Labor Market and Globalization: A Comparison of the Latin American and the East Asian Experiences in the 1980s and 1990s

In this paper we analyse the labor market and its relationship with globalization in two groups of countries similar in their GDP per capita levels at the beginning of the 1980s but otherwise significantly different in their economic and social structures. On the one hand we look at Argentina, Brazil and Chile, on the other hand we analyse South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. It is argued that the Latin American group adopted pro-globalization policies too quickly and without an adequate social safety net, and that the East Asian group was particularly vulnerable to the 1997 crisis in connection with an ill-designed financial markets liberalisation and poor labor market policies. We suggest that the high social costs of labor market imbalances generated throughout the 1980s and 1990s in these two groups of countries should have been tackled within an encompassing development strategy, with an eye at social safety nets and labor supply policies – such as active and passive labor market institutions – designed for each country specifically.globalization, labor market, Latin America, East Asia

Rule of Law, Institutional Quality and Information

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the persistent lawlessness attitude observed in some transition and developing countries where an overall increase in the quality of institutions is recorded. The mechanism of information diffusion on institutional quality is explored using a model where the state confronts a continuum of agents prone to either strip assets or to invest. The model predicts that high uncertainty and potential sunk costs in a situation of rule of law enforcement push the economy towards anarchy, a Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Vice versa, if the assets' value and the cost of asset-stripping are high, this is instrumental to a rule of law enforcement, a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. High institutional quality can increase the likelihood of rule of law enforcement if there is enough information about the strength of institutions. On the other hand, if good institutions and good information about institutions do not come together, there is scope for the puzzled co-existence of advancement in reforms and poor property rights protection.rule of law, institutions, global games

Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Rule of Law

This paper presents a model of Rule of Law in which a continuum of agents plays against the State for the appropriation of the economic assets of a stylised economy. The model shows how each agent can either challenge the State or acquiesce, with the latter having the choice of either protecting property rights or abandoning the economy to anarchy. Players' payoffs are affected by strategic complementarities, not only between State and agents but also among agents themselves. As a consequence of this, a Coordination Failure is generated. The solution of the game is given by two Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria emerging from the context. Introducing idiosyncratic information and sequential play generates a unique equilibrium, according to the global game approach. On the one hand, this model predicts that high uncertainty and sunk costs in law enforcement have a negative effect, pushing the economy towards a Pareto-dominated equilibrium. On the other hand, the high value given to the economy's assets (embedded social norms) has a positive influence, leading to a Pareto-dominant equilibrium.Rule of Law, Coordination Failure, Global Games

Speed of Transition, Unemployment Dynamics and Nonemployment Policies: Evidence from the Visegrad Countries

In Central and Eastern Europe the restructuring process of large state enterprises had the effect of increasing unemployment. Social policy expenditure, in particular nonemployment policies, grew faster then expected due to the need of financing the \textit{out of labor force} categories. The interactions among unemployment, speed of transition and nonemployment subsidies/pensions are studied taking into account the shrinking labor force during transition. The reallocation of workers from the state to the private sector imposed a heavy burden on the budget deficit due to the increased social policy expenditure. This combination of effects is captured by a model of the speed of transition, in which a non-constant labor force is considered as well as the opposition of the insiders to restructuring is accounted for. After the reforms of the so-called Passive Labor Market Policies (PLMPs) at the beginning of 1992, there was a slowing down of the transition and this is has not been yet completely explained by the Optimal Speed of Transition (OST) literature.Unemployment, Model of Transition, Social Safety Net

Labor Market Policies, Institutions and Employment Rates in the EU-27

We compare labor market policies, institutions and outcomes for the EU member states, for the period 2000-2005. We document the main differences in Labor Market Policies across EU members, including new member states after 2004. We focus on indicators of policy generosity (expenditures relative to GDP) and relate these and other policy indicators to indicators of labor market outcomes and performance. Our results show that, on a cross-country basis, higher rates of employment are in general associated with: (i) higher expenditures on labor market policies, especially on active policies for countries with a high pro-work attitude; (ii) a lower degree of rigidity in labor market institutions and in product market regulation.labor market policies, labor market outcomes, European social models

Rule of Law, Institutional Quality and Information

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the persistent lawlessness attitude observed in some transition and developing countries where an overall increase in the quality of institutions is recorded. The mechanism of information diffusion on institutional quality is explored using a model where the state confronts a continuum of agents prone to either strip assets or to invest. The model predicts that high uncertainty and potential sunk costs in a situation of rule of law enforcement push the economy towards anarchy, a Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Viceversa, if the assets' value and the cost of asset-stripping are high, this is instrumental to a rule of law enforcement, a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. High institutional quality can increase the likelihood of rule of law enforcement if there is enough information about the strength of institutions. On the other hand, if good institutions and good information about institutions do not come together, there is scope for the puzzled co-existence of advancement in reforms and poor property rights protection

Institutions and Entry: A Cross-Regional Analysis in Russia

We analyse a micro-panel data set to investigate the effect of regional institutional environment and economic factors on Russian new firm entry rates across time, industries and regions. The paper builds on novel databases and exploits inter-regional variation in a large number of institutional variables. We find entry rates across industries in Russia are not especially low by international standards and are correlated with entry rates in developed market economies, as well as with institutional environment and firm size. Furthermore, industries that, for scale or technological reasons, are characterised by higher entry rates experience lower entry within regions affected subject to political change. A higher level of democracy enhances entry rates for small sized firms but reduces them for medium or large ones.entry rate, institutions, democracy

Institutional Determinants of New Firm Entry in Russia: A Cross Regional Analysis

We analyse a three-year panel data set of Russian firms spanning from 2000 to 2002 and we investigate the effect of regional institutional and economic factors on entry rates across time, industries and regions. The paper builds on a novel database and exploits inter-regional variation in a large number of institutional variables. We find entry rates in Russia are not especially low by international standards and are correlated with natural entry rates, institutions and firm size. Furthermore, industries that - for scale and technological reasons - are characterised by higher entry rates will experience lower entry within regions affected by higher business risk. In other words industries that naturally have low entry barriers are most affected by business constraints.Tobit model, business environment, entry rate

Joining Panel Data with Cross-Sections for Efficiency Gains: an Application to a Consumption Equation for Nicaragua

This paper explores how cross-sectional data can be exploited jointly with longitudinal data, in order to increase estimation effciency while properly tackling the potential bias due to unobserved individual characteristics. We propose an innovative procedure and we show its implementation by analysing the determinants of consumption in Nicaragua, based on data from three Living Standard Measurement Study surveys from 1993, 1998 and 2001. The last two rounds constitute an unbalanced longitudinal data set, while the first is a cross-section of di®erent households. Under the assumption that the relationship between observed and unobserved characteristics is homogenous across time, information from longitudinal is are used to clean the bias in the unpaired sample. In a second step, corrected unpaired observations are used jointly with panel data. This reduces the standard errors of the estimation coe±cients and might increase their significance as well, otherwise compromised by the limited variation provided by the short longitudinal data

Labor Market Policies and Outcomes: Cross Country Evidence for the EU-27

We conduct a comparative analysis of Labor Market Policies and outcomes for the EU member states, for period 2000-2005. We document the main differences in Labor Market Policies across EU members, including new members states after 2004. We focus on indicators of policy generosity (expenditures relative do GDP) and relate these and other policy indicators to indicators of labor market outcomes and performance. Our results show that, on a cross-country basis, higher rates of employment are in general associated with: (i) higher expenditures on labor market policies, especially on active policies; (ii) a lower degree of rigidity in labor market institutions and in product market regulation