62 research outputs found
Accounting for input in comitology committees: an uncomfortable silence
This article analyses to what extent comitology is an accountable form of governance. Past research related to this question exclusively focused on the formal arrangements between European institutions and the comitology committees, and showed that accountability is on the increase but still quite poorly developed. However, it took no notice of an equally important set of actors: the superiors of the committee participants working in national ministries. This article uses new survey and interview data collected among Dutch and Danish superiors of committee participants. It shows that superiors are generally able to sanction or reward the behaviour of their subordinates, but they do not actively process information and they do not often discuss the input of the committee participants. This article concludes that accountability for this multilevel governance setting is lost somewhere between the European and national levels
Holding the European Commission to account : The promise of delegated acts
This article focuses on a new type of rules that the European Union may adopt: delegated legislation. Although this instrument may be new, it follows from a long-standing controversy over the means by which the European Parliament can hold the European Commission to account when it adopts executive rules. On the basis of interviews and documentary evidence, this article aims to test to what degree the new system delivers on its promise of stronger accountability. Although the new system is still in its infancy, the article concludes that formal rules, internal norms and practices are already indicative of stronger legislative control. However, capacity issues within the European Parliament, as well as a lack of public transparency, may well prove to be detrimental when the number of delegated acts increases
Controlling comitology: Accountability in a multi-level system
Item does not contain fulltex
Backstage Europe: Comitology, accountability and democracy in the European Union
Item does not contain fulltextUtrecht UniversityPromotores : Bovens, M., Curtin, D.M.
Co-promotor : Meijer, A.J
Accountability in the post-Lisbon European Union [Introduction to theme issue]
Contains fulltext :
163076.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)This special issue takes stock of recent post-Lisbon additions to the European Union’s accountability toolkit. It provides indications that older decision-making tools tend to be more accountable than newer ones, and that, in some areas, decision-making is shifting towards less accountable arenas. This introductory article reviews the debate on the gradual evolution of the European Union’s accountability system and introduces key aspects of the post-Lisbon era that can be expected to affect accountability in the European Union, and that have been overlooked by the literature thus far: delegated acts, economic governance and regulatory evaluations. The contributions to this special issue address each of these domains in detail and highlight the degree to which accountability has been enhanced. A final contribution shows how these arrangements fit into the wider landscape of already-existing European Union accountabilities and how this landscape has developed over time.17 p
Comitology: over 50 years of institutional reforms and emerging practices
Item does not contain fulltex
The effect of information on oversight: the European Parliament's response to increasing information on comitology decision-making
Item does not contain fulltex
Backstage Europe : Comitology, Accountability and Democracy in the European Union
Comitology committees deal with the implementation of European policies. In total, about two-thirds of all implementation measures first passes through comitology. This makes comitology responsible for about half of all European directives, regulations and decisions. Several hundreds of these committees exist, and their competences range from juridical aspects of cableways to preventing animal diseases. They are composed of civil servants from all member states who are specialized in the topics under discussion. Expertise, thus, plays a prominent role. Who, if anyone, monitors and assesses their performance? To what extent are the current accountability regimes and practices in this area of EU governance appropriate? Past research related to this question exclusively focused at the formal arrangements between comitology and the European Parliament or the Court of Justice. It shows that accountability is on the increase, but still quite poorly developed. This thesis argues that accountability at the European level alone does not suffice for multi-level governance instruments like comitology. Rather, accountability needs to be assured at both the European and the national levels. But evidence from the national level is not available for comitology. This thesis therefore uses new data collected at the national level. The evidence has been collected by means of a survey to all Dutch and Danish committee participants and their immediate superiors, as well as by interviews with twenty-eight of them, supplemented by five observations of committee meetings in Brussels. The analysis shows that the superiors of the committee participants are quite much guided by what comes to their desks. The amount of transmitted information depends on the degree of expertise of both the policy expert and his superior, and also on the degree of autonomy that the superior leaves to the committee participant. The superiors furthermore read selectively as they have to cope with a high workload themselves. This also translates itself in the frequency of discussions: if no written feedback is given about a committee meeting, the odds that past behaviour is being discussed go down. Ill-informed superiors are thus left asleep. But sometimes, superiors do see it is time for action and it appears that mostly they are able to sanction or reward the behaviour of their subordinates. That, however, is only the final step of a process of accountability; in terms of information transfer and frequency of debates cases differ a lot more. Accountability at the national level, thus, appears supply-driven instead of demand-driven: the initiative for sending information lies with the committee participant. This is situation is problematic, especially for comitology. Because of its multi-level character, no single entity can justifiably be held responsible for its outcomes. The Commission depends on the member states and vice versa, and within the member states the national parliaments are supposed to scrutinize their respective governments
- …