The Big Table - A Software Tool for Nuclear Trade Analysis

This report overviews functionalities provided by 'The Big Table' (TBT), a software tool designed to support nuclear trade analysis for IAEA safeguards. TBT allows analysts to perform steps preparatory to the retrieval and analysis of data records pertinent to case studies on nuclear trade. Trade data records stem from open source web data services on global trade and are retrieved by Harmonized System codes, i.e. commodity descriptors used by traders to declare imports and exports to customs authorities. The report is structured in two main Parts. The first Part presents elements of nuclear trade analysis. The report concludes by comparing TBT to related information tools developed in the context of export controls. Future developments on TBT are outlined pointing to new application areas.JRC.DG.E.9-Nuclear security (Ispra

Customs perspective on Strategic Trade Control

Le lecture is about the Customs perspective on Strategic Trade Control and in particular the ability to intercept illegal shipments of dual use item

Customs and Catch-All implementation: Catch-All Controls -Theory and Practice

This paper presents the main issues of the enforcement of "catch all" close in export control regulations and specifically in relations to customs processes in the context of Mexic

licensing and detection challenges

This speech described the various challenge sand typical practices in the detection of export control violation

WCO and 1540: Challenges and engagement for the world customs community

There is an historical gap between the customs community, internationally embodied in the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the non-proliferation community promoting and implementing the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1540 (1540). Many cultural, historical, political and technical reasons can explain this gap. Nevertheless, the WCO has endeavoured to take on the challenge and recently launched a number of interesting initiatives. This is an appropriate time to look at where and how the WCO could best provide leadership, guidance and support to Customs administrations in implementing 1540.JRC.E.8-Nuclear securit

Fraud Schemes

The presentations presents a non- exhaustive typology of export control fraud pattern

European Commission Joint Research Center Export Control Capacity Building Initiatives: Staying Relevant for 1540 Implementation

After 11 years of implementing UNSC resolution 1540, many of us can testify to the variety of export control components which must be developed, maintained, and kept up-to-date to fulfill the resolution’s requirements. Considering the complexity of the topic, we must not only do more and do it well, but we must also constantly explore new ways to do better. Some of the recent European Commission Joint Research Center (JRC) initiatives described hereafter are examples of good practices. They are creative and complementary activities designed to be part of this required constant effort to keep international trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

SimEX 2015 was an export control cooperation exercise designed by EU Member States for EU Member States. Renaud Chatelus and Filippo Sevini of the Nuclear Security Unit of the European Joint Research Centre review the exercise and the valuable lessons learned.

Export control systems are complex by nature. They involve many national stakeholders. A typical national export controlapparatus requires the cooperation of between seven and 15 governmental ministries, services and agencies, each having its own mandate, constraints and work culture. But export control cannot be seen from a purely national perspective. Export control’s ultimate purpose, overall efficacy, and legal basis are genuinely international. International instruments and bodies, such as Resolution 1540 and its committee, or the various multilateral export control regimes, provide some guidance and opportunities for cooperation. It is, however, far from sufficient for addressing all the cooperation challenges at the national and international levels. Recognising this important need for cooperation, the Nuclear Security Unit of the European Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy, organised in March 2015, a three-day innovative EU export control simulation exercise with operatives of 11 Member States, involving standard work processes as well as specific fraud patterns

CHALLENGES TO NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS TODAY

Nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation programs are potentially inter-twinned, which is a point to be taken into account when analysing the development of civil nuclear energy, both domestically and as foreign investment. International agreements ensure that the adhering countries fulfil their obligations and do not abuse civil nuclear programs for the production of nuclear weapons. Uranium enrichment is the process currently most focussed on in this respect by recent news and recent technological and commercial developments. But also the so-called reactor-based pathway, with extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel by reprocessing remains in the spotlight of inspectors. Two of the main and complementary pillars on which the prevention of such diversion relies, are Strategic Export Control and International Safeguards. Strategic export control is a key barrier against nuclear proliferation. In many countries including the EU it is set by a legal framework, envisaging implementation, enforcement and prosecution. The goods that can exported only with authorisations are those identified by the international export control regimes; primarily the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the case of nuclear items. It is complemented by nuclear safeguards measures, and especially in the past few years, by the IAEA State Level concept, which looks at the overall country’s potential, including its industrial structure to derive conclusions on the absence of undeclared activities. However, the strict control of goods and knowledge is a moving target, since technological developments, globalisation and the intensifying exchange of information via the worldwide web offer increasing opportunities to proliferators to acquire sensitive items and competences, and create bigger challenges to enforcement, calling for new responses. Research and development programmes must be directed towards supporting the adaptation of current proliferation containment systems to these new challenges. The proposed paper will address the nature of strategic trade controls challenges, describe a few emerging threats and stress the key role of exporters’ awareness and compliance in this respect.JRC.E.8-Nuclear securit

States’ reporting of Annex II exports (AP) and the significance for safeguards evaluation

The paper describes the origin of States’ declarations to the Agency of exports of equipment and non-nuclear material specified in Annex II of the Additional Protocol (a list based on an early revision of INFCIRC/254/Part 1 Trigger List) and elaborates on how the reporting of Annex II exports contributes to the consistency analysis of States’ declared nuclear activities. The paper also indicates other areas of States’ licensing of nuclear-related exports which can bring valuable relevant information to safeguards evaluation – should States be prepared to voluntarily supply such information – as well as the process and prospects for updating Annex II, if and when Member States identify this as a priority.JRC.E.8-Nuclear securit