual Imagery

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    Mental imagery has been associated with many cognitive functions, both high and low-level. Despite recent scientific advances, the contextual and environmental conditions that most affect the mechanisms of visual imagery remain unclear. It has been previously shown that the greater the level of background luminance the weaker the effect of imagery on subsequent perception. However, in these experiments it was unclear whether the luminance was affecting imagery generation or storage of a memory trace. Here, we report that background luminance can attenuate both mental imagery generation and imagery storage during an unrelated cognitive task. However, imagery generation was more sensitive to the degree of luminance. In addition, we show that these findings were not due to differential dark adaptation. These results suggest that afferent visual signals can interfere with both the formation and priming-memory effects associated with visual imagery. It follows that background luminance may be a valuable tool for investigating imagery and its role in various cognitive and sensory processes

    Is imagination introspective?

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    The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves, and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it looks as if in these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience

    Olfactory and gustatory mental imagery : modulation by sensory experience and comparison to auditory mental imagery

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    Olfactory and gustatory mental images are defined as short-term memory representations of olfactory or gustatory events that give rise to the experience of “smelling with the mind’s nose” or “tasting with the mind’s tongue.” This chapter reviews converging evidence supporting the view that, as with visual mental images, odor and taste mental images preserve some aspects of olfactory and gustatory percepts. The variability that affects both types of imagery is also considered in an experiment comparing the effect of experience on chemosensory mental imagery and auditory mental imagery
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