RESOURCE OR NUISANCE? MANAGING AFRICAN ELEPHANTS AS A MULTI-USE SPECIES

Increasing human interference with natural systems causes us to re-think our perception of wildlife species and the economic choices society makes with regards to their management. Accordingly, we generalize existing 'bioeconomic' models by proposing an economically-based classification of species. The theoretical model is applied to the case of African elephant management. We demonstrate that the classification of the steady state population of a species depends on both species' density and economic factors. Our main results are threefold. First, we demonstrate the classification-dependent possibility of multiple equilibria and perverse comparative statics for multi-use species. Second, upon comparing the optimal stock of a multi-use species to the stock under an open access regime, we find that the ranking in terms of abundance is ambiguous. Finally, and consistent with existing literature on resource management in a second-best world, our case study supports the idea that trade measures have ambiguous effects on wildlife abundance under open access.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Kings and Vikings: On the Dynamics of Competitive Agglomeration

This paper studies the Viking age – the roughly 300 year period beginning in 800 AD – from the perspective of the economics of conflict. The Viking age is interesting because throughout the time period, the scale of conflict increased – small scale raiding behaviour eventually evolved into large scale clashes between armies. With this observation in mind, we present a theoretical model describing the incentives both the defending population and the invading population had to agglomerate into larger groups to better defend against attacks, and engage in attacks, respectively. The result is what might be called a theory of competitive agglomeration. We also apply our model in assessing the factors behind the onset of Vikings raids at the end of the 8th century.

The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings

We critically evaluate the empirical basis for the so-called resource curse and find that, despite the topic’s popularity in economics and political science research, this apparent paradox is a red herring. The most commonly used measure of ‘resource abundance’ can be more usefully interpreted as a proxy for ‘resource dependence’—endogenous to underlying institutional factors. In multiple estimations that combine resource abundance and dependence, institutional and constitutional variables, we find that (i) resource abundance, constitutions and institutions determine resource dependence, (ii) resource dependence does not affect growth, and (iii) resource abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality.Natural resource curse, economic growth, growth regressions, political regimes, institutions, constitutions

Positional spending and status seeking in rural China

Focusing on a remote area in rural China, we use a panel census of households in 26 villages to show that socially observable spending has risen sharply in recent years. We demonstrate that such spending by households is highly sensitive to social spending by other villagers. This suggests that social spending is either positional in nature (that is, motivated by status concerns) or subject to herding behavior. We also document systematic relations between social spending and changes in higher order terms of the income distribution. In particular, and consistent with theories of rank-based status seeking, we find the poor increase spending on gifts as the income distribution tightens so that local competition for status intensifies. In addition families of unmarried men (who face grim marriage prospects given China’s high sex ratios, especially in poor areas) intensify their competition for status by increasing their spending on weddings. The welfare implications of spending in order to “keep up with the Joneses” are potentially large, particularly for poor households.Positional spending, Poverty, Rural-urban linkages, status,

A NOTE ON HIGH DISCOUNT RATES AND DEPLETION OF PRIMARY FORESTS

Conventional wisdom implies that high discount rates accelerate depletion of tropical forests. As shown in this article, this result does not necessarily hold in a two-state variable model that distinguishes between primary and secondary forest stocks. In the context of a fixed concession period and imperfect government control, logging of primary forests may be both accelerated and depressed as discount rates increase.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Can We Improve the Impact of Microfinance?:A Survey of the Recent Literature and Potential Avenues for Success

By surveying the latest literature, this chapter aims to contribute to the recent discussion on the successes and failures of microfinance. We argue that the question “does microfinance work?” is neither important nor informative. What matters is knowing when, and in which conditions, microfinance works—and for whom. We claim that the answers to these questions depend on the details of the microcredit contract as well as on the range of services that microfinance institutions provide (including non-financial ones). We point at two important reasons why the impact of several microcredit programs is lower than expected: (1) the rigidness of credit contracts, and (2) the human capital of end-users. As reforming contract terms and building human capital via business training and technical assistance are costly, we argue that perhaps subsidies are needed. We focus on studies dealing with end-users, and pay specific attention to the evolving discussion on group lending and the role of joint liability to reduce asymmetric information problems and improve repayment rates. We also discuss the literature focusing on the recent shift of several microfinance institutions to individual lending, and the related trend toward commercialization of microfinance

Coevolutionary Investments in Human Speech and Trade

We propose a novel explanation for the emergence of language in modern humans, and the lack thereof in other hominids. A coevolutionary process, where trade facilitates speech and speech facilitates trade, driven by expectations and potentially influenced by geography, gives rise to multiple stable development trajectories. While the trade-speech equilibrium is not an inevitable outcome for modern humans, we do find that it is a relatively likely result given that our species evolved in Africa under climatic conditions supporting relatively high population densities.Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

Competitive Exclusion, Diversification, and the Origins of Agriculture

The beginnings of agriculture, or the agricultural revolution, is now recognized to be the widespread adoption of known practices – a change in behavior – as opposed to a phenomenon of discovery and innovation. In this paper, we combine elements of three theories—climate change, property rights, and competitive exclusion—to create a paleoeconomic model of agriculture and its diffusion. We focus on climate change as a necessary trigger, which combined with group property rights and competitive exclusion processes produced conditions sufficient for the diffusion of early agriculture. In contrast to other models in which farming emerges as technological progress or climate makes it a more productive option than hunting, farming emerges in our model even if farmers are poor hunters and cannot sustain themselves with agriculture alone. Moreover, the strategy of farming can invade the system even if farmers initially generate lower per capita consumption than hunters. The key is that the simple innovation of property rights over an immobile resource can help to insulate farmers from competitive ecological pressures.Farm Management, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Horticultural Households Profit Optimization and the Efficiency of Labour Contract Choice

In agriculture, the coexistence of different forms of land tenancy or labour contract has been explained so far by several theories related to Marshallian inefficiency, incentives, risk sharing, and transaction costs, including supervision costs. These theories and the empirical evidences have greatly contributed to explain the reasons behind land tenancy or labour contract choice. This study follows up on this. Moreover, it intends to take a further step by focusing particularly on the production technologies at plot level, and by designing and testing a theoretical model based on household profit optimization. This model will take into account the supervision costs of labour (i) to compare optimum profit derived from plots based on household labour, a sharecropping labour contract, and a wage labour contract, controlling for irrigation equipment (ii) to test the efficiency of the labour contract choice using data from Senegal’s horticultural zone. As expected, the production elasticity of labour decreases when improved irrigation equipment like a motor pump is used. The technology displays an increasing return to scale on plots without a motor pump and a constant return to scale on plots irrigated with a motor pump. While on plots without a motor pump the sharecropping contract is the efficient labour contract choice, leading to a higher optimum profit for the household, on plots irrigated with a motor pump, the wage contract is the best labour contract choice. Consequently, we can conclude from this finding that the use of a motor pump drives out the sharecropping contract in favour of household labour and the wage labour contract.land tenancy, labour, sharecropping, wage, contract, supervision, household, profit optimization, efficient, irrigation equipment, horticulture, Senegal, Agricultural Finance,

Natural resources and violent conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars

In this paper we examine the claim that natural resources invite civil conflict, and challenge the main stylized facts in this literature. We find that the conventional measure of resource dependence is endogenous with respect to conflict, and that instrumenting for dependence implies that it is no longer significant in conflict regressions. Instead, it appears that conflict increases dependence on resource extraction (as a default sector). Moreover, resource abundance is associated with a reduced probability of the onset of war. These results are robust to a range of specifications and, considering the conflict channel, we conclude there is no reason to regard resources as a general curse to peace and developmen