Magnetic monopole loop for the Yang-Mills instanton

We investigate 't Hooft-Mandelstam monopoles in QCD in the presence of a single classical instanton configuration. The solution to the Maximal Abelian projection is found to be a circular monopole trajectory with radius $R$ centered on the instanton. At zero loop radius, there is a marginally stable (or flat) direction for loop formation to $O(R^4 logR)$. We argue that loops will form, in the semi-classical limit, due to small perturbations such as the dipole interaction between instanton anti-instanton pairs. As the instanton gas becomes a liquid, the percolation of the monopole loops may therefore provide a semi-classical precursor to the confinement mechanism.Comment: 19 pages, ReVTeX, 5 Encaptulated Postscript figure

Who Then Should Judge? Developing the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11

The only potentially unique aspect of NAFTA Chapter 11 is that the governments of two nations with developed economies agreed to enter into an investment protection treaty between themselves. The overwhelming majority of BITs to date have been North to South, between capital-exporting countries and capital-importing countries, and the private investors who actually have benefited from such treaties have been those from the North. Practically speaking, countries such as Canada and the United States simply have not had to worry that they would ever have to defend a claim in arbitration under a BIT. The cross-border investment flows between Canada and the United States, however, are astronomically higher than, for example, those between Cameroon and the United States, and it was inevitable, once NAFTA\u27s investment protection regime became operative, that Canada and the United States would be defending themselves before an international tribunal. Indeed, it is no coincidence that all of the Chapter 11 cases thus far commenced against the United States have been brought by Canadian nationals and all but one of the cases against Canada have been brought by US nationals. One may surmise that at least some of the distress felt by Canada and the United States over NAFTA Chapter 11 has been caused by the novel and disconcerting fact of having to live up to the same substantive and procedural guarantees that they have required of their BIT partners. Of course the fact that the NAFTA Parties are getting precisely what they bargained for does not necessarily answer the specific criticisms being leveled against Chapter 11. In analyzing the substance of this criticism, however, one should not lose sight of the reasons why the NAFTA Parties negotiated Chapter 11 in the first place. NAFTA Chapter 11 creates substantive investment protections that are enforceable in arbitration by the individuals directly impacted by any breach of such protections. In establishing this investment regime, the NAFTA Parties wanted to achieve three main objectives: (1) to tear down existing foreign investment barriers by eliminating arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions; (2) to build investor confidence throughout the region through the elaboration and enforcement of clear and fair rules; and (3) to depoliticize the resolution of investment disputes by eliminating the need for State- to-State adjudication. Any criticism of the Chapter 11 regime that fails to take account of these three factors is, literally, beside the point

Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?

The present Article addresses three distinct issues that are central to the critique of investment treaties and arbitration. First, it discusses the virtues of granting investors an independent right to initiate dispute settlement directly against the host state instead of forcing them to rely either on dispute resolution in domestic courts or on interstate dispute resolution. Second, this Article shows how investment-treaty arbitration takes into account private and public interests in deciding whether state conduct has violated the rights granted to investors under investment treaties. It thus argues that concepts related to investors\u27 rights, such as fair and equitable treatment or the concept of indirect expropriation, do not establish rights that unilaterally favor investors over states. Third, this Article addresses the relatively recent critique of whether arbitration, as compared to a permanent court with tenured judges, vitiates the legitimacy of international investment law. It explains the institutional choice in favor of arbitration, analyzes the independence and impartiality of arbitrators and shows which control mechanisms preclude the arbitral mechanism from becoming a source of pro-investor bias. Finally, the Article concludes by pointing to strategies by which the present system of investment-treaty arbitration can, and increasingly does, accommodate the legitimate concerns of nonparties to the proceedings. Such strategies, it is argued, do not require a radical redesign of the entire system, but can be integrated into the existing system of international investment law and arbitration. In sum, this Article argues that investment treaties and investor-state arbitration constitute a legitimate vehicle for structuring and stabilizing foreign investment activities