Why not be a desertist?: Three arguments for desert and against luck egalitarianism

Many philosophers believe that luck egalitarianism captures “desert-like” intuitions about justice. Some even think that luck egalitariansm distributes goods in accordance with desert. In this paper, we argue that this is wrong. Desertism conflicts with luck egalitarianism in three important contexts, and, in these contexts, desertism renders the proper moral judgment. First, compared to desertism, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too stingy: it fails to justly compensate people for their socially valuable contributions—when those contributions arose from “option luck”. Second, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too restrictive: it fails to justly compensate people who make a social contribution when that contribution arose from “brute luck”. Third, luck egalitarianism is too limited in scope: it cannot diagnose economic injustice arising independently of comparative levels of justice. The lesson of this paper is that luck egalitarians should consider supplementing their theory with desert considerations. Or, even better, consider desertism as a superior alternative to their theory

Desert, Luck, and Justice

Op 7 januari 2020 promoveerde Huub Brouwer aan Tilburg University met zijn proefschrift ‘Verdienste, Toeval, en Rechtvaardigheid’. In deze bijdrage vertelt hij over zijn onderzoek

What Does Desert Cost?

Desert plays a relatively minor role in philosophical discussions on distributive justice, whereas it plays a central role in philosophical discussions on retributive justice. At the same time, theorists of justice argue that separating both spheres is to some extent artificial. Quite a few political philosophers have claimed that this asymmetry of desert needs to be defended, and some have offered defenses. I critically evaluate the last defense of the asymmetry that has not been challenged so far: Moriarty’s argument that an asymmetry in the costs of requiting desert between both spheres of justice (partially) vindicates the asymmetry of desert. It is my contention that his defense ultimately fails. The reason is that he does not specify a fairness threshold that systems setting out to reward desert need to live up to

Discussing Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale

In Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale, Debra Satz (2010) argues that four considerations should guide moral reflection on markets: does a market involve weak agency, extreme vulnerability, extremely harmful outcomes to individuals, or extremely harmful outcomes to society? If the answer is yes to one or more of these questions, a market could very well be noxious. In this paper, I assess to what extent Satz’ framework can indeed be used to discuss the moral status of markets. I claim that (1) it would be desirable to have a criterion that tells us when weak agency and extreme vulnerability make a market noxious; (2) it is unproductive to discuss the moral status of a theoretical market without first thinking about a regulatory framework for this market; and (3) it is paramount to consider all empirical evidence available on markets because they might turn out very differently in reality from how they look on paper

Introduction: The Wealth-Power Nexus

This introductory chapter provides a general framework for thinking about the relationship between wealth and power. It begins by situating the topic in the history of political thought, modern social science, and recent political philosophy, before putting forward an analytical framework. This has three elements: first, the idea of liberalism's public/private divide: a division between a power-wielding state from which wealth should be absent, and a market economy from which power should be absent; second, the two ways the division can be transgressed by the power of the wealthy: by the wealthy subverting the power of the state and by directly exercising power within the economy; and third, the four different approaches to responding to the transgression, either aiming to reassert the public/private divide or to move beyond it

All Animals are Equal, but Some More than Others?

Does the moral badness of pain depend on who feels it? A common, but generally only implicitly stated view, is that it does not. This view, ‘unitarianism’, maintains that the same interests of different beings should count equally in our moral calculus. Shelly Kagan’s project in How to Count Animals, more or less (2019) is to reject this common view, and develop an alternative to it: a hierarchical view of moral status, on which the badness of pain does depend on who feels it. In this review essay, we critically examine Kagan’s argument for status hierarchy. In particular, we reject two of the central premises in his argument: that (1) moral standing is ultimately grounded in agency and (2) that unitarianism is overdemanding. We conclude that moral status may, despite Kagan’s compelling argument to the contrary, not be hierarchical