Privatization and State Capacity in Postcommunist Society

Economists have used cross-national regression analysis to argue that postcommunist economic failure is the result of inadequate adherence liberal economic policies. Sociologists have relied on case study data to show that postcommunist economic failure is the outcome of too close adherence to liberal policy recommendations, which has led to an erosion of state effectiveness, and thus produced poor economic performance. The present paper advances a version of this statist theory based on a quantitative analysis of mass privatization programs in the postcommunist world. We argue that rapid large-scale privatization creates severe supply and demand shocks for enterprises, thereby inducing firm failure. The resulting erosion of tax revenues leads to a fiscal crisis for the state, and severely weakens its capacity and bureaucratic character. This, in turn, reacts back on the enterprise sector, as the state can no longer support the institutions necessary for the effective functioning of a modern economy, thus resulting in deindustrialization. Using cross-national regression techniques we find that the implementation of mass privatization programs negatively impacts measures of economic growth, state capacity and the security of property rights.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40192/3/wp806.pd

Groundwater of Rome

This paper describes the contents of the new Hydrogeological Map of the City of Rome (1:50,000 scale). The map extends to the entire municipality (1285 km2) and is based on both the most recent scientific studies on the groundwater field and new survey activities carried out in order to fill the data gaps in several areas of the examined territory. The map is the result of a combination of different urban groundwater expertise and Geographic Information System (GIS)-based mapping performed using the most recent available data and has been produced with the intention of furnishing the City of Rome with the most recent and updated information regarding groundwater

Monetary union and the Maastricht inflation criterion: the accession countries

We model an accession country facing a Maastricht‐type inflation criterion that specifies an inflation ceiling. In addition to deciding whether or not to satisfy this criterion, the country must decide how much costly economic reform to undertake. If the country puts enough weight on the future that it can credibly meet the inflation criterion no matter what the ceiling is, then the inflation criterion benefits the country but lowers reform. If the country puts less weight on the future, then a criterion with a properly chosen inflation ceiling can increase reform. We derive the inflation ceilings that maximize the country's welfare and its reform