Irreducible Aspects of Embodiment: Situating Scientist and Subject

Feminist philosophers of science have long discussed the importance of taking situatedness into account in scientific practices to avoid erasing important aspects of lived experience. Through the example of Gillian Einstein’s [2012] situated neuroscience, I will add support to Gallagher’s [2019] claims that intertheoretic reduction is problematic and provide reason to think pluralistic methodologies are explanatorily and ethically preferable

Gender and the senses of agency

This paper details the ways that gender structures our senses of agency on an enactive framework. While it is common to discuss how gender influences higher, narrative levels of cognition, as with the formulation of goals and in considerations about our identities, it is less clear how gender structures our more immediate, embodied processes, such as the minimal sense of agency. While enactivists often acknowledge that gender and other aspects of our socio-cultural situatedness shape our cognitive processes, there is little work on how this shaping takes place. In order to provide such an account, I will first look at the minimal and narrative senses of agency (Gallagher 2012), a distinction that draws from work on minimal and narrative selves (Zahavi 2010). Next I will explain the influence of the narrative sense of agency on the minimal sense of agency through work on intention-formation (Pacherie 2007). After a discussion of the role of gender in the narrative sense of agency, I’ll expand on work by Haslanger (2012) and Young (1980) to offer three ways in which gender influences the minimal sense of agency, showing the effect that gender has on how we perceive our possibilities for interaction in a phenomenologically immediate, pre-reflective manner

Distal engagement: Intentions in perception

Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use

Maternal Mortality in Developing Countries: The Role of the Mexico City Policy

The Mexico City Policy prohibits United States aid to foreign non-governmental organizations from spending any of their funds on abortion services, education, or referral. The United States has repeatedly enacted and repealed this policy along partisan lines, perhaps at times without regard for its possible health and economic effects. I examined the role of the Mexico City Policy on the Maternal Mortality Ratio, a marker of maternal health that, in 2000, the World Health Organization pledged to reduce. This study suggests that the Mexico City Policy may play a role in affecting the maternal mortality ratio differently across developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. This study serves as a preliminary analysis for exploration of this policy on maternal mortality.Master of Public Healt

Wound infection in gynecologic surgery.

OBJECTIVE: We sought to determine the wound infection rate among patients undergoing elective gynecologic surgery at a single tertiary care center and to determine the predictive value of various factors that contribute to infection. We further investigated the adequacy of hospital records in documenting infection rates as well as the timing of presentation of wound infections. METHODS: The records of 115 patients undergoing elective gynecologic surgery at our institution were reviewed. Patients were further subdivided based on route of surgery. We analyzed the importance of antibiotic prophylaxis, route of surgery, smoking, diabetes, and body mass index (BMI). RESULTS: The overall wound infection rate was 12.17% with no significant difference in the subgroups by route of surgery. Overall, antibiotic prophylaxis significantly decreased infection rates (P = 0.0118), but the route of surgery, BMI, smoking, and diabetes were not significant predictors of infection. Only one case of infection was detected during the initial hospital stay (6.1%). Fifty percent of the patients with infection required readmission, and of these 35.7% required an additional surgical procedure. The average length of hospital stay was 2.4 days longer in patients with infection. CONCLUSIONS: Antibiotic prophylaxis has a role in the management of patients undergoing abdominal gynecologic surgery. In today's environment of cost containment, an increased hospital stay and the added likelihood of additional surgical intervention associated with wound infection are important targets for prevention. Most patients with wound infection were diagnosed after discharge from the hospital. In our population, among whom transportation problems and remote residence are prevalent, strategies for infection surveillance should be integral to discharge planning

Narrative practices in medicine and therapy: Philosophical reflections

This article examines two important movements-narrative medicine and narrative therapy-that aim to put narrative practices at the heart of medicine and therapeutic practices. It exposes the core assumptions of these movements and identifies ways in which attention to those assumptions can benefit from philosophical clarification and further investigation. Overall, our analysis defends the view that being a competent narrator matters for understanding and building trust with others, and that it also matters for shaping ourselves because the narratives we weave can help us to see live options and improve our chances of flourishing and living well

Minimal Model Explanations of Cognition

Active materials are self-propelled non-living entities which, in some circumstances, exhibit a number of cognitively interesting behaviors such as gradient-following, avoiding obstacles, signaling and group coordination. This has led to scientific and philosophical discussion of whether this may make them useful as minimal models of cognition (Hanczyc 2014, McGivern 2019). Batterman and Rice (2014) have argued that what makes a minimal model explanatory is that the model is ultimately in the same universality class as the target system, which underpins why it exhibits the same macrobehavior. We appeal to recent research in basal cognition (Lyon et al. 2021) to establish appropriate target systems and essential features of cognition as a target of modeling. Looking at self-propelled oil droplets, a type of active material, we do not find that organization alone indicates that these systems exhibit the essential features of cognition. We then examine the specific behaviors of oil droplets but also fail to find that these demonstrate the essential features of cognition. Without a universality class, Batterman & Rice’s account of the explanatory power of minimal models simply does not apply to cognition. However, we also want to stress that it is not intended to; cognition is not the same type of behavioral phenomena as those found in physics. We then look to the minimal cognition methodology of Beer (1996, 2020) to show how active materials can be explanatorily valuable regardless of their cognitive status because they engage in specific behaviors that have traditionally been expected to involve internal representational dynamics, revealing misconceptions about the cognitive underpinnings of certain, specific behaviors in target systems where such behaviors are cognitive. Further, Beer’s models can also be genuinely explanatory by providing dynamical explanations

Putting down the revolt: Enactivism as a philosophy of nature

Enactivists frequently argue their account heralds a revolution in cognitive science: enactivism will unseat cognitivism as the dominant paradigm. We examine the lines of reasoning enactivists employ in stirring revolt, but show that none of these prove compelling reasons for cognitivism to be replaced by enactivism. First, we examine the hard sell of enactivism: enactivism reveals a critical explanatory gap at the heart of cognitivism. Drawing on Steiner (2019), we show that enactivism does not meet the requirements to incite a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense - there is no internal crisis in cognitivism. Nor does it provide inherently better explanations of cognition as some have claimed. Second, we consider the soft sell of enactivism: enactivism provides a more attractive, parsimonious, or clear-eyed lens on cognition. This move proves to boil down to a misunderstanding of how theories are selected in science. Instead we lend support to a broader and more desirable way to conceive of enactivism - Gallagher’s (2017) proposal that enactivism is a philosophy of nature. We explain how a philosophy of nature does more than support a single research paradigm by integrating scientific questions into a cohesive picture