Duramycin-induced calcium release in cancer cells

Introduction: Duramycin through binding with phosphatidylethanolamine (PE) has shown potential to be an effective anti-tumour agent. However its mode of action in relation to tumour cells is not fully understood. Methods: PE expression on the surface of a panel of cancer cell lines was analysed using duramycin and subsequent antibody labelling then analysed by flow cytometry. Cell viability was also assessed via flow cytometry using annexin V and propidium iodide (PI). Calcium ion (Ca²⁺) release by tumour cells in response to duramycin was determined by spectrofluorometry following incubation with Fluo-3, AM. Confocal microscopy was performed on the cancer cell line AsPC-1 to assess real time cell response to duramycin treatment. Results: Duramycin was able to detect cell surface PE expression on all 15 cancer cell lines screened, which was shown to be duramycin concentration dependent. However higher concentrations induced necrotic cell death. Duramycin induced calcium ion (Ca²⁺) release from the cancer cell lines also in a concentration and time dependent manner. Confocal microscopy showed an influx of PI into the cells over time and induced morphological changes. Conclusion: Duramycin induces Ca²⁺ release from cancer cell lines in a time and concentration dependent relationship

On Horror\u27s Head Horrors Accumulate : A Reflective Comment on Capital Child Rape Legislation

The constitutionality of imposing capital punishment for the crime of child rape remains an open question. The author asserts that state capital child rape statutes are constitutional. The author bases his conclusion on the United States Supreme Court\u27s capital punishment decisions, the historical treatment of sex offenses and non-homicide capital crimes, and the brutality of rape, itself. Finally, the author urges caution to ensure that capital punishment is not meted out in a racially discriminatory manner

Jones, Lackey, and Teague, 48 J. Marshall L. Rev. 961 (2015)

In a recent, high-profile ruling, a federal court finally recognized that a substantial delay in executing a death row inmate violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Courts have repeatedly rejected these so-called “Lackey claims,” making the federal court’s decision in Jones v. Chappell all the more important. And yet it was deeply flawed. This paper focuses on one of the major flaws in the Jones decision that largely escaped attention: the application of the non-retroactivity rule from Teague v. Lane. By comprehensively addressing the merits of the Teague bar as applied to Lackey claims, and making the case for applying the bar, this paper adds to, and challenges, the existing literature on capital punishment, Lackey claims, and Teague doctrine. This paper dissects the Jones ruling on the application of Teague, examining the Supreme Court’s “new rule” case law and concluding that Lackey claims, when viewed at the appropriate level of generality, propose a new rule. It then addresses the more complicated aspect of applying Teague in this context, recognizing that the first Teague exception poses the most likely basis for avoiding the Teague bar on a Lackey claim. At a minimum, Lackey claims (like Miller v. Alabama claims, now the subject of substantial Eighth Amendment litigation on collateral review) sit at the intersection of procedural and substantive rules. Nonetheless, this paper makes the case for viewing the claim as procedural and therefore Teague-barred. Ultimately, then, this paper emphasizes a point that could substantially influence existing litigation: litigators and federal judges should take the Teague bar more seriously when considering Lackey claims on federal habeas review, particularly when viewed in light of modern habeas rules and doctrine that limit relief and protect the interests of the states. But the paper also emphasizes an important point about death penalty policy and politics: if the state is to have a death penalty at all, it should be prepared, and willing, to ensure that death sentences are actually carried out

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—LOYALTY, MONEY, AND BUSINESS: THE NEW PRICE FOR A PRESIDENTIAL PARDON

The President of the United States, pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, has the sole power to issue pardons that free individuals of the confines and limitations of federal prosecution and conviction. In his only term as President so far, Donald Trump issued approximately 143 pardons. Several of those pardons were directed to those who attempted to interfere with the 2016 presidential election by way of lying to investigators and members of Congress and by tampering with evidence and witnesses. Many other pardons issued by President Trump were given only to those who had close ties to the Republican Party or the President himself. The purpose of this Article is to showcase several of the individuals pardoned by President Trump in order to argue that he used the pardon power for personal gain and not as originally intended by the Founding Fathers. This Article also argues that constitutional amendments to the presidential pardon power are required in order to protect the American judicial system and our democratic principles from further executive abuse—be it from a potential second term of President Trump or any other future President of the United States