An analytic approximation to the Diffusion Coefficient for the periodic Lorentz Gas

An approximate stochastic model for the topological dynamics of the periodic triangular Lorentz gas is constructed. The model, together with an extremum principle, is used to find a closed form approximation to the diffusion coefficient as a function of the lattice spacing. This approximation is superior to the popular Machta and Zwanzig result and agrees well with a range of numerical estimates.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figure

Regulatory Effectiveness & Offshore Financial Centers

Onshore jurisdictions, such as the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany, are critical of offshore financial centers (OFCs), such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Channel Islands. Arguments against OFCs include claims that their regulatory oversight is lax, allowing fraud and criminal activity. In this article, we present cross-jurisdictional data, showing that OFCs are not lax. We also provide qualitative analyses of regulatory effectiveness, demonstrating that input-based measures of regulation are inappropriate metrics for comparing jurisdictions. Based on both quantitative input measures and a qualitative assessment, we reject the onshore critique of OFCs as bastions of laxity

Regulatory Effectiveness & Offshore Financial Centers

Onshore jurisdictions, such as the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany, are critical of offshore financial centers (OFCs), such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Channel Islands. Arguments against OFCs include claims that their regulatory oversight is lax, allowing fraud and criminal activity. In this article, we present cross-jurisdictional data, showing that OFCs are not lax. We also provide qualitative analyses of regulatory effectiveness, demonstrating that input-based measures of regulation are inappropriate metrics for comparing jurisdictions. Based on both quantitative input measures and a qualitative assessment, we reject the onshore critique of OFCs as bastions of laxity

What Should Lawyers Know About Economics

To find out what law-and-economics scholars and economists think lawyers should know about economics, we conducted surveys of random samples of members of the American Law and Economics Association and the American Economic Association. We posed two questions to both groups: What do you think are the five most important economic concepts law students ought to learn in a law-and-economics course? Law-and-economics courses sometimes include economics articles in their reading lists. If you could choose up to five articles for such a course, what would they be

What Should Lawyers Know About Economics

To find out what law-and-economics scholars and economists think lawyers should know about economics, we conducted surveys of random samples of members of the American Law and Economics Association and the American Economic Association. We posed two questions to both groups: What do you think are the five most important economic concepts law students ought to learn in a law-and-economics course? Law-and-economics courses sometimes include economics articles in their reading lists. If you could choose up to five articles for such a course, what would they be

Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions

Standard economic analysis of judicial behavior, at least with respect to federal judges, has to some extent foundered on the apparent success of the Constitution\u27s framers in designing an institution where almost the whole thrust of the rules governing compensation and other terms and conditions of judicial employment is to divorce judicial action from incentives. That is, the structure takes away the carrots and sticks and the different benefits and costs associated with different behaviors which inform human action in an economic model. Nonetheless, our earlier empirical work, as well as work by others, found significant associations between promotion potential and judicial decision making in the federal district bench. This earlier work left unclear, however, how district judges might use their positions to enhance their opportunities for advancement. In this paper we examine how federal judges can use the content and outcome of their decisions to signal that they would be appropriate candidates for elevation to a higher court. We first develop a framework that explains how judges can use decisions and opinions to signal to appointing authority. We then test the theory through a detailed examination of federal district judges\u27 behavior in their decisions on the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines during the Sentencing Guidelines Crisis of 1988. Examining judges\u27 decisions to rule through a written opinion, we find evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis. Judges were more likely to use written opinions to communicate their rulings in Sentencing Guidelines cases where the potential for promotion to the circuit court of appeal was greater. We also find that precedent influences outcome but not the particular reasons judges articulate for their decisions[.

Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions

Standard economic analysis of judicial behavior, at least with respect to federal judges, has to some extent foundered on the apparent success of the Constitution\u27s framers in designing an institution where almost the whole thrust of the rules governing compensation and other terms and conditions of judicial employment is to divorce judicial action from incentives. That is, the structure takes away the carrots and sticks and the different benefits and costs associated with different behaviors which inform human action in an economic model. Nonetheless, our earlier empirical work, as well as work by others, found significant associations between promotion potential and judicial decision making in the federal district bench. This earlier work left unclear, however, how district judges might use their positions to enhance their opportunities for advancement. In this paper we examine how federal judges can use the content and outcome of their decisions to signal that they would be appropriate candidates for elevation to a higher court. We first develop a framework that explains how judges can use decisions and opinions to signal to appointing authority. We then test the theory through a detailed examination of federal district judges\u27 behavior in their decisions on the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines during the Sentencing Guidelines Crisis of 1988. Examining judges\u27 decisions to rule through a written opinion, we find evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis. Judges were more likely to use written opinions to communicate their rulings in Sentencing Guidelines cases where the potential for promotion to the circuit court of appeal was greater. We also find that precedent influences outcome but not the particular reasons judges articulate for their decisions[.