Antinomy of the Void

The paper commences by trying to articulate what is arguably the key epistemological deadlock of the void. The first hypothesis of the paper is namely that the epistemological problem of the void is not merely encompassed within the traditional argument that the void in itself is unthinkable. Apart from being unthinkable, and in seeming contradiction to its first determination, the void is also necessarily thought of as necessary. This necessity is linked to the concept of matter. The more precise way of articulating the deadlock is namely this: although the void “in itself” is indeed unthinkable, a certain spontaneous logical necessity nonetheless exists, which in any attempt to ontologically conceptualize matter qua matter compels us to think of the void either as necessarily present, or as necessarily identical to matter itself. This is what we term the antinomy of the void. The antinomy can be at least partially resolved, though, by an approach that we term “reversed transcendentalism”. This approach consists of finding a solution to the deadlock at its abstract level by showing that the two seemingly contradictory negative determinations of the void (unthinkable as well as necessarily thought of), can be reversed into some sort of proof that a minimal pinning of the void to a thought does exist. In the remainder of the paper the focus shifts to the more concrete aspects of this antinomy, which entail elements of the philosophies of the Greek atomists, Badiou, Aristotle, and Plato

Misel večnega vračanja v Nietzschejevem zvezku M III.: Začetki doktrine in sledi njenega molka

The article is primarily a study of Nietzsche’s unpublished fragments from the period spring-autumn 1881, in which Nietzsche first developed his thought of the “eternal recurrence of the same.” In the article, I attempt to accomplish two goals: the first goal is to explain Nietzsche’s theses on the eternal recurrence, which at that time were still remarkably clear and coherent. And the second goal is to try to find in these same theses an explanation for their future silence. In other words, the article examines the relationship between Nietzsche’s theses that he developed in 1881 and his book Thus spoke Zarathustra, which, in Nietzsche’s own words, relies on these theses as their “grounding thought,” but nevertheless never fully reveals them. Both lines of inquiry lead to the conclusion that the core of Nietzsche’s introduction of the idea of eternal recurrence is his concept of Einverleibung or embodiment. Indeed, the analysis shows that Nietzsche’s main concern with the thought of eternal recurrence was not to set forth its clear articulation within consciousness, but rather to construct it in such a way that it could become an unconscious instinct capable of gradually displacing the “embodied mistakes” that dominate our thinking from within itself.Članek je prvenstveno študija Nietzschejevih neobjavljenih fragmentov iz obdobja pomlad – jesen 1881, v katerih je Nietzsche prvič vpeljal svojo misel večnega vračanja enakega. V prispevku si zastavljam dva cilja: prvi cilj je razlaga Nietzschejevih tez o večnem vračanju, ki so bile v tej fazi še presenetljivo jasne in koherentne. In drugi cilj je: v samih teh tezah poskusiti poiskati pojasnilo njihovega bodočega molka. Z drugimi besedami, prispevek je raziskava razmerja med tezami, ki jih je Nietzsche razvil leta 1881, in knjigo Tako je govoril Zaratustra, ki se, po Nietzschejevih lastnih besedah, opira na te teze kot na svojo »temeljno misel«, a jih, kljub temu, nikoli v celoti ne razkrije. Obe smeri raziskave vodita do zaključka, da jedro Nietzschejeve vpeljave ideje večnega vračanja tvori njegov pojem Einverleibung, oziroma utelesitev. Analiza namreč pokaže, da srž Nietzschejevega prizadevanja okoli misli večnega vračanja ni v tem, kako je to misel mogoče jasno artikulirati znotraj zavesti, temveč prej, kako jo izoblikovati na način, ki bi omogočal, da bi postala nezaveden instinkt, ki bi postopoma lahko spodrinil »utelešene zmote«, katere od znotraj obvladujejo naše mišljenje

Bosnia’s Paradox: The Irony of External Pressure within Consociational Democracy

The merits of consociational democracy as a suitable approach in achieving stabilization in plural societies, especially societies deeply divided along ethnic lines, have come under fire in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This paper argues that the consociational approach enshrined in the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the Bosnian conflict in 1995, has been unable to fulfill the stabilizing potential due to the active interference of international institutions. Too frequently international actors have offered “quick fixes” to heal Bosnia; however, in attempting to reform, international figures undermine the existing consociational framework. This is the irony of prolonged intervention. A mathematical proof of accommodation by consociational logic further accentuates this claim by demonstrating that the problem is not with consociationalism, but rather with outside intervention

Effects of brassinolide on the growing of rice plants

Brassinosteroids are plant steroid hormones that are essential for plant growth. When germinated rice seeds were treated with brassinolide (BL), stems were elongated and root spiral formation was observed at 5 nM of BL. Such root spiral formation was not induced by other plant hormones such as auxin and gibberellin. Since weak non-steroidal brassinolide-like compound (NSBR1) also induced spiral formation, this root spiral induction can be used as the index in the search for BL-like compounds

Saving private One

Based upon analysis of some fragments of Plato and Thomas Aquinas, the paper critically and provocatively questions the role that Badiou ascribes to the notion of One in philosophy after Plato, that is, the role of the secret God of metaphysics that has supposedly never really released its iron grip on non-mathematical ontology. Further on the paper polemically questions the mere perception of Greek philosophy as being based on a finite ontology. In the last part, the author briefly presents a hypothesis on the role of One in Parmenides, and tries to show that there is in fact no necessary continuity between One in Parmenides’ philosophy and the mystical One of Akhenaton pantheistic monotheism.Zasnovana kot analiza nekaterih fragmentov Platona in Tomaža Akvinskega, študija kritično in provokativno preizprašuje vlogo, ki jo Badiou pripisuje pojmu Enega v postplatonski filozofiji, torej vlogo skritega Boga metafizike, ki nematematičnih ontologij nikoli ni povsem izpustil iz svojega jeklenega prijema. Poleg tega prispevek polemično preizprašuje samo percepcijo grške filozofije kot utemeljene na finitistični ontologiji. V zadnjem delu, avtor na hitro skicira hipotezo o vlogi Enega pri Parmenidu, ter skuša pokazati, da med Enim v Parmenidovi filozofiji in mističnim Enim Ahnetonovega panteističnega monoteizma, de facto ni nujne kontinuitete

Renesančni cogito, ali o okrutnosti objekta

The basic task of the paper is to show that – through its artistic threating of madness and folly – the North European Renaissance developed an entirely new type of certainty, which can be associated with neither ontological argument nor empirical knowledge. On the basis of two examples, the paper develops the argument that this new type of certainty rests solely on an entirely conceptual innovation, defined within the paper as the “Renaissance paradoxical absolute”, and which is generally expressible (and within the paper further elaborated) in terms of the following seemingly contradictory rule: every possible negation of X is either a form or a level of X itself. The thesis of the paper is that this new type of certainty already involves most of the key features of what Žižek names the “hidden obverse” of the Cartesian cogito. Or in other words, the paper aims at showing that in order to “excavate” this hidden obverse or the missing link of Cartesian subjectivity, it is not necessary to involve later philosophy, such as Kant’s, but rather to analyse the epistemological aspects of works such as Bosch’s “Extraction of the Stone of Madness” and Erasmus’s Praise of Folly.Osnovna naloga besedila je v prikazu, da je severno renesančna umetnost prek obravnave norosti in neumnosti razvila povsem nov tip gotovosti, ki ga ni moč povezati, ne z ontološkim argumentom, ne z empirično vednostjo. V članku na podlagi dveh primerov razvijemo argument, da ta nov tip gotovosti v celoti sloni na pojmovni invenciji, ki jo v prispevku imenujemo »renesančni paradoksalni absolut«, in jo je mogoče izraziti v obliki navidez protislovnega pravila: vse možne negacije X so forme ali stopnje samega X. Teza članka je, da ta tip renesančne gotovosti v sebi že vključuje večino komponent tega, kar Žižek imenuje »skrito nasprotje« kartezijanskega cogita. Oziroma z drugimi besedami, v članku skušamo pokazati, da za »izkopavanje« tega »skritega nasprotja« oziroma manjkajočega člena kartezijanske subjektivnosti, ni nujna vključitev kasnejših filozofij, kot je denimo Kantova, ampak predvsem analiza epistemoloških vidikov umetniških del kot sta Boscheva »Ekstrakcija kamna norosti« in Erazmova Hvalnica Norosti

Nietzsche, krutost, mazohizem, genealogija

The paper is primarily devoted to Nietzsche’s account of cruelty, which represents an indispensable key to understanding Nietzsche’s genealogical project in many of its essential aspects. This study is complemented by parallels with two other outstanding intellectual figures of the late nineteenth century: Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch. Dostoevsky wrote that “civilisation has made mankind if not more bloodthirsty, at least more vilely, more loathsomely bloodthirsty.” Nietzsche went a step further in this assessment: not only does civilisation not make us immune to cruelty, but it must itself be seen to emerge directly from cruelty at every significant step it has taken. What brings Nietzsche close to Masoch, on the other hand, is the fact that these historical or even prehistorical developments that have shaped humankind and civilisation are not only related to cruelty, but must be observed as various forms of the internalisation (“spiritualisation”, “deification”) of cruelty. The core of the study is devoted to analyses of different forms and aspects of Nietzsche’s concept of the internalisation of cruelty (in relation to power-relations, subject-object relations, mutations of pleasure, and perversions).Prispevek se prvenstveno posveča Nietzschejevi obravnavi okrutnosti, ki v številnih bistvenih pogledih predstavlja nenadomestljiv ključ za razumevanje Nietzschejevega genealoškega projekta. Ta študija je dopolnjena z vzporednicami s še dvema izstopajočima intelektualnima figurama poznega devetnajstega stoletja: Fjodorjem Mihajlovičem Dostojevskim in Leopoldom von Sacher-Masochom. Dostojevski je zapisal: »če človek zaradi civilizacije ni postal bolj krvoločen, je postal pa vsaj huje, odvratneje krvoločen.« Nietzsche je šel v tej oceni še korak dlje: ne le, da nas civilizacije ne naredi imune za okrutnost, pač pa je treba dojeti kako se sama, na vseh svojih odločilnih korakih, neposredno izrašča iz okrutnosti. Kar Nietzscheja po drugi strani povezuje z Masochom, je dejstvo, da vsi ti zgodovinski in celo predzgodovinski procesi, ki so izoblikovali človeštvo in civilizacijo, niso samo povezani z okrutnostjo, temveč jih moramo razumeti kot različne oblike ponotranjenja (»poduhovljenja«, »božanstvenja«) okrutnosti. Jedro študije je posvečeno analizam različnih oblik in vidikov Nietzschejevega koncepta ponotranjenje okrutnosti (v relaciji do razmerij moči, razmerja subjekt-objekt, mutacij užitka in perverzij)

Mi, ki je nič, in nič, ki je mi. Hegel in Nietzsche

The article analyzes three constellations of the notion we – one coming from Hegel and two from Nietzsche. Their common feature is that in their inner sense, they should not be understood as something that designates a group of people, but rather instead as three different structures of nothing. By developing them, the author attempts to grasp some of the key differences between the two philosophical endeavors.Članek obravnava tri konstelacije pojma mi: Heglovo in dve Nietzschejevi. Skupna točka vseh treh je, da v svojem najnotranjejšem pomenu ne označujejo neke skupine ljudi – vas mene in nje tam levo zgoraj, ampak svoj smisel dosežejo tam, kjer jih je potrebno misliti kot tri različne strukture niča. Avtor poskuša skozi njihovo razvitje izpostaviti nekatere odločilne ločnice med obema filozofijama