54 research outputs found

    A political economy of the separation of electoral origin

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    Political constitutions frequently separate the roles of proposer and veto player in policymaking processes. A fundamental distinction lies in whether both offices are subject to direct and separate election, or whether the voter instead may directly elect the holder of only one office. In the latter case, the voter constitutionally forfeits a degree of ex-post electoral control. Why should she benefit from such a relatively coarse electoral instrument? When politicians' abilities are private information, actions taken by one agent provide information to the voter about both agents' types. A system in which the electoral fate of these agents is institutionally fused reduces the incentives of the veto player to build reputation through the specious rejection of the proposer's policy initiatives. This can improve the voter's inference about the types of politicians and her welfare, relative to a system in which the survival of the veto player is institutionally separated from that of the proposer

    Reelection and renegotiation : the political economy of international agreements

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    We study dynamic international agreements when one of the negotiating parties faces a threat of electoral replacement during negotiations, when agreements made before the election are the starting point for any subsequent renegotiation, and when governments cannot commit to future negotiation strategies. Conflicts of interest between governments may be softened or intensified by the governments’ conflicts of interest with voters. We characterize when the threat of electoral turnover strengthens the prospect for successful negotiations, when it may cause negotiations to fail, and how it affects the division of the surplus from cooperation. We also show how changes in domestic politics—including uncertainty about the preferences of domestic political parties—affect a domestic government’s ability to extract greater concessions in negotiations

    The race to the base

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    We study multi-district legislative elections between two office-seeking parties when the election pits a relatively strong party against a weaker party ; when each party faces uncertainty about how voter preferences will evolve during the campaign; and, when each party cares not only about winning a majority, but also about its share of seats in the event that it holds majority or minority status. When the initial imbalance favoring one party is small, each party targets the median voter in the median district, in pursuit of a majority. When the imbalance is moderate, the advantaged party continues to hold the centre-ground, but the disadvantaged party retreats to target its core supporters; it does so to fortify its minority share of seats in the likely event that it fails to secure a majority. Finally, when the imbalance is large, the advantaged party advances toward its opponent, raiding its moderate supporters in pursuit of an outsized majority

    The race to the base

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    We study multi-district legislative elections between two office-seeking parties when one party has an initial valence advantage that may shift and even reverse during the campaign; and, each party cares not only about winning a majority, but also about its share of seats. When the initial imbalance favoring one party is small, each party targets the median voter. For moderate imbalances, the advantaged party maintains the centre-ground, but the disadvantaged party retreats to target its core supporters; and for large imbalances, the advantaged party advances toward its opponent, raiding its moderate supporters in pursuit of an outsized majority

    The Politics of Bargaining as a Group

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    We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the "agent") in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over agreements and are uncertain about the agent’s resolve. We show that all group members favor more aggressive proposals than they would if they were negotiating alone. By eliciting more information about the agent’s resolve, these offers reduce the group members’ uncertainty about the agent’s preferences and therefore reduce the group’s internal conflicts over its negotiating strategy. To mitigate the consequent risk that negotiations fail, decisive group members successively give up their influence over proposals: starting from any initially democratic decision process, the group eventually consolidates its entire negotiation authority into the hands of a single member

    Standard care informed by the result of a placental growth factor blood test versus standard care alone in women with reduced fetal movement at or after 36+0 weeks’ gestation: a pilot randomised controlled trial

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    BackgroundBiomarkers of placental function can potentially aid the diagnosis and prediction of pregnancy complications. This randomised controlled pilot trial assessed whether for women with reduced fetal movement (RFM), intervention directed by the measurement of a placental biomarker in addition to standard care was feasible and improved pregnancy outcome compared with standard care alone.MethodsWomen aged 16–50 years presenting at eight UK maternity units with RFM between 36+0 and 41+0 weeks’ gestation with a viable singleton pregnancy and no indication for immediate delivery were eligible. Participants were randomised 1:1 in an unblinded manner to standard care and a biomarker blood test result revealed and acted on (intervention arm) or standard care where the biomarker result was not available (control arm). The objectives were to determine the feasibility of a main trial by recruiting 175–225 participants over 9 months and to provide proof of concept that informing care by measurement of placental biomarkers may improve outcome. Feasibility was assessed via the number of potentially eligible women, number recruited, reasons for non-recruitment and compliance. Proof of concept outcomes included the rates of the induction of labour and caesarean birth, and a composite adverse pregnancy outcome.ResultsOverall, 2917 women presented with RFM ≥ 36 weeks, 352 were approached to participate and 216 (61%) were randomised (intervention n = 109, control n = 107). The main reason for not approaching women was resource/staff issues (n = 1510). Ninety-seven women declined the trial, mainly due to not liking blood tests (n = 24) or not wanting to be in a trial (n = 21). Compliance with the trial interventions was 100% in both arms. Labour was induced in 97 (45%) participants (intervention n = 49, control n = 48), while 17 (9%) had planned caesarean sections (intervention n = 9, control n = 8). Overall, 9 (8%) babies in the intervention arm had the composite adverse pregnancy outcome versus 4 (4%) in the control arm.ConclusionsA main trial using a placental biomarker in combination with delivery, as indicated by the biomarker, in women with RFM is feasible. The frequency of adverse outcomes in this population is low, hence, a large sample size would be required along with consideration of the most appropriate outcome measures
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