Leopold II and the selectorate: an account in contrast to a racial explanation

'Von 1885 bis 1908 war Leopold II nicht nur König von Belgien, sondern auch der Eigentümer des Freien Staates Kongo. Seine Politik in beiden Ländern konnte jedoch verschiedener kaum sein: Während in Belgien die Lebensbedingungen der Menschen verbessert wurden, errichtete Leopold im Kongo eine brutale Tyrannenherrschaft. Der Artikel analysiert die fundamentalen Unterschiede im Regierungsstil mit Hilfe der 'selectorate theory', die die unterschiedlichen Politikergebnisse auf Varianzen der politischen Institutionen zurückführt. Dafür modelliert er regierende Politiker als nutzenmaximierende Akteure, was für den Regierenden zu allererst bedeutet, seine Macht zu erhalten. Im Rahmen von Belgiens Regierungssystem benötigte Leopold II eine breite Anhängerschaft um an der Macht zu bleiben. Im Gegensatz dazu war er im Kongo nur auf eine sehr kleine Gruppe von Unterstützern angewiesen. Um zu zeigen, dass die 'selectorate theory' einer ad hoc Erklärung von Leopolds unterschiedlichen Regierungsstilen z.B. durch Rassismus überlegen ist, wird die fortdauernde Relevanz politischer Institutionen anhand eines Vergleichs mit der Regierungszeit des Kongolosen Mobutu Sese Seko gezeigt.' (Autorenreferat)'From 1885 until 1908 Leopold II was not only the King of Belgium but also the personal owner of the Congo Free State. The policy outcomes during his reign turned out to be fundamentally different in the two countries: Whereas in Belgium he improved living conditions, in the Congo he established a brutal tyranny. This paper analyses the reasons for these different leadership styles of Leopold II by means of the 'selectorate theory'. The selectorate theory explains policy outcomes as a function of governance institutions. It assumes that the ruler maximizes his own utility which means first of all to sustain himself in power. Under Belgium's governmental institutions Leopold II required broad support from the general public but in the Congo he only needed a very small group of supporters. To reduce the possibility that Leopold's different leadership styles were caused mainly by racism his period is compared to the reign of the Congolese leader Mobutu Sese Seko.' (author's abstract

The Political Economy of Corporate Fraud: A Theory and Empirical Tests.

Guided by a theory governance known as slectrorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al,2003), we examine how governance structures within publicly traded companies affects corporate performance, the ease with which corporate executives lose their jobs for poor performance, and the incentives of executives to misstate corporate performance to protect their jobs. Firms are classified according to number of individuals who have a say in who should lead them (the slectorate) and the size of the group of supporters and leaders needs to gain or maintain control (the winning coalition). Using publicly available data, we develop measures of these concepts within the corporate setting and show that these governance structures influence corporate performance and compensation packages used to reward management and stockholders. We compare compensation packages and reported performance with those expected given governance structures. Deviations from expectations provide predictors of fraudulent reporting that allow for discrimination between firms that subsequently commit fraud (within two years) and those that do not

A Mark in Time Saves Nein

A method for predicting political interactions and policy outcomes based on two political theorems is presented and illustrated with an examination of the decision to merge the two German currencies. Political perceptions and actions are anticipated by combining the substantive knowledge of area experts with the theoretical insights embedded in the median voter theorem and a monotonicity theorem that links expectations to probabilistic statements of action. The proposed model has proven accurate about 90 percent of the time. The proposed forecasting method identifies a sequential strategy that may have been followed by Chancellor Kohl in forging the coalition needed to merge successfully the two German currencies. Using comparative statics, the analysis suggests how subtle and sophisticated Chancellor Kohl had to be to succeed in getting the policy outcome he desired despite stiff opposition.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/66924/2/10.1177_019251219201300106.pd

Selection institutions and war aims

We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47901/1/10101_2005_Article_108.pd

Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization

How does domestic regime type affect bilateral cooperation, and one of its most visible manifestations, bilateral treaties? This article explains how domestic political regime affects bilateral cooperation and, contrary to the expectations of some scholars, why autocracies should be expected to be more likely than democracies to enter into bilateral treaties. If the preferences of a pair of states are not identical, the sets of agreements that each party would consent to (win-sets) need to overlap for a bilateral treaty to be acceptable. Because additional domestic constraints reduce the size of a country’s win-set, autocracies should have broader win-sets than democracies. Therefore, autocratic dyads should be more likely to formalize bilateral treaties than other pairs of states. Based on an original data set, I present empirical evidence showing that pairs of autocracies are more likely than other pairs of states to enter into agreements formalizing bilateral cooperation

Democracy, Autocracy and the Likelihood of International Conflict

This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii) on average win more of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complementarities. The likelihood of interstate war, therefore, is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair), highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent with empirical findings

Group Incentives and Rational Voting

Our model describes competition between groups driven by the choices of self-interested voters within groups. Within a Poisson voting environment, parties observe aggregate support from groups and can allocate prizes or punishments to them. In a tournament style analysis, the model characterizes how contingent allocation of prizes based on relative levels of support affects equilibrium voting behavior. In addition to standard notions of pivotality, voters influence the distribution of prizes across groups. Such prize pivotality supports positive voter turnout even in non-competitive electoral settings. The analysis shows that competition for a prize awarded to the most supportive group is only stable when two groups actively support a party. However, competition among groups to avoid punishment is stable in environments with any number of groups. We conclude by examining implications for endogenous group formation and how politicians structure the allocation of rewards and punishments.Comment: 34 pages, 1 figur

Can Terrorism Abroad Influence Migration Attitudes at Home?

This article demonstrates that public opinion on migration “at home” is systematically driven by terrorism in other countries. Although there is little substantive evidence linking refugees or migrants to most recent terror attacks in Europe, news about terrorist attacks can trigger more negative views of immigrants. However, the spatial dynamics of this process are neglected in existing research. We argue that feelings of imminent danger and a more salient perception of migration threats do not stop at national borders. The empirical results based on spatial econometrics and data on all terrorist attacks in Europe for the post-9/11 period support these claims. The effect of terrorism on migration concern is strongly present within a country, but also diffuses across states in Europe. This finding improves our understanding of public opinion on migration, spill-over effects of terrorism, and it highlights crucial lessons for scholars interested in the security implications of population movements