Comprehension, Demonstration, and Accuracy in Aristotle

according to aristotle's posterior analytics, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means that they are known by "demonstration", a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called "demonstrative knowledge".1 However, not all propositions in a scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles, whose knowledge is called "comprehension".2 If the knowledge of all scientific propositions were..

Explanation and Essence in Posterior Analytics II 16-17

In Posterior Analytics II 16-17, Aristotle seems to claim that there cannot be more than one explanans of the same scientific explanandum. However, this seems to be true only for “primary-universal” demonstrations, in which the major term belongs to the minor “in itself” and the middle term is coextensive with the extremes. If so, several explananda we would like to admit as truly scientific would be out of the scope of an Aristotelian science. The secondary literature has identified a second problem in II 16-17: the middle term of a demonstration is sometimes taken as the definition of the minor term (the subject), other times as the definition (or the causal part of the definition) of the major (the demonstrable attribute). I shall argue that Aristotle’s solution to the first problem involves showing that certain problematic attributes, which appear to admit more than one explanation, actually fall into the privileged scenario of primary-universal demonstrations. In addition, his solution suggests a conciliatory way-out to our second problem (or so I shall argue): the existence of an attribute as a definable unity depends on its subject having the essence it has, which suggests that both the essence of subjects and the essence of demonstrable attributes can play explanatory roles in demonstration

Aristotle's Foundationalism

For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first principles of science could be known as such independently of their explanatory connections to demonstrable propositions. I shall argue that knowing first principles as such involves knowing them as explanatory of other scientific propositions. I shall then explain in which way noetic and demonstrative knowledge are in a sense interdependent cognitive states – even though νοῦς remains distinct from (and, in Aristotle’s words, more ‘accurate’ than) demonstrative knowledge

Experimental limits on the free parameters of higher-derivative gravity

Fourth-derivative gravity has two free parameters, $\alpha$ and $\beta$, which couple the curvature-squared terms $R^2$ and $R_{\mu\nu}^2$. Relativistic effects and short-range laboratory experiments can be used to provide upper limits to these constants. In this work we briefly review both types of experimental results in the context of higher-derivative gravity. The strictest limit follows from the second kind of test. Interestingly enough, the bound on $\beta$ due to semiclassical light deflection at the solar limb is only one order of magnitude larger.Comment: 4 pages. Contribution to the proceedings of the 14th Marcel Grossmann Meeting, Rome 12-18 July 201

On the cancellation of Newtonian singularities in higher-derivative gravity

Recently there has been a growing interest in quantum gravity theories with more than four derivatives, including both their quantum and classical aspects. In this work we extend the recent results concerning the non-singularity of the modified Newtonian potential to the most relevant case in which the propagator has complex poles. The model we consider is Einstein-Hilbert action augmented by curvature-squared higher-derivative terms which contain polynomials on the d'Alembert operator. We show that the classical potential of these theories is a real quantity and it is regular at the origin disregard the (complex or real) nature or the multiplicity of the massive poles. The expression for the potential is explicitly derived for some interesting particular cases. Finally, the issue of the mechanism behind the cancellation of the singularity is discussed; specifically we argue that the regularity of the potential can hold even if the number of massive tensor modes and scalar ones is not the same.Comment: 17 pages, 1 figure. References added, typos corrected, some parts rewritten. Accepted for publication in Phys. Lett.

Omitted Asymmetric Persistence and Conditional Heteroskedasticity

We show that asymmetric persistence induces ARCH effects, but the LM-ARCH test has power against it. On the other hand, the test for asymmetric dynamics proposed by Koenker and Xiao (2004) has correct size under the presence of ARCH errors. These results suggest that the LM-ARCH and the Koenker-Xiao tests may be used in applied research as complementary tools.

Iconic semiosis and representational efficiency in the London Underground Diagram

The icon is the type of sign connected to efficient representational features, and its manipulation reveals more information about its object. The London Underground Diagram (LUD) is an iconic artifact and a well-known example of representational efficiency, having been copied by urban transportation systems worldwide. This paper investigates the efficiency of the LUD in the light of different conceptions of iconicity. We stress that a specialized representation is an icon of the formal structure of the problem for which it has been specialized. By embedding such rules of action and behavior, the icon acts as a semiotic artifact distributing cognitive effort and participating in niche construction

Light bending in F[g(□)R]F\left[g(\square)R\right] extended gravity theories

We show that in the weak field limit the light deflection alone cannot distinguish between different $R + F[g(\square)R]$ models of gravity, where $F$ and $g$ are arbitrary functions. This does not imply, however, that in all these theories an observer will see the same deflection angle. Owed to the need to calibrate the Newton constant, the deflection angle may be model-dependent after all necessary types of measurements are taken into account.Comment: 17 pages, 1 figur