The Recognition Theory of Rights, Customary International Law and Human Rights

This article addresses the most fundamental question in the philosophy of rights. If there are any moral rights, where do they come from and how do we acquire them? The difficulty of answering the question is compounded when asked in relation to universal rights and obligations where the international community in which they function is far less solidarist than at the domestic level. The suggestion is that while answers that presuppose something about the ontology of the person, such as an emphasis on basic needs, or inherent human dignity, are prevalent, they are a convenient fiction. It is contended that the rights recognition thesis, typically associated with British Idealism, is best exemplified with reference to common law theory, and customary international law, and provides a far more adequate account of what it means to have universal rights and obligations. It is suggested that customary international law functions in a similar way to how natural law used to function. The article concludes by emphasising the importance of customary international law in articulating the universal obligations of states and holding them to account for their actions. It addresses the question of what it means to have a universal right, and not what universal rights it is desirable to have

`Death to Tyrants': The political philosophy of tyrannicide - Part I

This paper examines the conceptual development of the philosophical justifications for tyrannicide. It posits that the political philosophy of tyrannicide can be categorised into three distinct periods or models, the classical, medieval, and liberal, respectively. It argues that each model contained unique themes and principles that justified tyrannicide in that period; the classical, through the importance attached to public life and the functional role of leadership; the medieval, through natural law doctrine; and the liberal, through the postulates of social contract theory. Subsequent analysis of these different models however, reveals that these historical models are unable to provide a sufficient philosophical basis for a contemporary justification of tyrannicide. In Part II, it will be contended that a reinvigorated conception of self-defence, a theme common to all three models, when coupled with the modern notion of universal human rights, may provide the foundation for a contemporary theory of tyrannicide