The Iowa Homemaker vol.6, no.2 Extra

Table of Contents An Invitation to Attend the Dedication of Home Economics Hall by Anna E. Richardson, page 1 In Our New Home at Last by Marcia E. Turner, page 2 Household Equipment by Eloise Davison, page 2 A Walk Around Campus by Vivian Jordan Brashear, page 3 Textiles and Clothing by Frances Sims, page 4 Child Care and Parent Training by Lydia Swanson, page 4 Applied Art by Joanna M. Hansen, page 5 Foods and Nutrition Department by Alma M. Riemenschneider, page 6 Institutional Management by Linda Spence Brown, page 7 Physical Education by Winifred R. Tilden, page 7 Home Economics Vocational Education by Marica E. Turner, page 8 The Department of Hygiene by Grace Magee, page 8 The Household Administration Department by Ruth M. Lindquist, page 9 Homemakers Department by Elizabeth M. Rivers, page

The politics of criminal law reform : a comparative analysis of lower court decision-making

This dissertation includes an analysis of sentencing reform in the United States federal system and England and Wales as well as an analysis of more general criminal law reform in Chile which converted its criminal process from one that was predominantly inquisitorial to one that is more adversarial in nature. By focusing on the effect of select instances of criminal law reform on lower court decision-making, the dissertation includes an analysis of whether lower courts are responsive to legislation and higher court mandates and whether the intent behind criminal law reforms was achieved or whether the reform resulted in unintended consequences. The dissertation includes empirical analyses of how lower court judges respond to limitations or expansion of their discretion imposed by the legislature and sometimes higher courts. In the U.S. federal example, case level data as well as opinions of judges from surveys conducted in 1991 and 2008 are analyzed. The analysis of sentencing reform in England and Wales relies on a content analysis of the reform, interviews with judges and sentencing officials, and statistical information on various prison populations from 1983 to 2007. In the case of Chile, the effect of reform on lower court judges is tested using data about rates of convictions, acquittals, and case processing times in lower courts. Although focused on criminal law reform, the dissertation describes the relationship between some higher law-making body (the principal) and lower courts (the agents). The principal-agent framework is used to explain why higher law-making bodies delegate to lower courts in the first place and to explain the risks involved in delegating discretion to lower court judges whose preferences may differ from the higher law-making bodies. Finally, the dissertation explores the political nature of criminal law reforms by comparing the political motivations behind reform with the actual consequences of such reform. Often political objectives, such as appearing tough on crime and reducing prison populations, are mutually exclusive. As a result, the political nature of criminal law reform prevents legislators from creating cogent or effective criminal law policy. Further, in reducing judicial discretion, a cornerstone of much of the reform analyzed here, legislators are discounting and weakening their most experienced and effective agents in the battle against crim

Fallando en Contra del Ejecutivo en los Casos de Amparo: Evidencia del Tribunal Constitucional Peruano

In this paper, we systematically analyze decisions made by the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal from 1996 to 2006 in amparo cases, which significantly impact individual rights. We ask the following question: in these types of cases, what conditions led the Tribunal to assert itself against the executive? Through an analysis of Tribunal decisions during the presidencies of Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo, we find that the Tribunal is more likely to rule against the executive, as the public’s confidence in the executive decreases and as the share of congressional seats of the president’s party declines. Further, the Tribunal is more willing to decide cases against the executive in areas that most pervade its docket, specifically in the areas of pensions and employment. These findings add to the comparative and American judicial politics literature by showing that high courts, even relatively weak ones, follow politics, but that case subject area and prevalence may temper this tendency.En este artículo presentamos un análisis sistemático de las decisiones del Tribunal Constitucional del Perú, específicamente las decisiones tomadas respecto a los casos de amparo entre 1996 y 2006. Estos casos son los de mayor relevancia para proteger los derechos individuales. Para este tipo de casos, buscamos contestar la siguiente pregunta: ¿qué determinantes políticos llevan al Tribunal Constitucional a fallar en contra del ejecutivo en este tipo de casos? Del análisis de todas las decisiones de amparo adoptadas por el Tribunal durante las presidencias de Alberto Fujimori y Alejandro Toledo, encontramos más probable que el Tribunal falle en contra del gobierno cuando la confianza del público en el ejecutivo declina y el número de legisladores del partido de gobierno en el congreso disminuye. Sin embargo, es más probable que el Tribunal decida en contra del ejecutivo en áreas o tipo de casos en los que más favorezcan sus intereses, específicamente en las áreas de pensiones y empleo. Los resultados empíricos de nuestro análisis contribuyen a la literatura sobre política judicial comparada y estadounidense al mostrar que el comportamiento de las cortes más importantes, aunque aún débiles, responden a condicionamientos políticos; aunque el tipo de caso (pensiones, empleo, propiedad pública, impuestos) y su recurrencia pueden reforzar o debilitar éste efecto

Evaluando las Teorías (Políticas) de Decisión Judicial en el Tribunal Constitucional Peruano

High courts with abstract review powers to find laws unconstitutional may provide a strong check on other political actors and influence public policy if the judges in these courts are impartial decision makers. This paper tests existing judicial decision-making theories in relation to the behavior of judges on the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal who are selected exclusively by Congress. Taking advantage of an original data set of judges’ votes on the Tribunal, we find that the origin of the law and whether the enacting governments at the national and subnational levels are still in power at the time of judicial review are important determinants of judicial behavior. Judges’ own political loyalties seem to have no perceived effect on decision making, which suggests that political affiliations are trumped by strategic concerns of judges due to the institutional design of the Tribunal as well as the political context in which it operates.La evaluación de la constitucionalidad de las leyes por parte de cortes constitucionales permite controlar el accionar que otros actores políticos tienen sobre la política pública, especialmente si los jueces en estas cortes mantienen posiciones imparciales. Este artículo evalúa el comportamiento de los jueces del Tribunal Constitucional Peruano quienes son elegidos exclusivamente por el Congreso Peruano. Aprovechando una base de datos original que reúne los votos de los jueces de este tribunal, encontramos que tanto el origen de la ley en cuestión (autoridades nacionales o sub-nacionales) como el hecho de si la ley fue promulgada por una autoridad aún en el poder son determinantes importantes del comportamiento judicial. Encontramos también que las lealtades y preferencias políticas de los jueces parecen no tener efecto en sus decisiones. Este último punto sugiere que las afiliaciones políticas de los jueces quedan relegadas por consideraciones estratégicas de los mismos debido al diseño institucional del Tribunal así como también al contexto político peruano en el cual la corte opera

Evaluating theories of decision-making on the peruvian constitutional tribunal

"High courts with abstract review powers to find laws unconstitutional may provide a strong check on other political actors and influence public policy if the judges in these courts are impartial decision makers. This paper tests existing judicial decision-making theories in relation to the behavior of judges on the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal who are selected exclusively by Congress. Taking advantage of an original data set of judges' votes on the Tribunal, we find that the origin of the law and whether the enacting governments at the national and subnational levels are still in power at the time of judicial review are important determinants of judicial behavior. Judges' own political loyalties seem to have no perceived effect on decision making, which suggests that political affiliations are trumped by strategic concerns of judges due to the institutional design of the Tribunal as well as the political context in which it operates." (author's abstract