Constructing narratives and reading texts: Approaches to history and power struggles between philosophy and emergent disciplines in inter-war France

In inter-war France, history of philosophy was a very important academic discipline, but nevertheless its practitioners thought it necessary to defend its identity, which was threatened by its vicinity to many other disciplines, and especially by the emergent social sciences and history of science. I shall focus on two particular issues that divided traditional historians of philosophy from historians of science, ethnologists and sociologists, and that became crucial in the definition of the identity of their disciplines: the conception of history and the interpretation of texts. By analysing representative discussions and positions, I shall show that traditional historians of philosophy needed to reassert their own approach to history, which, borrowing the term from Bergson, I define as ‘snapshot’. This approach is focused on a particular idea or text rather than a narrative. I shall also show that history of philosophy, in its traditional form, would have been undermined both intellectually and institutionally by the opposite ‘narrative’ approach of history of science and of the social sciences. Social scientists openly attacked history of philosophy’s methods and, in the eyes of traditional philosophers, its existence as an academic discipline. The same opposition is to be found in evaluation of past texts, which for traditional historians of philosophy were to be read as timeless documents, while for historians of science, ethnologists and sociologists were to be considered as documents exhibiting a particular mentality. However, between these alternatives there were intermediate positions. I shall in particular consider that of Léon Brunschvicg: he embraced a narrative approach and considered texts as documents of different ways of thinking, but at the same time carried on employing philosophical methods and defending the institutional position of philosophy. I shall argue that this was possible partly because of the considerable amount of power he enjoyed at the Sorbonne

Commentary on Anastasios Brenner's 'Epistemology Historicized'

By starting from a reflection on the article by Anastasios Brenner which precedes mine in this edited book, I discuss the 'difficult' relation of history and philosophy, and draw examples from the tradition of historical epistemology. On this basis, I evaluate the current status of history of philosophy of science, and I conclude with the defence of a truly historical approach to philosophy of science and of the philosopher's reflexivity

The mind and the faculties: the controversy over 'primitive mentality' and the struggle for disciplinary space at the interwar Sorbonne

This article deals with some aspects of the study of the mind between the 1920s and 1940s at the University of Paris. Traditionally the domain of philosophy, the study of the mind was encroached upon by other disciplines such as history of science, ethnology, sociology and psychology. These disciplines all had weak institutional status and were struggling to constitute themselves as autonomous. History of science did not as a rule reject its relationship with philosophy, whereas ethnology, sociology and psychology were constructing their identities by breaking away from philosophy. A discussion about Lévy-Bruhl’s La mentalité primitive, hosted by the Société Française de Philosophie in 1923, showed that the positions of philosophers, sociologists and psychologists about the questions posed by the book, namely the fixity and universality of the mind, were strictly linked with their views about the ‘scientificity’ of ethnology. A compromise between fixity and historical transformation of the mind was put forward by Gaston Bachelard, who institutionally represented the discipline of history and philosophy of science. This discipline was institutionally linked to ethnology, psychology and sociology, but, unlike them, had no claim to ‘scientificity’. Bachelard realized this compromise by breaking the unity of the mind and by employing an extra-institutional discipline: psychoanalysis. His freedom of choice corresponded with an increasingly weak institutional position for the discipline of history and philosophy of science

Espinosa e Merleau-Ponty: convergências? Spinoza and Merleau-Ponty: convergences?

A partir das reflexões do último Merleau-Ponty sobre a ontologia clássica e sua compreensão do ser, particularmente n’O visível e o invisível, podemos descobrir certas questões que aproximam sua filosofia da de Espinosa. Ao repassar algumas delas, esperamos mostrar ao menos a pertinência de uma investigação acerca das relações entre espinosismo e merleau-pontysmo.<br>In Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on classical ontology and his understanding of being (particularly in Le visible et l’invisible) one can discern some issues which approximate his philosophy to that of Spinoza’s. By showing that, I hope to establish at least the convenience of an investigation about the relationship between the ideas of the two philosophers

Montaigne and Descartes’ practical understanding of wisdom: A new ground for ethics and anthropology

Since the 1970s and 1980s, Business Ethics has been studied and taught. This Ethics is usually “pragmatist” or “deontological,” but it can also be “realistic.” Ethics is part of Philosophy, which was classically called “love of wisdom,” but that definition and ethics itself changed since Early Modernity. Realistic Business Ethics – inspired by Aristotle and St. Thomas – has a metaphysical ground that highly differs from the modern metaphysical one. Associated with the “science of man” and the truth conceived as “something useful,” this metaphysics is conceived as pragmatist. Anthropology and economics – considered as social sciences – were born with Modernity and Enlightenment, respectively, in a context of changing philosophical paradigms but have gained prominence since the nineteenth century. Our aim is to briefly explain who are the authors and the key points that made this change possible. This illustrates the new way of understanding the man and his action from a moral and social perspective. With Montaigne and Descartes the science of truth is left behind as the science of man gains more attention. This implies that contemplation is substituted by a technical action of one self who knows itself as a free and individualist actor (subject) with own interests and passions. In Descartes we find the traits of the new wise man, what is his method, and how metaphysics, anthropology, and ethics are now articulated, that is, how and why this change from a contemplative wisdom to a pragmatic one occurred