The hypothetical consent objection to anti-natalism

Abstract: A very common but untested assumption is that potential children would consent to be exposed to the harms of existence in order to experience its benefits (if it were possible for us to ask and for them to respond). And so, would-be parents might appeal to the following view: Procreation is all-things-considered permissible, as it is morally acceptable for one to knowingly harm an unconsenting patient if one has good reasons for assuming her hypothetical consent—and procreators can indeed reasonably rely on some notion of hypothetical consent. I argue that this view is in error. My argument appeals to a consent-based version of anti-natalism advanced by Seana Valentine Shiffrin. Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. While, like Shiffrin, I stop short of advocating a thoroughgoing anti-natalism, I nevertheless argue that procreators cannot appeal to hypothetical consent to justify exposing children to the harms of existence. I end by suggesting a more promising route by which this justification might be achieved

Human Embryos and Eggs::From long-term storage to biobanking

Genetic relatedness poses significant challenges to traditional practices of medical ethics as concerns the biobanking of human biological samples. In this paper, we first outline the ethical challenges to informed consent and confidentiality as these apply to human biobanks, irrespective of the type of tissue being stored. We argue that the shared nature of genetic information has clear implications for informed consent, and the identifying nature of biological samples and information has clear implications for promises of confidentiality. Next, with regard to the special case of biobanking human embryos and eggs, we consider issues arising from: first, the type of tissues being stored; second, the use to which these tissues are put; and third, how this plays out given the shared and identifying nature of these tissues. Specifically, we examine the differences between human bodily tissues and human reproductive tissues focusing on the assumed potential of the reproductive tissues and on the possible greater emotional attachment to these tissues because of their real and imagined kinship. For some donors there may be a sense of family connection with embryos and eggs they once thought of as ‘children-in-waiting’. Finally, we conclude by considering the implications for ethical practice

Explaining variation in Down's syndrome screening uptake: comparing the Netherlands with England and Denmark using documentary analysis and expert stakeholder interviews.

Background: The offer of prenatal Down’s syndrome screening is part of routine antenatal care in most of Europe; however screening uptake varies significantly across countries. Although a decision to accept or reject screening is a personal choice, it is unlikely that the widely differing uptake rates across countries can be explained by variation in individual values alone. The aim of this study was to compare Down’s syndrome screening policies and programmes in the Netherlands, where uptake is relatively low ( 90% respectively), in an attempt to explain the observed variation in national uptake rates. Methods: We used a mixed methods approach with an embedded design: a) documentary analysis and b) expert stakeholder analysis. National central statistical offices and legal documents were studied first to gain insight in demographic characteristics, cultural background, organization and structure of healthcare followed by documentary analysis of primary and secondary sources on relevant documents on DSS policies and programme. To enhance interpretation of these findings we performed in-depth interviews with relevant expert stakeholders. Results: There were many similarities in the demographics, healthcare systems, government abortion legislation and Down’s syndrome screening policy across the studied countries. However, the additional cost for Down’s syndrome screening over and above standard antenatal care in the Netherlands and an emphasis on the ‘right not to know’ about screening in this country were identified as potential explanations for the ‘low’ uptake rates of Down’s syndrome screening in the Netherlands. The social context and positive framing of the offer at the service delivery level may play a role in the relatively high uptake rates in Denmark. Conclusions: This paper makes an important contribution to understanding how macro-level demographic, social and healthcare delivery factors may have an impact on national uptake rates for Down’s syndrome screening. It has suggested a number of policy level and system characteristics that may go some way to explaining the relatively low uptake rates of Down’s syndrome screening in the Netherlands when compared to England and Denmark