Collective identities, European solidarity : identification patterns and preferences for European social Insurance

A degree of collective identity is often perceived to be a requirement for integration of core state powers, and even more so when redistributive measures are at stake. Existing research has shown that European identity is an important correlate of support for European social policy in general. This article explores the ways in which collective identities relate to the multidimensional nature of social policy at the European level. We explore in particular the features of European social policy that receive the most support from European publics, and how local, national and European identity moderates these preferences. We expect that people who have primarily sub-national or national attachments are less supportive of generous schemes and schemes that involve greater cross-country redistribution, and are more in favour of decentralized schemes administered by the member states than those with stronger European identities. We find support for these expectations in a conjoint survey experiment fielded in autumn 2018 in 13 EU member states

Financial Liberalisation and Political Variables: a response to Abiad and Mody

We challenge recent findings by Abiad and Mody (2005) which suggest that financial liberalization has little to do with political variables. This analysis is at odds with some of the established literature, and only with difficulty comes to terms with the considerable cross-national variation in the pace, phasing, and extent of financial reforms over time. Using Abiad and Mody's own index of financial liberalization, but slightly unbundling and refining their measures of 'ideological affinity' and 'regime type', we examine what Abiad and Mody call the 'triggers' of liberalisation and the dynamics of the subsequent 'cumulative transformation'. We demonstrate the role of political variables in relation to initial liberalisation episodes, and as variables affecting the cumulative dynamics and sustainability of ongoing financial reform processes, including those which affect the acceptability and costs of liberalization. These factors include (i) shifts to - as opposed to levels in - Left government; (ii) the incidence of Left governments combined with low levels of democracy; (iii) international voter support for free markets; (iv) the extent of social safety nets; (v) the presence of multilateral and bilateral aid programs. Our empirical investigation confirms these factors as statistically significant determinants of financial liberalization, and reveal what Abiad and Mody identify as 'learning' to be a highly political process.

The retreat of the west

The West is turning inward. Donald Trump’s presidency, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, and the spread of populist parties in Europe are the most visible signs of this retreat. The shift is not as recent as these examples suggest, however. In this paper, we show that Western governments’ support for liberal internationalism has been receding in important ways for over fifteen years, and argue that this trend is best understood as part of a larger “hollowing out” of the political center in Western democracies. Drawing on an array of cross-national data for industrialized democracies and for hundreds of political parties in those democracies, we document the erosion of Western government and party support for liberal internationalism from its Cold War apex, through the 2008 global economic downturn, and to the present. We show that this erosion in Western governments’ support for liberal internationalism corresponds to a steady weakening of mainstream parties’ electoral strength across OECD countries, and hence, to their declining policy-making influence. The erosion of the “vital center” has opened up political space for radical-right and radical-left parties which have been the vehicles of the current backlash against liberal internationalism. We discuss the implications of these trends for the future of the Western liberal international order and strategies now on offer to repair it

Sources and Legitimacy of Financial Liberalization

This article seeks to clarify how we understand domestic and international sources of globalization and specifically how we explain financial liberalization across countries. The article also develops our understanding of the underlying legitimacy of financial liberalization. We debate e.g. Abiad and Mody (2005) and others who have found political factors to have little impact on financial openness. Using the same data undergirding such conclusions we argue, in contrast, that even a slight broadening of the political variables employed in the model and much closer attention to “input” and “output” aspects of the political legitimacy of financial liberalization over time reveal a more central role for politics in shaping liberalization. Input legitimacy involves the representation of stakeholders in initial and ongoing decisions to liberalize, while “output” legitimacy concerns liberalization’s distributional consequences and management thereof over time. Several empirical measures of domestic-national and international political factors plausibly influence such aspects of legitimacy and are found to play a significant role in shaping liberalization, suggesting legitimation politics to be more important to financial openness than existing studies have typically acknowledged.financial openness; liberalization dynamics; financial regulation; political legitimacy; political variables; financial reform

Financial Liberalisation and Political Variables: a response to Abiad and Mody

We challenge recent findings by Abiad and Mody (2005) which suggest that financial liberalization has little to do with political variables. This analysis is at odds with some of the established literature, and only with difficulty comes to terms with the considerable cross-national variation in the pace, phasing, and extent of financial reforms over time. Using Abiad and Mody’s own index of financial liberalization, but slightly unbundling and refining their measures of ‘ideological affinity’ and ‘regime type’, we examine what Abiad and Mody call the ‘triggers’ of liberalisation and the dynamics of the subsequent ‘cumulative transformation’. We demonstrate the role of political variables in relation to initial liberalisation episodes, and as variables affecting the cumulative dynamics and sustainability of ongoing financial reform processes, including those which affect the acceptability and costs of liberalization. These factors include (i) shifts to – as opposed to levels in – Left government; (ii) the incidence of Left governments combined with low levels of democracy; (iii) international voter support for free markets; (iv) the extent of social safety nets; (v) the presence of multilateral and bilateral aid programs. Our empirical investigation confirms these factors as statistically significant determinants of financial liberalization, and reveal what Abiad and Mody identify as ‘learning’ to be a highly political process.

EU solidarity and policy in fighting infectious diseases: state of play, obstacles, citizen preferences and ways forward

In this paper we confront the role the EU traditionally plays in the domain of health with the urgent need for collective action triggered by the corona virus pandemic. In the face of such a crisis, we argue that the joint procurement, stockpiling and allocation of medical countermeasures is a key component of true European solidarity, besides maintaining the integrity of the Single Market. We present the first results of a survey experiment taken before the current crisis on citizens’ attitudes towards centralizing at the EU level of policies to combat infectious diseases, which indicates considerable support. We conclude that a more robust policy framework with substantial centralization of procurement, stockpiling and allocation is warranted

The Problem with Trade Measurement in International Relations

Trade statistics are widely used in studies and policymaking focused on economic interdependence. Yet, researchers in International Relations (IR) have largely disregarded half the data available to study trade. Bilateral trade flows are usually recorded twice: by the sending economy as an export and by the receiving one as an import. These two values should match, but discrepancies between them tend to be large and pervasive. Most studies ignore this issue, which we label the “mirror problem” for short, by using only one entry. However, it is not self-evident which one is consistently most accurate. Hence, IR's reliance on error-prone trade statistics may be distorting its study of economic interdependence. This article explores this problem in three steps: first, we quantify the mirror problem in trade data. Second, we investigate the origins of the mirror problem, using statistical analyses, archival records, and interviews with statistical experts. Third, we illustrate the implications of the mirror problem through replications covering diverse topics in IR. We find that accounting for the mirror problem can variably strengthen, undermine, or overturn conclusions of such analyses. The findings underscore the severity of measurement problems in IR and suggest particular ways to address those problems

Globalisation and automation as sources of labour-market competition, and support for European Union unemployment insurance

Societies and economies are experiencing deep and intertwined structural changes that may unsettle the perceptions European citizens have of their economic and employment security. Such labour-market perceptions are likely in turn to alter people’s political positions. For instance, those worried by labour-market competition may prefer greater social protection to compensate for the accrued risk, or might prefer more closed economies where external borders provide protection (or the illusion of protection). We test these expectations with a conjoint experiment in 13 European countries on European-level social policy, studying how citizens’ demands align with parties’ political supply. Results broadly corroborate our expectations on the moderating effects of different types of concerns about perceived sources of labour- market competition on the features of preferred European-level social policy

Compensated liberalization : using side payments to humanize and facilitate freer trade in the United States and the European Community

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1998.Includes bibliographical references (p. [577]-[592]).by Brian M. Burgoon.Ph.D

Public support for European cooperation in the procurement, stockpiling and distribution of medicines

Background: The COVID-19 outbreak has heightened ongoing political debate about the international joint procurement of medicines and medical countermeasures. The European Union (EU) has developed what remains largely contractual and decentralized international procurement cooperation. The corona crisis has broadened and deepened public debate on such cooperation, in particular on the scope of cooperation, solidarity in the allocation of such cooperation, and delegation of cooperative decision-making. Crucial to political debate about these issues are public attitudes that constrain and undergird international cooperation. Methods: Our survey includes a randomized survey experiment (conjoint analysis) on a representative sample in five European countries in March 2020, informed by legal and policy debate on medical cooperation. Respondents choose and rate policy packages containing randomized mixes of policy attributes with respect to the scope of medicines covered, the solidarity in conferring priority access and the level of delegation. Results: In all country populations surveyed, the experiment reveals considerable popular support for European cooperation. Significant majorities preferred cooperation packages with greater rather than less scope of medicines regulated; with priority given to most in-need countries; and with delegation to EU-level rather than national expertise. Conclusion: Joint procurement raises delicate questions with regard to its scope, the inclusion of cross-border solidarity and the delegation of decision-making, that explain reluctance toward joint procurement among political decision-makers. This research shows that there is considerable public support across different countries in favor of centralization, i.e. a large scope and solidarity in the allocation and delegation of decision-making