152 research outputs found
27. Sitzung des FAO/WHO-Codex-Alimentarius-Komitees fĂĽr Fische und Fischerzeugnisse
1963 wurde von der FAO und WHO die Codex-Alimentarius-Kommission gegrĂĽndet, die Lebensmittelstandards, Richtlinien und Vorschriften wie Codes of practice im Rahmen des gemeinsamen FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme erarbeiten sollte. Hauptziel dieses Programmes ist der Schutz der Gesundheit der Verbraucher und die Sicherung fairer Praktiken im Lebensmittelhandel sowie die Koordinierung der Arbeiten zu Lebensmittelstandards, die von international, staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Organisationen durchgefĂĽhrt werden
Exact Mean Computation in Dynamic Time Warping Spaces
Dynamic time warping constitutes a major tool for analyzing time series. In
particular, computing a mean series of a given sample of series in dynamic time
warping spaces (by minimizing the Fr\'echet function) is a challenging
computational problem, so far solved by several heuristic and inexact
strategies. We spot some inaccuracies in the literature on exact mean
computation in dynamic time warping spaces. Our contributions comprise an exact
dynamic program computing a mean (useful for benchmarking and evaluating known
heuristics). Based on this dynamic program, we empirically study properties
like uniqueness and length of a mean. Moreover, experimental evaluations reveal
substantial deficits of state-of-the-art heuristics in terms of their output
quality. We also give an exact polynomial-time algorithm for the special case
of binary time series
Testing Substitutability of Weak Preferences
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the
largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In
this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to
test substitutability of weak preferences. Interestingly, the algorithm is
faster than the algorithm of Hatfield et al. by a linear factor on the domain
of strict preferences.Comment: 7 page
An Ordinal Minimax Theorem
In the early 1950s Lloyd Shapley proposed an ordinal and set-valued solution
concept for zero-sum games called \emph{weak saddle}. We show that all weak
saddles of a given zero-sum game are interchangeable and equivalent. As a
consequence, every such game possesses a unique set-based value.Comment: 10 pages, 2 figure
28. Sitzung des FAO/WHO-Codex-Alimentarius-Komitees fĂĽr Fische und Fischereierzeugnisse
Die 28. Sitzung des Codex-Alimentarius-Komitees für Fische und Fischereierzeugnisse fand in Peking, China, vom 18. bis 22. September 2006 statt. Das Komitee folgte damit der in der letzten Sitzung ausgesprochenen Einladung der chinesischen Regierung und dem Ziel, die Codex-Sitzungen in verschiedenen Teilen der Welt abzuhalten. Geleitet wurde die Sitzung von Dr. Bjørn Røthe Knudsen, Regionaldirektor der norwegischen Behörde für Lebensmittelsicherheit. Professor Li Xiaochuan von der chinesischen Akademie für Fischforschung nahm die Rolle des Co-Chairman ein. Insgesamt 140 Delegierte, die 44 Mitgliedstaaten, die EU und eine internationale Organisation vertraten, nahmen an dieser Sitzung teil. Folgende Punkte wurden auf der diesjährigen Codex-Komitee-Sitzung diskutiert:
1. Erweiterung des Standards für Sardinen und sardinenähn-liche Erzeugnisse
2. Bearbeitung des Entwurfs eines Standards für Störkaviar
3. Ăśberarbeitung des Entwurfs eines Standards fĂĽr lebende und rohe Muscheln
4. Verhandlung über den Entwurf des Standards für geräu-cherten Fisch
5. Code of Practice fĂĽr Fische und Fischereierzeugnisse
6. ZukĂĽnftige Arbeite
The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes
In using approval voting to elect multiple winners to a committee or council, it is desirable that excess votes—approvals beyond those that a candidate needs to win a seat—not be wasted. The excess method does this by sequentially allocating excess votes to a voter’s as-yet-unelected approved candidates, based on the Jefferson method of apportionment. It is monotonic—approving of a candidate never hurts and may help him or her get elected—computationally easy, and less manipulable than related methods. In parliamentary systems with party lists, the excess method is equivalent to the Jefferson method and thus ensures the approximate proportional representation of political parties. As a method for achieving proportional representation (PR) on a committee or council, we compare it to other PR methods proposed by Hare, Andrae, and Droop for preferential voting systems, and by Phragmén for approval voting. Because voters can vote for multiple candidates or parties, the excess method is likely to abet coalitions that cross ideological and party lines and to foster greater consensus in voting bodies
The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes
In using approval voting to elect multiple winners to a committee or council, it is desirable that excess votes—approvals beyond those that a candidate needs to win a seat—not be wasted. The excess method does this by sequentially allocating excess votes to a voter’s as-yet-unelected approved candidates, based on the Jefferson method of apportionment. It is monotonic—approving of a candidate never hurts and may help him or her get elected—computationally easy, and less manipulable than related methods. In parliamentary systems with party lists, the excess method is equivalent to the Jefferson method and thus ensures the approximate proportional representation of political parties. As a method for achieving proportional representation (PR) on a committee or council, we compare it to other PR methods proposed by Hare, Andrae, and Droop for preferential voting systems, and by Phragmén for approval voting. Because voters can vote for multiple candidates or parties, the excess method is likely to abet coalitions that cross ideological and party lines and to foster greater consensus in voting bodies
Robust and verifiable proportionality axioms for multiwinner voting
When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections, it is surprisingly challenging to capture proportionality formally. As a consequence, the literature has produced numerous competing criteria of when a selected committee qualifies as proportional. Two of the most prominent notions are proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC) [Dummett, 1984] and extended justified representation (EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017]. Both definitions guarantee proportional representation to groups of voters with very similar preferences; such groups are referred to as solid coalitions by Dummett and as cohesive groups by Aziz et al. However, they lose their bite when groups are only almost solid or cohesive
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