Dissociating early- and late-selection processes in recall: the mixed blessing of categorized study lists

Two experiments are reported in which we used type-2 signal detection theory to separate the effects of semantic categorization on early- and late-selection processes in free and cued recall. In Experiment 1, participants studied cue–target pairs for which the targets belonged to two, six, or 24 semantic categories, and later the participants were required to recall the targets either with (cued recall) or without (free recall) the studied cues. A confidence rating and a report decision were also required, so that we could compute both forced-report quantity and metacognitive resolution (type-2 discrimination), which served as our estimates of early- and late-selection processes, respectively. Consistent with prior research, having fewer categories enhanced the early-selection process (in performance, two > six > 24 categories). However, in contrast, the late-selection process was impaired (24 > six = two categories). In Experiment 2, encoding of paired associates, for which the targets belonged to either two or 20 semantic categories, was manipulated by having participants either form interactive images or engage in rote repetition. Having fewer categories again was associated with enhanced early selection (two > 20 categories); this effect was greater for rote repetition than for interactive imagery, and greater for free recall than for cued recall. However, late selection again showed the opposite pattern (20 > two categories), even with interactive-imagery encoding, which formed distinctive, individuated memory traces. The results are discussed in terms of early- and late-selection processes in retrieval, as well as overt versus covert recognition

What memory is

I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term “ memory ” to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the “received view”, is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical and conceptual considerations to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of re-acquaintance with one’s past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more nuanced view of memory. -/