Comprehensive Analysis Reveals Dynamic and Evolutionary Plasticity of Rab GTPases and Membrane Traffic in Tetrahymena thermophila

Cellular sophistication is not exclusive to multicellular organisms, and unicellular eukaryotes can resemble differentiated animal cells in their complex network of membrane-bound structures. These comparisons can be illuminated by genome-wide surveys of key gene families. We report a systematic analysis of Rabs in a complex unicellular Ciliate, including gene prediction and phylogenetic clustering, expression profiling based on public data, and Green Fluorescent Protein (GFP) tagging. Rabs are monomeric GTPases that regulate membrane traffic. Because Rabs act as compartment-specific determinants, the number of Rabs in an organism reflects intracellular complexity. The Tetrahymena Rab family is similar in size to that in humans and includes both expansions in conserved Rab clades as well as many divergent Rabs. Importantly, more than 90% of Rabs are expressed concurrently in growing cells, while only a small subset appears specialized for other conditions. By localizing most Rabs in living cells, we could assign the majority to specific compartments. These results validated most phylogenetic assignments, but also indicated that some sequence-conserved Rabs were co-opted for novel functions. Our survey uncovered a rare example of a nuclear Rab and substantiated the existence of a previously unrecognized core Rab clade in eukaryotes. Strikingly, several functionally conserved pathways or structures were found to be associated entirely with divergent Rabs. These pathways may have permitted rapid evolution of the associated Rabs or may have arisen independently in diverse lineages and then converged. Thus, characterizing entire gene families can provide insight into the evolutionary flexibility of fundamental cellular pathways

"Religion and Attitudes toward the European Union: The New Member States; A Research Note"

This research note represents a first attempt at exploring the impact of religion on attitudes toward integration in post-communist Europe. Using Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer 2: Current Affairs and the Media, September-October 1991 we develop a multivariate regression model of support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe, paying particular attention to the role of religious tradition and church attendance to the formation of attitudes. Alternative theories also tested include: ideology, cognitive mobilization, European identity, economic optimism, urban living and sex. The results show that since religious variables only emerge in multivariate analysis, religion, mainly Catholicism, matters, but not in as direct a way as it does in the West. Cognitive mobilization demonstrates the most powerful impact on attitudes toward integration. The model is also run for each country in the study demonstrating differences between Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant countries

"Norway and the European Community: On the Outside Moving In?"

After nearly two decades of silence, Norway has reopened debate over joining the EC. In 1972 the electorate rejected membership in a referendum after a divisive campaign. The wounds opened by the campaign were so deep that Norwegian elites refused to discuss publicly the possibilities for membership in the EC for over fifteen years. Three events in the late 1980s have forced Norway to reopen the debate. The passage of the Single European Act encouraged a revitalization of the EC that EFTA countries could not ignore. The EC and EFTA began negotiations to establish a European Economic Area. The second event was the fall in oil prices in 1986 that reminded Norway of its economic vulnerability. Finally, the ending of the Cold War made it possible for Sweden to apply for membership. The Swedish application has added urgency to the debate in Norway. The current debate is almost identical to the one in 1972. The supporters of membership come mainly from the urban business community. They are led by the Conservative party, a large portion of the Labor party, and the Progress party. The supporters are not well organized and the political parties do not work together. The opposition is made up of farmers, leftist intellectuals, and unions loyal to the Labor party. A large grassroots organization, Nei til EF, leads the opposition. Public opinion in Norway is split three ways between EC supporters, opponents, and the undecided. The conflict in Norway is really between two competing visions of the country. Opponents see Norway as a shining example of how an industrialized democracy should be governed. Norway would lose its distinctiveness if it joined the EC. Supporters of membership believe Norway is too small to remain isolated. It must defend its vital interests by being part of the European unification process. The outcome of this debate is still in doubt

"Domestic Responses to Integration: A Research Agenda"

This paper represents an early exploration of a relatively unexplored topic: domestic responses to integration. Specifically, this essay explores several questions concerning the response of domestic interest groups and political parties to intentional attempts to integrate the economies and political systems in Western European countries. The exploration here is part of a larger project comparing domestic responses to integration in Europe and North America. The paper finds that in Western Europe (EC plus EFTA) support for integration centers in the "power elite," an alliance of political (most mainstream parties) and business leaders. Opposition to integration comes from the "red-green-brown alliance," a coalition of socialists, farmers, environmentalists, and right-wing nationalists. Several questions remain concerning the formation of alliances and their interaction with governmental institutions, the public, and each other. Explaining the composition and behavior of these alliances is also a challenge. Supranational theories of integration do not explain the persistence of popular resistance to integration. Intergovernmental theories focus attention on domestic politics, but must be supplemented by political theories of group formation and state-society relations

Confessional Cultures and European Identity: Religion, Ideology, and Economics

Proponents of greater European political unity through the development of the European Union (EU) have long sought to foster a “European” identity among citizens as a way of advancing their cause. And there is now a substantial body of scholarship devoted to understanding the social, economic, and demographic factors contributing to the development of such an identity. Recently, there has been a growing interest in cultural influences, but the possible impact of religion has been largely ignored. Using Eurobarometer 65.2 (2006), we show that religious groups differ systematically in their propensity to take “European” identity markers. Using multivariate analysis, we demonstrate that Catholics are most likely to be cognitive “Europeans”, while Protestants and other Christians are less likely to take such perspectives. Religiosity tends to reinforce the dominant propensity of each tradition. These religious differences persist even under statistical controls for other demonstrated influences, although their effects are strongest in the old Western European “core” of the EU. The long-term decline of Catholic religiosity thus has important implications for the future of “European” identities: their growth will depend increasingly on less “diffuse” and more variable influences, such as successful economic management by EU and national governments

"Does religion matter? Christianity and public attitudes toward the European Union"

Does religion matter politically in Europe? Mac Iver (1989) raises the possibility that religious tradition (i.e., Catholic vs. Protestant) may affect attitudes toward the EC, but her data set did not have the denominational variable needed to test this hypothesis. Mac Iver's study leads us to believe that religion may be important to individual attitudes toward integration, adding power to analyses focusing on ideology, political mobilization, and demographic factors. How important is religion in this mix? Can a systematic explanation for attitudes be developed? This study addresses these questions. We begin with a discussion of how we might expect religion to affect attitudes toward integration. Next, we turn to a multivariate examination of religious factors and other variables that have been credited with influencing attitudes toward integration. Then we test these same hypotheses in individual member states. Finally, we close with some observations on the role of religion in shaping European opinion and suggest some lines for further research

Protestant Apocalyptic Narratives and the European Union

Introduction: Christianity is apocalyptic. Christians since the days following the first-century crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth have anticipated a return of Christ Jesus—as stated in the Apostles’ Creed—“to judge the living and the dead.” Various Christian traditions have interpreted the prophetic utterances of the Jewish prophets, the author of Revelation and Jesus himself in their own particular ways—often arriving and very different views of the end of history. But orthodox Christians of all sorts have generally agreed that history will come to a dramatic conclusion with Jesus Christ returning in some manner to set things right. For some conservative European and North American Protestants the “imminent return of Christ” is central to their faith. They believe that the prophetic works of the Bible contain specific predictions that point to Jesus’ physical return to earth in the very near future. For many of these believers the apocalyptic narrative in Scripture is unfolding before their eyes—and the rise of the European Union (EU) figures prominently in the takeover of the world by the forces of evil. In their view the EU is on the wrong side of the cosmic struggle between good and evil

"Religious Culture and European Integration: Theory and Hypotheses"

Theories of European integration do not adequately account for the role of culture in the shaping of the integration process. This paper develops a cultural theory of European integration drawing heavily on the works of Karl W. Deutsch, Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber and Michael Walzer. Deutsch alerts us to the need for a sense of community among integrating states. Tocqueville, Weber and Walzer suggest that 1) the keys to the present are found in the distant past, 2) religious ideas shape thought and action, 3) religion continues to shape culture long after religious zeal, or even belief fades, 4) cultures vary over time, between countries and within countries, and 5) culture is not the only variable that matters. We employ this methodology to derive propositions and testable hypotheses that help explain the religious divide in the European Union