An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management

In this article, Professor Frischmann combines a number of current debates across many disciplinary lines, all of which examine from different perspectives whether certain resources should be managed through a regime of private property or through a regime of open access. Frischmann develops and applies a theory that demonstrates there are strong economic arguments for managing and sustaining openly accessible infrastructure. The approach he takes differs from conventional analyses in that he focuses extensively on demand-side considerations and fully explores how infrastructure resources generate value for consumers and society. As a result, the theory brings into focus the social value of common infrastructure, and strongly suggests that the benefits of open access (costs of restricted access) are significantly greater than reflected in current debates. Frischmann\u27s infrastructure theory ultimately ties together different strands of legal and economic thought pertaining to natural resources such as lakes, traditional infrastructure such as road systems, what antitrust theorists describe as essential facilities, basic scientific research, and the Internet. His theory has significant potential to reframe a number of important debates within intellectual property, cyberlaw, telecommunications, and many other areas. Note: Professor Lawrence Lessig will publish a Reply titled Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann in the same edition of the Minnesota Law Review

The Pull of Patents

The conventional view of the role of patents in the university research context (and more generally) is that patent-enabled exclusivity improves the supply-side functioning of markets for university research results (and inventions more generally) as well as those markets further downstream for derivative commercial end-products. The reward, prospect, and commercialization theories of patent law take patent-enabled exclusivity as the relevant means for fixing a supply-side problem—the undersupply of private investment in the production of patentable subject matter or in the development and commercialization of patentable subject matter that would occur in the absence of patent-enabled exclusivity. Put another way, patents attract private investment to productive activities that might otherwise be less attractive investments. The reason why is rather straightforward and well-understood. Without patents, the fruits of the investments, intellectual fruit, would be too easily accessed and used by others without compensation to the original investor, thus undermining the incentive to invest in the first place. This is the standard public goods story that serves as the textbook explanation for why we have a patent system. While the supply-side view of the role of patents is important, a view from the demand-side is needed to fully appreciate the role of patents in the university research context (and more generally) and to fully inform university decisions about the extent to and manner in which they participate in patenting and commercializing research. Introducing patents into the university research system, along with a host of other initiatives aimed at tightening the relationship between universities and industry, is (primarily) aimed at increasing connectivity between university science and technology research systems and the demands of industry for both university research outputs (including research results and human capital) and upstream infrastructural capital necessary to produce such outputs. In this essay, I explore how university science and technology research systems perform economically as infrastructural capital and explain how these systems generate social value. I explain the dual role of patents in the university research context. On the supply side, patents facilitate the transfer (or “push”) of university research to industry. On the demand side, patents attract (or “pull”) university resources to meet industry demands. I focus on the demand side dynamic and explain how “patent pull” in the university research context may lead to a slow and subtle shift in the allocation of critical infrastructure resources within universities. I explore what this means for both universities and society, and conclude with some observations about how universities might approach these issues strategically. Approaching the role of patents from the demand side is an entirely new enterprise, and it is critical to understanding the role of patents in the university context and more generally. Thus, in conclusion, I also make a few suggestions about future avenues of research in this area

An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management

In this article, Professor Frischmann combines a number of current debates across many disciplinary lines, all of which examine from different perspectives whether certain resources should be managed through a regime of private property or through a regime of open access. Frischmann develops and applies a theory that demonstrates there are strong economic arguments for managing and sustaining openly accessible infrastructure. The approach he takes differs from conventional analyses in that he focuses extensively on demand-side considerations and fully explores how infrastructure resources generate value for consumers and society. As a result, the theory brings into focus the social value of common infrastructure, and strongly suggests that the benefits of open access (costs of restricted access) are significantly greater than reflected in current debates. Frischmann\u27s infrastructure theory ultimately ties together different strands of legal and economic thought pertaining to natural resources such as lakes, traditional infrastructure such as road systems, what antitrust theorists describe as essential facilities, basic scientific research, and the Internet. His theory has significant potential to reframe a number of important debates within intellectual property, cyberlaw, telecommunications, and many other areas. Note: Professor Lawrence Lessig will publish a Reply titled Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann in the same edition of the Minnesota Law Review

The University As Constructed Cultural Commons

This Article illustrates an agenda for investigating the mechanics of innovation contexts

Governing Medical Knowledge Commons - Introduction and Chapter 1

Governing Medical Knowledge Commons makes three claims: first, evidence matters to innovation policymaking; second, evidence shows that self-governing knowledge commons support effective innovation without prioritizing traditional intellectual property rights; and third, knowledge commons can succeed in the critical fields of medicine and health. The editors' knowledge commons framework adapts Elinor Ostrom's groundbreaking research on natural resource commons to the distinctive attributes of knowledge and information, providing a systematic means for accumulating evidence about how knowledge commons succeed. The editors' previous volume, Governing Knowledge Commons, demonstrated the framework's power through case studies in a diverse range of areas. Governing Medical Knowledge Commons provides fifteen new case studies of knowledge commons in which researchers, medical professionals, and patients generate, improve, and share innovations, offering readers a practical introduction to the knowledge commons framework and a synthesis of conclusions and lessons

Knowledge Commons

This chapter provides an introduction to and overview of the knowledge commons research framework. Knowledge commons refers to an institutional approach (commons) to governing the production, use, management, and/or preservation of a particular type of resource (knowledge). The research framework supplies a template for interrogating the details of knowledge commons institutions on a case study basis, generating qualitative data that may be used to support comparative analysis

Governing Knowledge Commons -- Introduction & Chapter 1

“Knowledge commons” describes the institutionalized community governance of the sharing and, in some cases, creation, of information, science, knowledge, data, and other types of intellectual and cultural resources. It is the subject of enormous recent interest and enthusiasm with respect to policymaking about innovation, creative production, and intellectual property. Taking that enthusiasm as its starting point, Governing Knowledge Commons argues that policymaking should be based on evidence and a deeper understanding of what makes commons institutions work. It offers a systematic way to study knowledge commons, borrowing and building on Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize-winning research on natural resource commons. It proposes a framework for studying knowledge commons that is adapted to the unique attributes of knowledge and information, describing the framework in detail and explaining how to put it into context both with respect to commons research and with respect to innovation and information policy. Eleven detailed case studies apply and discuss the framework exploring knowledge commons across a wide variety of scientific and cultural domains

Public art today. How public art sheds light on the future of the theory of commons

Public art and common goods, although belonging to apparently distant realms of inquiry, share a long history and, inevitably, an evolving meaning. This chapter investigates the evolution of the practice of public art with the objective to obtain a viable understanding of how the value of public art is produced today. With a focus on the future of public art, this chapter investigates three public art cases. The results of the qualitative analysis of these public art experiences are interpreted from an institutional economics perspective. The combination of public art and the theory of commons sheds light on what seems to be the most important attributes of common goods in the current debate, that is the social practices that constitute the act of making the commons.</p