Effect of mivacurium 200 and 250 μg/kg in infants during isoflurane anesthesia: a randomized controlled trial [ISRCTN07742712]

BACKGROUND: Infants usually respond differently to a neuromuscular relaxant compared to children or adults. Isoflurane is commonly used as an anesthetic gas in infants. In an RCT design, we investigated whether a dose of mivacurium 250 μg/kg results in faster onset of action than 200 μg/kg in infants under isoflurane anesthesia. Spontaneous recovery times and cardiovascular response were also evaluated. METHODS: Twenty-four low surgical risk children, aged 6–24 months, undergoing an elective surgery and requiring tracheal intubation were selected. After anesthetic induction, patients randomly received an iv bolus dose of mivacurium 200 or 250 μg/kg. After maximal relaxation, the patient was intubated. Isoflurane was administered to maintain anesthetic level during the surgical procedure. Neuromuscular function was monitored by accelerometry (TOF-Guard) at the adductor pollicies. The first twitch (T) of the TOF and the T4/T1 were measured. The time-course of heart rate and systolic and diastolic blood pressure were analysed by transforming them into their respective areas under the curve. RESULTS: Mivacurium 250 μg/kg produced a maximal T block faster than 200 μg/kg, i.e. 2.4 ± 1.1 vs. 3.5 ± 1.4 min (p < 0.05). Spontaneous recovery times were similar in both groups. Heart rate was similar between doses while systolic and diastolic blood pressures were lower with the higher dose (p < 0.05). Flushing was observed in two cases, one in each group. CONCLUSIONS: The maximal effect of mivacurium 250 μg/kg, in infants under isoflurane anesthesia, was present one minute faster than 200 μg/kg. However, it produced a significant cardiovascular response

Implicit trust in clinical decision-making by multidisciplinary teams

In clinical practice, decision-making is not performed by individual knowers but by an assemblage of people and instruments in which no one member has full access to every piece of evidence. This is due to decision making teams consisting of members with different kinds of expertise, as well as to organisational and time constraints. This raises important questions for the epistemology of medicine, which is inherently social in this kind of setting, and implies epistemic dependence on others. Trust in these contexts is a highly complex social practice, involving different forms of relationships between trust and reasons for trust: based on reasons, and not based on reasons; based on reasons that are easily accessible to reflection and others that are not. In this paper, we focus on what it means to have reasons to trust colleagues in an established clinical team, collectively supporting or carrying out every day clinical decision-making. We show two important points about these reasons, firstly, they are not sought or given in advance of a situation of epistemic dependence, but are established within these situations; secondly they are implicit in the sense of being contained or nested within other actions that are not directly about trusting another person. The processes of establishing these reasons are directly about accomplishing a task, and indirectly about trusting someone else’s expertise or competence. These processes establish a space of reasons within which what it means to have reasons for trust, or not, gains a meaning and traction in these team-work settings. Based on a qualitative study of decision-making in image assisted diagnosis and treatment of a complex disease called pulmonary hypertension (PH), we show how an intersubjective framework, or ‘space of reasons’ is established through team members forging together a common way of identifying and dealing with evidence. In dealing with images as a central diagnostic tool, this also involves a common way of looking at the images, a common mode or style of perception. These frameworks are developed through many iterations of adjusting and calibrating interpretations in relation to those of others, establishing what counts as evidence, and ranking different kinds of evidence. Implicit trust is at work throughout this process. Trusting the expertise of others in clinical decision-making teams occurs while the members of the team are busy on other tasks, most importantly, building up a framework of common modes of seeing, and common ways of identifying and assessing evidence emerge. It is only in this way that trusting or mistrusting becomes meaningful in these contexts, and that a framework for epistemic dependence is established

Implicit trust in clinical decision-making by multidisciplinary teams

In clinical practice, decision-making is not performed by individual knowers but by an assemblage of people and instruments in which no one member has full access to every piece of evidence. This is due to decision making teams consisting of members with different kinds of expertise, as well as to organisational and time constraints. This raises important questions for the epistemology of medicine, which is inherently social in this kind of setting, and implies epistemic dependence on others. Trust in these contexts is a highly complex social practice, involving different forms of relationships between trust and reasons for trust: based on reasons, and not based on reasons; based on reasons that are easily accessible to reflection and others that are not. In this paper, we focus on what it means to have reasons to trust colleagues in an established clinical team, collectively supporting or carrying out every day clinical decision-making. We show two important points about these reasons, firstly, they are not sought or given in advance of a situation of epistemic dependence, but are established within these situations; secondly they are implicit in the sense of being contained or nested within other actions that are not directly about trusting another person. The processes of establishing these reasons are directly about accomplishing a task, and indirectly about trusting someone else’s expertise or competence. These processes establish a space of reasons within which what it means to have reasons for trust, or not, gains a meaning and traction in these team-work settings. Based on a qualitative study of decision-making in image assisted diagnosis and treatment of a complex disease called pulmonary hypertension (PH), we show how an intersubjective framework, or ‘space of reasons’ is established through team members forging together a common way of identifying and dealing with evidence. In dealing with images as a central diagnostic tool, this also involves a common way of looking at the images, a common mode or style of perception. These frameworks are developed through many iterations of adjusting and calibrating interpretations in relation to those of others, establishing what counts as evidence, and ranking different kinds of evidence. Implicit trust is at work throughout this process. Trusting the expertise of others in clinical decision-making teams occurs while the members of the team are busy on other tasks, most importantly, building up a framework of common modes of seeing, and common ways of identifying and assessing evidence emerge. It is only in this way that trusting or mistrusting becomes meaningful in these contexts, and that a framework for epistemic dependence is established