Reconstructed grounded theory: beyond comparison?

This paper examines the modifications made to constructed grounded theory for application within an ethnographic study of group work processes in a virtual learning environment. The paper details how the complex professional relationship of educational practitioner research, and the associated ethical issues, together with the variety of data analysed influenced the approach taken. The paper explores how the adaptations to constructed grounded theory process were applied and how this approach can be construed as grounded in grounded theory. The paper is explicit about the application and adaptation of grounded theory to meet the needs of the research and the epistemology of the researcher. Many studies purporting to use grounded theory are less explicit, this paper is intended to contribute to the discussion and development of a flexible approach to grounded theory, fit for purpose within the restraints of a practitioner based virtual educational ethnographic study. The relationship of the practitioner researcher (an Associate Lecturer) and the participants (the students) created a dichotomy between the neutrality and social distance of the researcher and the ethical implications for the Associate Lecturer. Whilst the participants were not vulnerable adults, many of the participants were novice learners returning to study and therefore a duty of care was required. The paper explains how the adaptation of constructed grounded theory enhanced the analysis and provided richer data than ethnographic observation alone. Despite the divergence from constructed grounded theory methods, rigor was achieved through the comparison of the coding produced throughout the analysis of the data. This level of rigor led to the emergence of unanticipated themes which influenced the group work processes. It is my belief that these would not have appeared through generic inductive approaches as they would have been overlooked and ignored without the line by line analysis. The modification of the grounded theory process retained the influence of constructed grounded theory rather than claiming to be rooted in constructed grounded theory. But the techniques applied are not beyond comparison with grounded theory. The research into virtual group work is timely in light of recent UK Government reports and relevant as interest in network delivered learning continues to grow

Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate

The U.S. Constitution is old, relatively brief, and very difficult to amend. In its original form, the Constitution was primarily a framework for a new national government, and for 230 years the national government has operated under that framework even as conditions have changed in ways beyond the Founders’ conceivable imaginations. The framework has survived in no small part because government institutions have themselves played an important role in helping to fill in and clarify the framework through their practices and interactions, informed by the realities of governance. Courts, the political branches, and academic commentators commonly give weight to such post-Founding governmental practice in discerning the Constitution’s separation of powers. That approach has been referred to as the “historical gloss” method of constitutional interpretation, based on language that Justice Frankfurter used to describe the concept in his concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case. Some originalist commentators, however, have advanced a potentially competing approach to crediting post-Founding practice, which they refer to as “liquidation,” an idea that they ascribe to James Madison and certain other members of the Founding generation. To date, there has not been any systematic effort to compare gloss and liquidation, even though the differences between them bear on the constitutionality of a range of governmental practices relating to both domestic and foreign affairs in the fields of constitutional law and federal courts. This Article fills that gap in the literature. We first provide an account of what must be shown in order to establish historical gloss. Our account focuses on longstanding governmental practices that have proven to be stable—that is, practices that have operated for a significant amount of time without generating continued inter-branch contestation. We then consider the extent to which the liquidation concept differs from that of gloss and whether those differences render liquidation more or less normatively attractive than gloss. We argue that a narrow account of liquidation, offered by Professor Caleb Nelson, most clearly distinguishes liquidation from gloss, but that it does so in ways that are normatively problematic. We further argue that a broader account of liquidation, recently offered by Professor William Baude, responds to those normative concerns by diminishing the distinction between liquidation and gloss, but that significant differences remain that continue to raise normative problems for liquidation. Finally, we question whether either scholar’s account of liquidation is properly attributed to Madison

Bright bichromatic entanglement and quantum dynamics of sum frequency generation

We investigate the quantum properties of the well-known process of sum frequency generation, showing that it is potentially a very useful source of non-classical states of the electromagnetic field, some of which are not possible with the more common techniques. We show that it can produce quadrature squeezed light, bright bichromatic entangled states and symmetric and asymmetric demonstrations of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. We also show that the semiclassical equations totally fail to describe the mean-field dynamics when the cavity is strongly pumped

Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate

The U.S. Constitution is old, relatively brief, and very difficult to amend. In its original form, the Constitution was primarily a framework for a new national government, and for 230 years the national government has operated under that framework even as conditions have changed in ways beyond the Founders’ conceivable imaginations. The framework has survived in no small part because government institutions have themselves played an important role in helping to fill in and clarify the framework through their practices and interactions, informed by the realities of governance. Courts, the political branches, and academic commentators commonly give weight to such post-Founding governmental practice in discerning the Constitution’s separation of powers. That approach has been referred to as the “historical gloss” method of constitutional interpretation, based on language that Justice Frankfurter used to describe the concept in his concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case. Some originalist commentators, however, have advanced a potentially competing approach to crediting post-Founding practice, which they refer to as “liquidation,” an idea that they ascribe to James Madison and certain other members of the Founding generation. To date, there has not been any systematic effort to compare gloss and liquidation, even though the differences between them bear on the constitutionality of a range of governmental practices relating to both domestic and foreign affairs in the fields of constitutional law and federal courts. This Article fills that gap in the literature. We first provide an account of what must be shown in order to establish historical gloss. Our account focuses on longstanding governmental practices that have proven to be stable—that is, practices that have operated for a significant amount of time without generating continued inter-branch contestation. We then consider the extent to which the liquidation concept differs from that of gloss and whether those differences render liquidation more or less normatively attractive than gloss. We argue that a narrow account of liquidation, offered by Professor Caleb Nelson, most clearly distinguishes liquidation from gloss, but that it does so in ways that are normatively problematic. We further argue that a broader account of liquidation, recently offered by Professor William Baude, responds to those normative concerns by diminishing the distinction between liquidation and gloss, but that significant differences remain that continue to raise normative problems for liquidation. Finally, we question whether either scholar’s account of liquidation is properly attributed to Madison

Quantum ultra-cold atomtronics

It is known that a semi-classical analysis is not always adequate for atomtronics devices, but that a fully quantum analysis is often necessary to make reliable predictions. While small numbers of atoms at a small number of sites are tractable using the density matrix, a fully quantum analysis is often not straightforward as the system becomes larger. We show that the fully quantum positive-P representation is then a viable calculational tool. We postulate an atomtronic phase-gate consisting of four wells in a Bose-Hubbard configuration, for which the semi-classical dynamics are controllable using the phase of the atomic mode in one of the wells. We show that the quantum predictions of the positive-P representation for the performance of this device have little relation to those found semi-classically, and that the performance depends markedly on the actual quantum states of the initially occupied modes. We find that initial coherent states lead to closest to classical dynamics, but that initial Fock states give results that are quite different. A fully quantum analysis also opens the door for deeply quantum atomtronics, in which properties such as entanglement and EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) steering become valuable technical properties of a device.Comment: 12 pages, 6 figures, submitted to Phys. Rev

After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause in NLRB v. Noel Canning stands as one of the Supreme Court’s most significant endorsements of the relevance of “historical gloss” to the interpretation of the separation of powers. This Article uses the decision as a vehicle for examining the relationship between interpretive methodology and historical practice, and between historical practice and textual ambiguity. As the Article explains, Noel Canning exemplifies how the constitutional text, perceptions about clarity or ambiguity, and “extra-textual” considerations such as historical practice operate interactively rather than as separate elements of interpretation. The decision also provides a useful entry point into critically analyzing the concept of constitutional “liquidation,” which the majority in Noel Canning seemed to conflate with historical gloss but which seems more consistent with the approach to historical practice reflected in Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment. Finally, this Article argues that the historical gloss approach, when applied cautiously and with sensitivity to the potential concerns raised by Justice Scalia and others, is not vulnerable to the charge of licensing executive aggrandizement by “adverse possession.

Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text

In recent years, constitutional theorists have attended to the unwritten aspects of American constitutionalism and, relatedly, to the ways in which the constitutional text can be “constructed” upon by various materials. This Article takes a different approach. Instead of considering how various materials can supplement or implement the constitutional text, it focuses on how the text itself is often partially constructed in American constitutional practice. Although interpreters typically regard clear text as controlling, this Article contends that whether the text is perceived to be clear is often affected by various “modalities” of constitutional interpretation that are normally thought to come into play only after the text is found to be vague or ambiguous: the purpose of a constitutional provision, structural inferences, understandings of the national ethos, consequentialist considerations, customary practice, and judicial and nonjudicial precedent. The constraining effect of clear text, in other words, is partially constructed by considerations that are commonly regarded as extratextual. This phenomenon of constructed constraint unsettles certain distinctions drawn by modern theorists: between interpretation and construction, between the written and the unwritten constitutions, and between the Constitution and the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” Although primarily descriptive, this Article also suggests that constructed constraint produces benefits for the constitutional system by helping interpreters negotiate tensions within democratic constitutionalism

Historical Gloss, Constitutional Convention, and the Judicial Separation of Powers

Scholars have increasingly focused on the relevance of post-Founding historical practice to discern the separation of powers between Congress and the executive branch, and the Supreme Court has recently endorsed the relevance of such practice. Much less attention has been paid, however, to the relevance of historical practice to discerning the separation of powers between the political branches and the federal judiciary — what this Article calls the “judicial separation of powers.” As the Article explains, there are two ways that historical practice might be relevant to the judicial separation of powers. First, such practice might be invoked as an appeal to “historical gloss”— a claim that the practice informs the content of constitutional law. Second, historical practice might be invoked to support what Commonwealth theorists have termed “constitutional conventions.” To illustrate how both gloss and conventions enrich our understanding of the judicial separation of powers, the Article considers the authority of Congress to “pack” the Supreme Court, and the authority of Congress to “strip” the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. This Article shows that, although the defeat of Franklin Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan in 1937 has been studied almost exclusively from a political perspective, many criticisms of the plan involved claims about historical gloss; other criticisms involved appeals to non-legal but obligatory constitutional conventions; and still others blurred the line between those two categories or shifted back and forth between them. Strikingly similar themes emerge in debates in Congress in 1957-58, and within the Justice Department in the early 1980s, over the authority of Congress to prevent the Court from deciding constitutional issues by restricting its appellate jurisdiction. The Article also shows, based on internal executive branch documents that have not previously been discovered or discussed in the literature, how Chief Justice John Roberts, while working in the Justice Department and debating Office of Legal Counsel head Theodore Olson, failed to persuade Attorney General William French Smith that Congress has broad authority to strip the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Article then reflects on the implications of gloss and conventions for the judicial separation of powers more generally