40 research outputs found

    Incorporating Race

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    Common law courts have for centuries regarded corporations as artificial persons—colorless, invisible, intangible persons. Yet, recently some courts have ruled that corporations can and do possess racial identities as a matter of law. This Article explores the practical and theoretical implications of this ruling, both for our understanding of corporate personality and of race. In doing so, the Article develops an economic model of race based on representations and interpretations of racial signals and commitments. This model is used to suggest an approach to antidiscrimination law that avoids racial essentialism and an approach to corporate law that complicates shareholder primacy

    The Banality of Racial Inequality

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    Black Markets and the Exchange Structure

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    The Efficient Performance Hypothesis

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    Beyond Ex Post Expediency—An Ex Ante View of Rescission and Restitution

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    It is commonly held that if getting a contractual remedy was costless and fully compensatory, rescission followed by restitution would not exist as a remedy for breach of contract. This claim, we will demonstrate, is not correct. Rescission and restitution offer more than remedial convenience. Rational parties, we argue, would often desire a right of rescission followed by restitution even if damages were fully compensatory and costless to enforce. The mere presence of a threat to rescind, even if not carried out, exerts an effect on the behavior of parties. Parties can enlist this effect to increase the value of contracting

    Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts

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    Many partnership contracts (and other joint-venture agreements) include so-called Texas Shootout Clauses to govern future breakups. In a Texas Shootout, one partner names a single buy-sell price and the other partner has the option to buy or sell at that price. While the prior literature has considered the allocative efficiency of the Texas Shootout, this paper focuses on the incentives of private parties to make these offers to begin with. We consider a model where sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Although both partners are equally capable, one has private information about the common value of the asset. When given the choice, they avoid making buy-sell offers because these offers give away bargaining surplus (the partners are gun shy ). Instead, they often (but not always) prefer to make simple offers to buy or simple offers to sell and bargaining failures arise. Texas Shootout contracts that assign trigger rights - where one party can force the other to name a price - increase efficiency and are jointly desirable
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