Strictly monotonic preferences on continuum of goods commodity spaces

We consider a set K of differentiated commodities. A preference relation on the set of consumption plans is strictly monotonic whenever to consume more of at least one commodity is more preferred. It is an easy task to find examples of strictly monotonic preference relations when K is finite or countable. However, it is not easy for spaces like l[infinity]([0,1]), the space of bounded functions on the unit interval. In this note we investigate the roots of this difficulty. We show that strictly monotonic preferences always exist. However, if K is uncountable no such preference on l[infinity](K) is continuous and none of them have a utility representation.Utility representation Strictly monotonic preferences

An equivalence theorem for a differential information economy

In a pure exchange economy with di_erential information and a finite set of traders, physical commodities and states of nature, we characterize the Walrasian expectations or Radner equilibria by using the veto power of the grand coalition. We prove that an allocation x is a Radner equilibrium allocation if and only if it is"privately non-dominated" by the grand coalition in every economy obtained by perturbing the original initial endowments in the direction of x. The first and second welfare theorems become particular cases of our main result. Since the deterministic Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model is a special case of the di_erential information economy model we also provide a new characterization of the Walrasian equilibria

Characterization and incentive compatibility of walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces

We consider a differential information economy with infinitely many commodities and analyze the veto power of the grand coalition with respect the ability of blocking non-Walrasian expectations equilibrium allocations. We provide two different Walrasian expectations equilibrium equivalence results. First by perturbing the initial endowments in a precise direction we show that an allocation is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium if and only if it is not "privately dominated" by the grand coalition The second characterization deals with the fuzzy veto in the sense of Aubin but within a differential information setting. This second equivalence result provides a different characterization for the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and shows that the grand coalition privately blocks in the sense of Aubin any non Walrasian expectations equilibrium allocation with endowment participation rate arbitrarily close to the total initial endowment participation for every individual. Finally, we show that any no free disposal Walrasian expectations equilibria is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible. Since the deterministic Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model is a special case of the di_erential information economy model, one derives new characterizations of the Walrasian equilibria in economies with infinitely many commodities

On mixed markets with asymmetric information

Asymmetric information economies, Oligopolistic market models, Private core, Aubin private core, Walrasian expectations equilibria, C71, D43, D51, D82,