Defeating the U-Boat

In Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper 36, Jan. S. Breemer tells the story of the British response to the German submarine threat. His account of Germany\u27s \u27asymmetric\u27 challenge (to use the contemporary term) to Britain\u27s naval mastery holds important lessons for the United States today, the U.S. Navy in particular.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1035/thumbnail.jp

The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of the First World War

On the afternoon of 31 May 1916, the British grand fleet and the German High Sea Fleet met in the only massed battle fleet action of the First World War. After a series of exchanges that lasted some twelve hours, both sides, in what became known as the Battle of Jutland, broke off battle and failed to engage each other again. The German decision was prompted by the unexpected appearance of the Grand Fleet\u27s superior number of battleships; Admiral Sir John Jellicoe\u27s decision not to pursue his fleeing opponent stemmed from his fear of running into a torpedo trap. Both sides claimed victory.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1004/thumbnail.jp

The Maritime Strategy: One Ally\u27s View

Much ink has been spilled of late on the question of whether the Maritime Strategy is the U.S. Navy\u27s design for going it alone or whether it is a sincere invitation to the European Allies for a rebirth of a true coalitional naval strategy. One of the strategy\u27s early critics, Robert W. Komer, warned, in 1984, that the Europeans might interpret it as a form of U.S. global unilateralism or a form of neoisolationism. If so, he said, the effect of the Maritime Strategy on the credibility of America\u27s alliances would be devastating.

De-Committing the Sixth Fleet

The Sixth Fleet has dominated the military scene on and over Mediterranean waters for over 30 years. In spite of dramatic political, economic, and military changes in the region, the avowed purposes of the fleet\u27s presence have remained remarkably constant. They include deterring aggression against Western Europe by being prepared to launch either conventional or nuclear weapons strikes under either Nato auspices or under US aegis alone

The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Why Explanations Matter

The article of record as published may be found at https://doi.org/10.1080/0307184890844540

Anti-submarine warfare : a strategy primer

http://archive.org/details/antisubmarinewar00breeN

The maritime strategy debates: a guide to the renaissance of U.S. naval strategic in the 1980s

http://archive.org/details/maritimestrategy89019swarApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited