Justice distributive et justice rétributive

Cet article examine les positions de John Rawls par rapport à la justice retributive (pénale). Nous soutenons d'abord que la perspective de Rawls est éclectique par rapport aux deux polarités exemplaires de la justice pénale soit, en première part, celle du rétributivisme et de l'utilitarisme, et, en seconde part, celle du déontologisme et du conséquentialisme. L'examen des textes révèle que la pensée de Rawls conjugue des éléments qui la qualifient à la fois comme rétributiviste et déontologiste et d'autres qui la rapprochent de l'utilitarisme et du conséquentialisme. Les positions de Rawls sont ensuite scrutées à la lumière des résultats récents de la recherche empirique sur la justice pénale. Nous soutenons alors que la conception rawlsienne de la justice pénale comme un processus sanctionnateur de nature strictement réactive fpost factoj ne peut se concilier avec les aspects pro-actifs de plus en plus affirmés de ce type de justice. On suggère enfin que le principe de Rawls que l'inégalité n'est légitime que lorsqu'elle profite aux plus défavorisés n'a que peu d'application au sein de la justice pénale, dont la cible première est précisément constituée par les pauvres et les sans-pouvoirs.This paper explores Rawls' positions on the subject of retributive (criminal) justice. It is first argued that Rawls' perspective is hybrid with respect to the two traditional dichotomies of retributivism vs. utilitarianism and of deontologism vs. consequentialism. There is evidence to the effect that Rawls is both a retributivist and a consequentialist. Secondly, Rawls' positions are discussed in the light of recent empirical research. It is argued that his view of retributive justice as being strictly reactive conflicts with the present proactive dimension of criminal justice. It is also suggested that the principle that all inequality should profit the least advantaged members of society has now little application in criminal justice which essentially targets the poor and the powerless

Provocations

This paper is an attempt at the refutation of certain fallacies, which have gained a wide currency in legal and criminological thinking. These fallacies are the following. First, the mistaken interpretation of universal statements such as “Any person condemns murder” as the expression of a cross-cultural consensus about the blameworthiness of a certain type of behaviour; such statements, it is argued, are mere tautologies reflecting the cogency of our linguistic customs. Second, the erroneous belief that criminology can dogmatically account for the sum of the facts which appertain to its field of study, by means of a single, all-encompassing explanation; arguments are given to show that the fate of criminological studies is fragmentation. Third, it is argued that the criminal justice system should be conceived as an apparatus for social provocation rather than as institutionalized social reaction. Fourth, it is pointed out that we must draw an unambiguous distinction between the legal notion of a sentence and the intuitive notion of punishment; stressing this difference leads the author to compare briefly the main tenets of what he respectively calls dogmatic and sceptical criminology. Finally, the necessity to recognize as separate issues the justification and the allocation of criminal sanctions is proven and it is shown how the penal fascination with capital punishment is responsible for blurring the distinction between these issues

Haute et basse police après le 11 septembre

La distinction entre la haute police (police politique) et la basse police (police criminelle ordinaire) a accru sa pertinence dans le prolongement des attentats terroristes du 11 septembre 2001 (9/11). Ce texte reprend le contenu du paradigme de la haute police proposé en 1983 et répond à certaines critiques qui lui ont été récemment adressées. Nous proposons d’abord une remise à date des caractéristiques de la haute police. Celle-ci est considérée comme une police d’absorption, d’amalgame des pouvoirs au profit du pouvoir exécutif, de protection de l’État et d’infiltration de la société par des indicateurs de police. Nous montrons ensuite que les différentes commissions d’enquête qui se sont penchées sur les lacunes de l’action policière et des services de renseignement dans la prévention des attentats du 9/11 ont trouvé que la distinction entre la haute et la basse police était encore plus profonde qu’on ne l’avait anticipé. Dans une troisième partie du texte, la question de l’existence d’une haute police privée est abordée. Bien que l’existence d’une haute police privée ne puisse maintenant être remise en question, cette haute police privée ne possède qu’en partie les traits qui définissent le modèle initial de la haute police publique. Dans la dernière partie, le contraste entre haute et basse police est examiné à la lumière de sa résonance symbolique.The distinction between high and low policing is increasingly relevant in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. This paper reviews the content of the high policing paradigm and addresses recent criticism. Its first part provides an update of the defining features of high policing : absorbent policing, power conflation favouring the executive, the primacy of protecting the state and massive use of infiltration through of covert informants. It is, thereafter, argued that the high and low police distinction is considered to run deeper than anticipated by the various bodies reporting on the policing and intelligence failure to prevent 9/11. In part three, the place of private security agencies in high policing is assessed. Private high policing must be taken into account, but it only shares in some of the defining features of high policing and is lacking in others. Finally, the contrast between high and low policing is examined in relation to symbolic significance

Quelques notes sur la réforme de la détermination de la peine au Canada

This review of recent developments in the field of sentencing in Canada begins by observing that none of the recommendations of the Canadian Sentencing Commission were implemented, since the commission issued its report in 1987. This amounts to a prolongation of the status quo. We propose elements of explanation as to why there was no follow up to the Commission's proposals. Second, we present a critical analysis of the latest consultation package on sentencing and parole, that was put together by the federal Department of Justice in 1990. We argue that the proposed statement of purposes and principles of sentencing should priorize the different sentencing goals that it enumerates. We also point out that there is an unbalance between the sentencing and parole components of the permanent commission proposed by the Department of Justice. The sentencing component is required to make sentencing policy, whereas the parole component acts as an advisor to the National Parole Board