Stress perception among employees in a French University Hospital

Background Nantes University Hospital comprises 20 activity sectors.Aims To investigate the role of the work environment at the individual level, as well as the workplace level, in explaining the variability in employees’ perception of stress. Methods A self-administered enhanced Karasek Job Content Questionnaire was sent to employees. The main variables were the psychological job demand (PJD) score and the job decision latitude (JDL) score. Univariate and multivariate logistic regression analyses were conducted to estimate crude odds ratio (OR) and adjusted OR. Results One thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight workers were included. Nursing managers (25.9 ± 3.4), non-specialized nurses (25.6 ± 3.5) and physicians (25.3 ± 3.4) had the highest PJD. Cleaning staff (61.4 ± 11.4) and nurse aides (63.6 ± 8.8) had the lowest JDL. Items correlated with high PJD are: unacceptable work schedule, adjusted OR 2.16 (95% CI = 1.3–3.5); unsatisfactory workstation accessibility, OR 1.92 (95% CI = 1.1–3.2); getting from A to B, OR 1.67 (95% CI = 1.2–2.4); and heavy manual handling, OR 1.62 (95% CI = 1.1–2.3). Sleeping tablet use was linked to high PJD (P < 0.01), extra workload (P < 0.05) and tiredness (P < 0.05). Use of painkillers was correlated with musculoskeletal disorders (P < 0.05). Conclusions Our study highlighted women >40 years old, nurse managers, physicians, permanent and/or full-time workers having a high PJD. Nursing aides, medical secretary and nurses presented with high strain. Better control measures should be implemented for those socioprofessional categories to improve prevention measures. This study should be repeated in the future with a multi-centre approach to determine the generalizability of the findings

The effect of introducing IGRA to screen French healthcare workers for tuberculosis and potential conclusions for the work organisation

INTRODUCTION: In France, pre-employment screening for tuberculosis (TB) is performed for healthcare workers (HCW). Screening is repeated when exposure to TB patients or infectious material occurs. The results of these TB screenings were analysed in a retrospective analysis. METHOD: Tuberculin skin tests (TST) and interferon-gamma release assays (QuantiFERON® Gold In-Tube - QFT) were used to perform the TB screenings. The screening results of 637 HCWs on whom QFT was performed were taken from the records of the University Hospital of Nantes. RESULTS: In three (0.5%) HCW, the QFT was indeterminate. In 22.2%, the QFT was positive. A second QFT was performed in 118 HCWs. The reversion rate was 42% (5 out of 17). The conversion rate was 6% (6 out of 98). A TST was performed on 466 (73.5%) of the HCWs. Results for TST > 10 mm were 77.4%. In those with a TST < 10 mm, QFT was positive in 14% and in those with a TST ≥ 10 mm, QFT was positive in 26.7%. Depending on the definition for conversion in the QFT, the annual attack rate was 4.1% or 7.3%. X-ray and pneumology consultation was based on positive QFT rather than TST alone (52 out of 56). No active TB was detected. CONCLUSION: The TST overestimated the prevalence of LTBI in this cohort. The decision about X-ray and consultation regarding preventive treatment should be based on the QFT rather than the TST results. The high reversion rate should be taken into consideration when consulting with HCWs regarding preventive treatment. The high conversion rate seems to indicate that preventive measures such as wearing masks should be improved

Kant's Threefold Synthesis On a Moderately Conceptualist Interpretation

In this chapter I advance a moderately conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction. Often the first version of TD, the A-Deduction, is thought to be less conceptualist than the later B-version from 1787 (e.g. Heidegger 1991, 1995). Certainly, it seems that in the B-Deduction Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the understanding in determining the manifold of representations in intuition than he does in the A-Deduction. It also appears that in the A-Deduction the seemingly pre-conceptual aspects of a priori synthesis, namely those of the synthesis of apprehension and the imagination, are more prominently featured than in the B-Deduction. And the fact that in the A-Deduction judgement does not appear to play any significant role reinforces the view that the A-Deduction is less strongly conceptualist. I believe that Kant is a conceptualist also in the A-Deduction (as much as in the B-Deduction) in the sense that all syntheses, which are expounded in the second section of the A-Deduction, must be seen as involving the categories or the understanding as the seat of the categories. However, despite some apparent strong modal claims regarding apperception in the A-Deduction, I argue that Kant is a moderate conceptualist in the sense that he allows for the real possibility that some representations are apprehended that are not subsumed or subsumable under the categories, or determined or determinable by the understanding as the seat of the categories. Not all representations must be synthesised and hence be conceptualised (by means of the categories), nor are all representations necessarily conceptualisable (by means of the categories). Often it is argued that the application of the categories must be seen as separate from or prior to conceptualisation (that is, employment of concepts in a judgement), so that the categories must be considered to apply to representations at least to the extent that the productive imagination or recognitive synthesis is involved, even if no empirical concepts are applied in an actual judgement. But it is difficult to see how categories can apply outside the context of an actual judgement in which ipso facto empirical concepts are employed, because, after all, categories are nothing but logical functions of judgement (e.g. B143). More in particular, I shall argue for the claims that (1) appearances to the contrary, all three levels of syntheses in the A-Deduction, including the synthesis of recognition, are interdependent and are not to be seen as operating singly or independently of each other, and hence of the categories; (2) ‘mere’ apprehension, or ‘mere’ intuition, is not dependent on the understanding and the application or possible application of the categories; and that (3) ‘mere’ apprehension does not even invoke a priori synthesis of apprehension and hence is as such fully lawless in terms of Kantian a priori laws. In this context, I also address Kant’s argument in the A-Deduction about the role of the imagination in the production of spatial objects and explain his apt use of the example of cinnabar to show that the kind of association that is at issue here concerns the possibility of knowledge, not the possibility of mere association, as is often assumed

Kant's conception of proper science

Kant is well known for his restrictive conception of proper science. In the present paper I will try to explain why Kant adopted this conception. I will identify three core conditions which Kant thinks a proper science must satisfy: systematicity, objective grounding, and apodictic certainty. These conditions conform to conditions codified in the Classical Model of Science. Kant's infamous claim that any proper natural science must be mathematical should be understood on the basis of these conditions. In order to substantiate this reading, I will show that only in this way it can be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific status. © 2009 The Author(s)

Getting Acquainted with Kant

My question here concerns whether Kant claims that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. However there is a sense in which this debate concerning the content of intuition is ill-conceived. Part of this has to do with the terms in which the debate is set, and part to do with confusion over the connection between Kant’s own views and contemporary concerns in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. However, I think much of the substance of the debate concerning Kant’s views on the content of experience can be salvaged by reframing it in terms of a debate about the dependence relations, if any, that exist between different cognitive capacities. Below, in Section 2, I clarify the notion of ‘content’ I take to be at stake in the interpretive debate. Section 3 presents reasons for thinking that intuition cannot have content in the relevant sense. I then argue, in Section 4, that the debate be reframed in terms of dependence. We should distinguish between Intellectualism, according to which all objective representation (understood in a particular way) depends on acts of synthesis by the intellect, and Sensibilism, according to which at least some forms of objective representation are independent of any such acts (or the capacity for such acts). Finally, in Section 5, I further elucidate the cognitive role of intuition. I articulate a challenge which Kant understands alethic modal considerations to present for achieving cognition, and argue that a version of Sensibilism that construes intuition as a form of acquaintance is better positioned to answer this challenge than Intellectualism

Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction

In this paper, I discuss the debate on Kant and nonconceptual content. Inspired by Kant’s account of the intimate relation between intuition and concepts, McDowell (1996) has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Kantians Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view the charge that it neglects the possibility of the existence of essentially nonconceptual content that is not conceptualised or subject to conceptualisation. Their critique of McDowell amounts to nonconceptualism. However, both views, conceptualist and nonconceptualist, share the assumption that intuition is synthesised content in Kant’s sense. My interest is not in the validity of the philosophical positions of conceptualism or nonconceptualism per se. I am particularly interested in the extent to which the views that McDowell and Hanna and Allais respectively advance are true to Kant, or can validly be seen as Kantian positions. I argue that although McDowell is right that intuition is only epistemically relevant in conjunction with concepts, Hanna and Allais are right with regard to the existence of essentially nonconceptual content (intuitions) independently of the functions of the understanding, but that they are wrong with regard to non-conceptualised intuition being synthesised content in Kant’s sense. Kantian conceptualists (Bowman 2011; Griffith 2012; Gomes 2014) have responded to the recent nonconceptualist offensive, with reference to A89ff./B122ff. (§13)—which, confusingly, the nonconceptualists also cite as evidence for their contrary reading—by arguing that the nonconceptualist view conflicts with the central goal of the Transcendental Deduction, namely, to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I contend that the conceptualist reading of A89ff./B122ff. is unfounded, but also that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer strictly to objects independently of the functions of the understanding, and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis. I argue that Kant is a conceptualist, albeit not in the sense that standard conceptualists assume. Perceptual knowledge is always judgemental, though without this resulting in the standard conceptualist claim that, necessarily, all intuitions or all perceptions per se stand under the categories (strong conceptualism). I endorse the nonconceptualist view that, for Kant, perception per se, i.e. any mere or ‘blind’ intuition of objects (i.e. objects as indeterminate appearances) short of perceptual knowledge, does not necessarily stand under the categories. Perception is not yet perceptual knowledge. In this context, I point out the common failure in the literature on the Transcendental Deduction, both of the conceptualist and nonconceptualist stripe, to take account of the modal nature of Kant’s argument for the relation between intuition and concept insofar as cognition should arise from it

Photosynthèse d'une culture en rangs de tomates sous serre. Modélisation analytique et cartographie de l'activité du feuillage

Afin de fournir les éléments d'une optimisation dynamique de la régulation des différents paramètres climatiques sous serre, un modèle mécaniste du fonctionnement d'un couvert en rangs a été élaboré sur la base du modèle d'interception du rayonnement solaire de Sinoquet (1989), puis calé et validé sur une culture de tomates de printemps. A partir de la connaissance du rayonnement incident au sommet de la culture, de sa répartition en ses composantes directe et diffuse et de la position du soleil, il calcule l'interception du rayonnement en tenant compte des rediffusions, ainsi que de l'activité photosynthétique du couvert. Deux fonctions de réponse photosynthétique foliaire ont été utilisées : - une fonction hyperbolique classique caractérisant les potentialités moyennes de l'ensemble des feuilles de la culture (modèle 1); - une fonction tenant compte de l'âge des feuilles, leurs capacités photosynthétiques étant d'autant plus faibles qu'elles sont âgées (modèle 2). Le calage a été réalisé à partir de mesures de photosynthèse foliaire, la validation avec des mesures in situ de la photosynthèse de plantes entières. Les mesures nécessaires au fonctionnement du modèle (rayonnement, description géométrique de la surface foliaire) ont été faites sur la même culture. La comparaison des simulations et des mesures de photosynthèse du couvert montre une assez bonne adéquation des 2 modèles. Cependant, le modèle avec effet âge sous-estime l'activité du couvert, lorsqu'il est soumis à un fort rayonnement; ce biais peut être attribué à une sous-estimation des capacités photosynthétiques des feuilles âgées. Nous avons simulé l'expérience présentée par Acock et al (1978) où l'activité de couches de feuilles d'âges différents a été mesurée par effeuillages successifs. Le modèle 2, avec effet âge, conduit à une photosynthèse équivalente, mais répartie différemment, essentiellement réalisée par la couche supérieure. La sous-estimation des capacités photosynthétiques des feuilles âgées apparaît nettement.Photosynthesis of a greenhouse row crop of tomatoes. Development of an analytical model and mapping of foliage activity. On the basis of the solar radiation interception model of Sinoquet (1989), we developed a mechanistic model of the photosynthesis of a row crop, to be used for the dynamic optimization of greenhouse climate. This model was calibrated and validated on a spring tomato crop. The canopy is divided into units of assumed uniform leaf area density, leaf angle distribution and photosynthetic PAR response. This division can be made along 2 or 3 axes, thus allowing variability along the rows to be accounted for the rows as well as across them (fig 1). From the input of incident diffuse and direct radiation on top of the canopy, the model computes, for each canopy unit, the leaf area distribution with respect to PAR interception, taking into account multiple diffusions, and photosynthetic activity. The canopy carbon gain is then computed as the sum of the unit values. Two leaf photosynthetic light-response functions were used: - one single hyperbolic function to describe the mean activity of all the leaves of the crop (model 1); - one function which includes a reduction factor proportional to leaf age, with the lowest photosynthetic rate for the oldest leaves. Measures of leaf photosynthesis were used to calibrate the model; the validation was made with in situ measures of whole-plant CO2 exchanges done under different radiative conditions (fig 2). Incident irradiance and canopy structure measurements were also performed on the same crop, and used in the model. Comparing in situ measures of crop photosynthesis with simulated data shows a good predictive value of both models, although the model with a leaf age effect under-estimates crop photosynthesis under high irradiance (fig 3). We analyzed the interaction between the date and hour of photosynthesis measurement on the residuals of the models (fig 4) and we compared the simulations performed with the two models (fig 5). From this analysis, we concluded that the under estimation of crop assimilation by model 2 is mainly due to a too high reduction factor for the oldest leaves. We simulated the experiment in which Acock et al (1978) measured the photosynthetic activity of canopy layers of different leaf age by successive partial defoliations (fig 6). Model 2, including a leaf age effect, computes a value of crop photosynthesis similar to that mesured by Acock et al (1978) but the distribution among the crop layers is distorted; the under-estimation of the activity of the older leaves is clearly shown

Temperature nocturne et photosynthese. II. Une chambre d'assimilation climatisee pour la mesure des echanges gazeux de plantes entieres

National audienceThe paper describes a set of two assimilation chambers with independent regulation of air and soil temperature, as well for night as for day conditions. In these chambers, the gaseous exchange of the tops and possibly the roots of whole plants up to 1 meter high, can be measured continuously for several days.Pour l’étude des arrière-effets de la température nocturne, on a mis au point un ensemble de deux chambres d’assimilation climatisées, avec régulation indépendante des conditions diurnes et nocturnes, séparément pour la partie aérienne et les racines. Ces chambres permettent de suivre pendant plusieurs jours les échanges gazeux de la partie aérienne et, éventuellement, des racines de plantes entières ayant une hauteur maximum de 1 m

Photosynthese d'une culture en rangs de tomates sous serre. Modelisation analytique et cartographie de l'activite du feuillage

National audienceOn the basis of the solar radiation interception model of Sinoquet (1989), we developed a mechanistic model of the photosynthesis of a row crop, to be used for the dynamic optimization of greenhouse climate. This model was calibrated and validated on a spring tomato crop. The canopy is divided into units of assumed uniform leaf area density, leaf angle distribution and photosynthetic PAR response. This division can be made along 2 or 3 axes, thus allowing variability along the rows to be accounted for the rows as well as across them (fig 1). From the input of incident diffuse and direct radiation on top of the canopy, the model computes, for each canopy unit, the leaf area distribution with respect to PAR interception, taking into account multiple diffusions, and photosynthetic activity. The canopy carbon gain is then computed as the sum of the unit values. Two leaf photosynthetic light-response functions were used: - one single hyperbolic function to describe the mean activity of all the leaves of the crop (model 1); - one function which includes a reduction factor proportional to leaf age, with the lowest photosynthetic rate for the oldest leaves. Measures of leaf photosynthesis were used to calibrate the model; the validation was made with in situ measures of whole-plant CO2 exchanges done under different radiative conditions (fig 2). Incident irradiance and canopy structure measurements were also performed on the same crop, and used in the model. Comparing in situ measures of crop photosynthesis with simulated data shows a good predictive value of both models, although the model with a leaf age effect under-estimates crop photosynthesis under high irradiance (fig 3). We analyzed the interaction between the date and hour of photosynthesis measurement on the residuals of the models (fig 4) and we compared the simulations performed with the two models (fig 5). From this analysis, we concluded that the under estimation of crop assimilation by model 2 is mainly due to a too high reduction factor for the oldest leaves. We simulated the experiment in which Acock et al (1978) measured the photosynthetic activity of canopy layers of different leaf age by successive partial defoliations (fig 6). Model 2, including a leaf age effect, computes a value of crop photosynthesis similar to that mesured by Acock et al (1978) but the distribution among the crop layers is distorted; the under-estimation of the activity of the older leaves is clearly shown.Afin de fournir les éléments d’une optimisation dynamique de la régulation des différents paramètres climatiques sous serre, un modèle mécaniste du fonctionnement d’un couvert en rangs a été élaboré sur la base du modèle d’interception du rayonnement solaire de Sinoquet (1989), puis calé et validé sur une culture de tomates de printemps. A partir de la connaissance du rayonnement incident au sommet de la culture, de sa répartition en ses composantes directe et diffuse et de la position du soleil, il calcule l’interception du rayonnement en tenant compte des rediffusions, ainsi que de l’activité photosynthétique du couvert. Deux fonctions de réponse photosynthétique foliaire ont été utilisées : - une fonction hyperbolique classique caractérisant les potentialités moyennes de l’ensemble des feuilles de la culture (modèle 1); - une fonction tenant compte de l’âge des feuilles, leurs capacités photosynthétiques étant d’autant plus faibles qu’elles sont âgées (modèle 2). Le calage a été réalisé à partir de mesures de photosynthèse foliaire, la validation avec des mesures in situ de la photosynthèse de plantes entières. Les mesures nécessaires au fonctionnement du modèle (rayonnement, description géométrique de la surface foliaire) ont été faites sur la même culture. La comparaison des simulations et des mesures de photosynthèse du couvert montre une assez bonne adéquation des 2 modèles. Cependant, le modèle avec effet âge sous-estime l’activité du couvert, lorsqu’il est soumis à un fort rayonnement; ce biais peut être attribué à une sous-estimation des capacités photosynthétiques des feuilles âgées. Nous avons simulé l’expérience présentée par Acock et al (1978) où l’activité de couches de feuilles d’âges différents a été mesurée par effeuillages successifs. Le modèle 2, avec effet âge, conduit à une photosynthèse équivalente, mais répartie différemment, essentiellement réalisée par la couche supérieure. La sous-estimation des capacités photosynthétiques des feuilles âgées apparaît nettement